Congress, NASA

House appropriations hearings schedule

House appropriations hearings schedule

The hearings on the FY08 NASA budget by the Commerce, Justice, and Science subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee will actually be spread over two days, according to the schedule on the subcommittee web site:

03/13/07
Commerce, Justice, Science Subcommittee
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
10:00 AM – General Overview 2362 A Rayburn House Office Building
2:00 PM – Science and Aeronautics
2362 B Rayburn House Office Building
Michael D. Griffin, Administrator

03/14/07
Commerce, Justice, Science Subcommittee
NASA Exploration and Space Operations
10:00 AM & 2:00 PM 2362 A Rayburn House Office Building
Michael D. Griffin, Administrator

None of the hearings, unfortunately, will be webcast by the committee, nor apparently will they be on NASA TV.

32 comments to House appropriations hearings schedule

  • Stephen Metschan

    The two questions I wish someone had the courage to ask Mike Griffin.

    “If you had to choose between closing the Gap by four years or the Ares I which would you choose?”

    “If you had to choose between having a Jupiter-1 online in 7 years or an Ares V on line in 20 years what would you choose?”

    http://www.thespacereview.com/article/814/1

    http://www.thespaceshow.com/detail.asp?q=677

  • John Malkin

    Has any engineer, reporter or activist approached a congressman with these concerns to be included in a hearing? Has it been ignored? I don’t think congressmen have enough technical understanding to make these judgments and therefore question Griffin’s decisions. I understand that committee members should have a deeper understanding of the committee subject they but still I don’t think they have enough. Sometime listening to the hearings, I wonder if they lack knowledge about a subject or they are playing dumb for political reasons.

  • anonymous

    This phrase from page 4 of Griffin’s testimony really galls me:

    “previously underestimated costs to fly the Space Shuttle to 2010″

    Those costs were not underestimated. Griffin changed the assumptions on which the costs were based.

    Before Griffin & Co., O’Keefe & Co. assumed a very reasonable drawdown in the Shuttle workforce as orbiters were retired and other Shuttle functions were taken offline or terminated. It was especially important to draw down the workforce if the follow-on vehicles were going to be operated for a fraction of Shuttle’s costs and open up a serious budget wedge for lunar exploration.

    Griffin, however, doesn’t want to fire anyone on his watch and is thus retaining the entire Shuttle workforce through and after the last flight, handing a massive budget and workforce problem to his successor. To hear Griffin complain now about the costs of a Shuttle workforce he decided to wastefully retain at high cost to the taxpayer is extremely hypocritical.

    I also have to say that the entire tone and argument of the testimony is off. There’s no underlying rationale or justification for human space exploration other than its something that America has done in the past and should do in the future. And aside from the “gap”, there’s no attempt to lay out any concrete goals or benefits that an appropriator could weigh a pricetag against. It’s all fluffy flags, eagles, and apple pie. Griffin already has a very high wall to climb to get his 6% budget increase in 2008, but this testimony does not help appreciably. It may even hurt with the more skeptical appropriators and leave NASA more open to attack.

    I wish the appropriations hearings were be played. It would be very interesting to see how receptive the appropriators are to Griffin’s testimony. I imagine they will be relatively cool, especially in comparison to the authorizers.

  • Stephen Metschan

    John, you’re correct,

    but the KSC reps. do understand the language of 75% Lay-offs waiting for the Ares V to show up in 2025. The JSC reps. understand the language of astronauts, trainers, and mission control twiddling their thumbs or being Laid-off until the Ares I shows up in 2017. The MSFC reps. understand the language of reducing the capability of their STS launch system for Ares I rather than building upon now for Jupiter-1. LaRC, GSC and JPL reps. understand the language of less money for science and aeronautics because of the inefficiencies in ESAS. Even ATK reps. understand that selling more SRB’s sooner and over the long term is better.

    All the above brought to you by the Stick and solvable by a nomial four crew Orion, ELV’s and the Jupiter-1.

  • al Fansome

    ANONYMOUS: I also have to say that the entire tone and argument of the testimony is off.

    Anon,

    I agree that Griffin’s JFK argument is weak (it is also kind of funny how suddenly JFK is now in, because the Dems took over). It is a very risky play on Griffin’s part card to make no other “substantive” argument.

    His argument assumes that Members are ignorant of history. All they need to do is remember that JFK’s ONLY “strategic” motiviation was “to win the Cold War with the Soviet Union”. JFK made it very clear he did not care about other arguments for NASA funding. We have it on tape.

    The present day equivalent of “winning the Cold War” is “winning the War on Terror”. Griffin’s architecture does nothing to help with current national strategic priorities.

    There are other clear “national strategic” priorities that Griffin could tie NASA’s future to.

    EXAMPLE: the DoD cares about ORS. Members of Congress from both sides of aisle are increasingly supportive of ORS — now saying ORS is a high national security priority (see the recent thread on Rep. Harman and Sen. Kyl — Griffin could HANG HIS HAT on the ORS argument.

    Too bad he is so fixated on his huge booster, which nobody else plans to use. If he was not so emotionally attached, it is clear as day (to me) that an architecture that uses a LEO Prop Depot would substantially increase the demand for new responsive (and potentially reusable) launch vehicles. This approach could be tied directly to the national security priority of “Operationally Responsive Spacelift” (ORS).

    On top of this, the operational capability of storing and transferring propellant in orbit could be strategically critical to other national assets. Imagine what a refuelable KH-11 or KH-12 could do? It could run away from that Chinese ASAT missile that was chasing them, and then refuel.

    Imagine Griffin making a substantive and defendable argument about how an investment in NASA would have a measurable increase in national security.

    Imagine Griffin using the recent Chinese ASAT test as part of his argument for funding NASA.

    I think NASA would generate a LOT of traction with this strategic approach. Instead of giving fuzzy speeches about JFK, he could tie his funding argument to major problems of our time. He could then talk about the “economic” benefits that this new space industry would bring to our country, and (only) then talk about the human exploration benefits of this approach too. He could quote JFK to his heart’s desire … like the cherry on top of the chocolate sunday. He could have it all.

    But this is just “could a, would a, should a” complaint. As you have said, “a more perfect administrator” would be willing to acknowledge the problems with the current strategy and adjust.

    – Al

  • Al, I like your proposal for a political way forward.

    — Donald

  • Anonymous8

    “Has any engineer, reporter or activist approached a congressman with these concerns to be included in a hearing? Has it been ignored? I don’t think congressmen have enough technical understanding to make these judgments and therefore question Griffin’s decisions. I understand that committee members should have a deeper understanding of the committee subject they but still I don’t think they have enough. Sometime listening to the hearings, I wonder if they lack knowledge about a subject or they are playing dumb for political reasons.”

    Congressmen have staffs to understand and interpret the technical stuff for them.

    But you raise a really good question that I would turn back on you: the blogosphere is filled with perhaps a couple of dozen people who are absolutely convinced that they are right and NASA is wrong about the lunar architecture. They have already written off the Ares I as a stupid mistake. But is there any evidence that they have managed to have any influence at all beyond the blogosphere? If the situation is as completely obvious as they claim, then how come nobody seems to be listening to them?

    I have seen no committee hearings on this. No articles in trade publications. It does not seem to have gotten anywhere besides the blogosphere. In summary, the people who hold this opinion seem to have no influence at all.

    Further questions: who are these people? What are their credentials? Where are their economic models or trade studies to justify their opinions? Why _should_ anybody in Congress or elsewhere take them seriously?

  • Anonymous8

    “Before Griffin & Co., O’Keefe & Co. assumed a very reasonable drawdown in the Shuttle workforce as orbiters were retired and other Shuttle functions were taken offline or terminated. It was especially important to draw down the workforce if the follow-on vehicles were going to be operated for a fraction of Shuttle’s costs and open up a serious budget wedge for lunar exploration.”

    This is completely false.

    It was pretty clear from the day that O’Keefe unveiled his fictional “sand chart” in February 2004 that the shuttle drawdown represented a fictional savings. As Griffin has stated on several occasions, NASA has been operating the shuttle for many years now and knows fairly well what it costs to operate. It is clear that the shuttle costs around $4.5 billion a year regardless of flight rate. That last part is especially important, because it means that marginal costs, which should be the first things that you save when you shut down the program (such as not buying more ETs or SRBs) have very little effect on the annual cost.

    As a result, O’Keefe showed a savings on shuttle that people who worked on the program knew could not be achieved–shuttle costs about $4.5 billion a year if you fly six of them or if you fly one of them, and it only starts costing _less_ than that when you shut the program off. That expensive standing army is necessary to keep the orbiters flying right up to cancellation.

    You accuse him of lying (provide evidence, please), but Griffin made it clear when he soon entered office that he discovered that the savings were illusionary and he was pretty mad about that. He has made no secret of the fact that he dislikes shuttle and wants to build the replacement as soon as possible. If he could take shuttle money and divert it to Constellation he would. He’s been blunt about that.

  • anonymous

    “It is clear that the shuttle costs around $4.5 billion a year regardless of flight rate. That last part is especially important, because it means that marginal costs, which should be the first things that you save when you shut down the program (such as not buying more ETs or SRBs) have very little effect on the annual cost.”

    You confuse marginal savings from lowering the flight rate (a lower rate of consumption and activity) with shutdown savings from ending contracts, turning off functions, and reducing the workforce. These are two very different things. Under the former, NASA is maintaining capabilities and still has to pay the high fixed costs of those capabilities. Under the latter, NASA is terminating capabilities and both the marginal _and_ fixed costs associated with those capabilities can go away. The only reason the fixed costs are not going away as Shuttle nears retirement is because Griffin doesn’t want to be responsible for any RIFs or other workforce dislocations during his tenure.

    “That expensive standing army is necessary to keep the orbiters flying right up to cancellation.”

    I hate to be the one to tell you, but the program has been “cancelled”.

    “He has made no secret of the fact that he dislikes shuttle and wants to build the replacement as soon as possible. If he could take shuttle money and divert it to Constellation he would. He’s been blunt about that.”

    Griffin doesn’t want to be responsible for any firings on his watch even more than that. From day one, he’s been very clear that he’s going to keep the entire NASA workforce employed, come hell, high costs, or lack of programmatic logic. It’s unclear to me if that’s driven by some mistaken sentiment based on his personal experience during the Apollo/Shuttle gap, or if it’s a promise he made to Senators Hutchison, Nelson, or other legislators as part of the price of his confirmation. Regardless, it’s very poor management of both the taxpayer dollar and NASA’s limited resources.

    “You accuse him of lying”

    I did not accuse him of lying. I accused him (or his speechwriter) of being hypocritical — of whining about a problem that he’s created. They are two different things.

    “provide evidence, please”

    Read this week’s Space News article about the third anniversary of the VSE. In it, there are quotes from Gerst to the effect that the Shuttle shutdown process is practically irreversible at this point — i.e., they have turned off enough contracts and terminated enough functions that the program can’t turn back. So if they have turned off critical Shuttle contracts and terminated critical Shuttle functions, where are the savings? Why isn’t the Shuttle budget getting lower, just as the budget for any other government or private sector program gets lower as it winds down? Answer: Griffin is shifting the responsibility for making the workforce cuts necessary to realize these Shuttle savings onto his successor. Read any of Griffin’s testimony to Congress on the NASA HQ. webpage (even the last speech to the authorizers), and full NASA employment rates very high in the list of accomplishments. He’s spending dollars needlessly to keep an entire workforce together, when that workforce should be getting smaller as Shuttle’s program and technical content shrinks. We don’t have to be a budgetary whizzes or program management experts to figure this stuff out.

    And going back to my original criticism, as much as I respect the NASA workforce, it’s a wasteful use of taxpayer dollars and limited NASA resources to maintain an unnecessarily bloated Shuttle workforce, especially when NASA needs to use those resources to get some actual human exploration hardware underway before the next White House takes office and the political window for the VSE closes forever. It’s either limp-wristed management or closed door political dealmaking at its worst. And for the guy who caused the problem to complain about it in testimony to Congress (although it was probably his speechwriter who wrote it) is the height of hypocrisy.

    Don’t get me wrong — there’s a lot that I do like about Griffin technically. But his lack of political acumen and inability to make hard management (not technical) decisions are not among them.

  • anonymous

    “the blogosphere is filled with perhaps a couple of dozen people who are absolutely convinced that they are right and NASA is wrong about the lunar architecture.”

    There is no united internet opinion regarding ESAS and Ares 1. On some sites (nasaspaceflight.com, for example), the supporters probably outnumber the detractors. And even amongst the detractors, there are probably more opinions about what NASA should do instead of ESAS and Ares 1 than there are detractors.

    “They have already written off the Ares I as a stupid mistake.”

    From an exploration and political perspective, I would argue that those who do write off Ares 1 are probably right, given that it is consuming the limited window of political opportunity for getting any actual lunar exploration hardware underway before the next White House takes office. From an ISS and U.S. human space flight perspective, I would also argue that they are right, since Ares 1 cannot be fielded in a reasonable timeframe within the resources Congress is now appropriating for exploration. And from a technical perspective, I would also argue that they are right, as the Ares 1/Orion system has so little performance margin at such an early stage of development that it is almost guaranteed to encounter major technical problems down the road.

    “But is there any evidence that they have managed to have any influence at all beyond the blogosphere?”

    Beyond maybe convincing one guy to write a sharply worded letter to the editor of the Washington Post and a Space News article that Griffin and Horowitz were forced to partly respond to, no, not really. That doesn’t mean that folks are not entitled to express dissenting opinions in this country.

    And if the various dissenting opinions on the internet are not having any influence, why do you care so much? What are you so worried about?

    “If the situation is as completely obvious as they claim, then how come nobody seems to be listening to them?”

    Probably mostly because no one is aware of the conversations and discussions that are going on. Most political staffers, NASA managers, and industry managers have day jobs (obviously) and families. Rare are the few that have the time or inclination to troll the internet on the subject they just spent eight work hours debating or developing. And those few that do and that are in positions of power are already heavily invested in Ares 1 in terms of ego, time, jobs, and political promises. Even if they agree with a dissenting opinion, they are not in a position to embrace it and take it forward.

    “No articles in trade publications.”

    Well, actually, the TeamVision proposal, the LockMart Atlas V proposal, and probably other counter-ESAS proposals that I’m not aware of have appeared as AIAA papers.

    “Further questions: who are these people? What are their credentials?”

    Some of us are former or current staffers for Congress or prior Administrations, former or current NASA managers, or former or current military or industry aerospace managers. Many others are variously NASA/military/industry technical staff, scientists, students, and/or enthusiasts. Some have tons of experience to share; others only creative ideas. As long as we treat each other with respect on these various forums, none of it bears on our right to express our opinions.

    I also have to say, it’s pretty hypocritical to call other people’s backgrounds and credentials into question from behind an anonymous moniker. Everyone should try to refrain from ad hominem attacks, but if you insist, please at least have the courage to identify yourself.

    [quote]
    Where are their economic models or trade studies to justify their opinions?
    [/quote]

    See the AIAA papers I mentioned above. Read the Direct proposal threads at nasaspaceflight.com. Visit selenianboondocks.com. And please read ESAS report as well.

    Do your homework before you go slinging mud at other folks’ hard work.

    “Why _should_ anybody in Congress or elsewhere take them seriously?”

    No one has to take anyone seriously. As I have often argued here, no opinions expressed on these threads are likely to change what happens over the next two years because Griffin is just too heavily invested in ESAS and Ares 1. Barring Griffin’s removal or an early technical meltdown on Ares 1, things will continue to plod along at an increasingly slower pace as NASA’s budget expectations are not met by Congress and NASA’s senior management refuses to change course given changing realities. That said, I still enjoy the debate and like to argue for a more perfect world.

    But setting that aside, I would still argue that some folks in power need to perform a serious and independent relook at ESAS, correcting its technical errors with regards to EELV blackout windows and engine performance, revisiting its more questionable safety assumptions and comparisons, adding much needed requirements sensitivity analysis on things like crew size, and taking better criteria into account and better balancing the existing criteria. This groundwork and generation of alternatives is much needed to prepare NASA for what is likely to happen after the next election when the new White House brings the whole VSE and lunar return effort into question and says “Now what?”

  • Stephen Metschan

    In July of 2004 Mike was not the NASA administrator. He saw the political flaws in Sean O’Keefe’s plan and wrote a little noticed paper until he became the NASA administrator. Due to budget cuts Mike’s plan now has those same flaws. The politicians will ultimately decide all of this either way. If someone shows them a more efficient way of protecting the jobs in their districts than that approach will supersede ESAS just like ESAS supersede the Tech spirals and all ELV approach.

  • Anonymous8,
    I have seen no committee hearings on this. No articles in trade publications. It does not seem to have gotten anywhere besides the blogosphere. In summary, the people who hold this opinion seem to have no influence at all.

    Does lack of current influence make an idea incorrect? And a lack of trade publications? Where have you been? There were the CE&R studies, numerous papers by Lockheed, Boeing, TeamVision, and other groups outlining better approaches that are being ignored.

    I’ll admit that I myself haven’t done too much in the political sphere on this topic beyond blogging. But that’s basically based on a semi-cowardly cost-benefit analysis on my part. I see the odds at this point of changing Griffin’s mind as just about zero, and the costs of trying to do that very, very high, and almost no personal upside in the deal (I don’t work for any of the companies that would most directly benefit if NASA changed course, don’t own any stock from those companies, and haven’t been given money by them either). If I truly felt that there was a chance that I could convince someone to take a better course, and if I actually had sufficient benefit to justify the massive amount of personal time it would take to do so, I might be doing more than just blogging.

    Further questions: who are these people? What are their credentials?

    Once again, do credentials make an argument any more or less valid? But for your edification, and in spite of the fact that you’re providing no credentials of your own, I’m a rocket propulsion engineer for a suborbital VTVL company. I’ve been studying lunar architectures since I was 18.

    But once again, if I had a PhD, or had worked for NASA for 20 years, would that somehow make my arguments any more valid?

    Where are their economic models or trade studies to justify their opinions? Why _should_ anybody in Congress or elsewhere take them seriously?

    Well, the analyses I’ve done are there for the world to see on my blog. Feel free to use the archives. I doubt I could provide sufficient proof to change anyone’s mind, but that still doesn’t make my position wrong.

    But it seems a little backwards that the guy who only wants to see NASA actually obey the law, use taxpayer money wisely, and actually fulfill its charter by helping catalyze the development of space should be defending his credentials against someone who is advocating that NASA spend billions of dollars reliving its glory years.

    ~Jon

  • anonymous

    “In July of 2004 Mike was not the NASA administrator. He saw the political flaws in Sean O’Keefe’s plan”

    I don’t think O’Keefe’s plan was politically flawed as long as O’Keefe, or someone with equally powerful political connections and federal budget chops, sat in the Administrator’s seat.

    Griffin lacks anything close to O’Keefe’s political and budgetary power and probably did need a different strategy going forward. Unfortunately, Griffin fell back on an out-of-date and irrelevant Apollo playbook that has proven to be as unsustainable as Apollo was (actually more so given the different political and budgetary environment).

    “and wrote a little noticed paper until he became the NASA administrator.”

    If you’re referring to the Planetary Society paper, beyond adding up the cost numbers and recommending that NASA get off Shuttle ASAP, there’s no political or budgetary strategy in it. And actually, that paper was consistent with O’Keefe’s approach in more details than just getting off Shuttle. Specifically, it recommended a CEV and was wide open regarding LVs for that CEV (EELV, foreign, and Shuttle-derived — see p. 19-23 of the report), of which O’Keefe’s approach represented only a subset (CEV on EELV).

    In fact, that paper recommended that the CEV be designed to fly on as many existing LVs as possible — even foreign LVs — for reasons of cost competition and backup in the event that one LV is offline for an extended period of time. Of course, Griffin has contradicted the Planetary Society study by dictating a needlessly large CEV (Orion) that narrows the available LVs capable of launching it; squashing studies looking at EELVs for CEV; and disallowing foreign participation in the lunar transportation architecture.

    Heaven help NASA if Ares 1 gets interminably delayed or doesn’t work…

  • But you raise a really good question that I would turn back on you: the blogosphere is filled with perhaps a couple of dozen people who are absolutely convinced that they are right and NASA is wrong about the lunar architecture.

    I would be one of those people. I think NASA should use a lunar architecture based around the use of the Earth-Moon L2 point for rendezvous of the lunar lander and crew vehicle. I’ve written the argument up on NASASpaceflight.com.

    No articles in trade publications.

    Actually, the argument is based on work done by Robert Farquhar and T. Edelbaum, eminent astrodynamicists who have published widely. I didn’t come up with the idea.

    It does not seem to have gotten anywhere besides the blogosphere. In summary, the people who hold this opinion seem to have no influence at all.

    I can’t help that. Doesn’t change the value of the idea though.

    Further questions: who are these people? What are their credentials?

    My credentials are immaterial. Those of Dr. Farquhar and the late Dr. Edelbaum are well known. What matters is whether the analysis is correct. To facilitate the understanding of this concept, I applied the relevant equations (circular restricted three-body equations) in a simulation that lets users see the results themselves.

    This is physics. You can run the sims, look at the results, and conclude for yourself.

    Now what really matters, whether the opinion is widely held, or whether it is correct? This is “Space Politics” so you tell me.

  • Anonymous: there are probably more opinions about what NASA should do instead of ESAS and Ares 1 than there are detractors . . . no opinions expressed on these threads are likely to change what happens over the next two years because Griffin is just too heavily invested in ESAS and Ares 1

    Which is why I still believe we should stop complaining about things we cannot change, and start constructively working out what to do with the Ares-1 / Orion going forward two (or more likely three) years from now when these decisions are revisited.

  • anonymous

    “Which is why I still believe we should stop complaining about things we cannot change, and start constructively working out what to do with the Ares-1 / Orion going forward two (or more likely three) years from now when these decisions are revisited.”

    Regarding LEO access, I don’t think much will be salvageable (or changeable) after the next election. Barring a technical meltdown on Ares 1, the next White House or NASA Administrator won’t be in a position to replace it with another launcher. Too many dollars and too much time will have been sunk on Ares 1, and they will still need the capability to shutdown Shuttle and service ISS. And barring a major reduction in capability, Orion will still be too big to launch safely on common commercial LVs, making the costs of continuing Ares 1 development versus developing a human-rated variant of a commercial LV that only NASA may use a wash in the cost analysis.

    Largely for the same reasons that the next White House is likely to cancel the human lunar return effort (no camel nose of actual human exploration hardware under the tent and nothing else dependent on a human lunar return), I think Ares 1/Orion will continue to plod along even after Griffin is gone (too much Ares 1/Orion camel nose under the tent and Shuttle retirement and ISS servicing largely dependent on Ares 1/Orion).

    It’s hard to project this far out, but I think the likeliest opportunity to get off Ares 1 will come only after its been operating for a while, when either the cost of going it alone on a LEO vehicle proves prohibitive to NASA’s future plans or when Ares 1 suffers infant mortality (i.e., an accident). But by that point (late teens or early 20s), I don’t think Orion would get shifted to another vehicle. I’d guess someone among the Space-Xs, Kistlers, Bensons, and T-Spaces of the world will probably have commercial human LEO access licked by that timeframe, and NASA will be forced to purchase the service.

    Again, if Ares 1 has a technical meltdown (not a terribly unlikely possibility given the system’s thin margins, especially at this stage of design and development) or if the budget situation in 2008 and out deteriorates even more than projected (NASA doesn’t even get a three percent budget increase, forget six percent) and Ares 1 operations are sliding into the late teens, then all bets are off and the next White House (or even Griffin) would be forced to rethink the LV and Orion’s sizing. But although they’re possibilities, I wouldn’t bet on those scenarios, at least not yet.

  • Anonymous: But by that point (late teens or early 20s), I don’t think Orion would get shifted to another vehicle. I’d guess someone among the Space-Xs, Kistlers, Bensons, and T-Spaces of the world will probably have commercial human LEO access licked by that timeframe, and NASA will be forced to purchase the service.

    And this is a bad outcome?

    Unfortunately, I can’t find a whole lot of room to disagree with your analysis. The only thing I would add is this: should the next (or another) administration find some reason to use it, a vehicle designed for deep space missions will be available, in production, for adaptation. The advantage of an expendable architecture (however much too heavy) is that you can mix-and-match components. That leaves us better off than we are now, albeit, not nearly as much as we might like.

    There are lots of potential reasons some future administration might want to tackle deep space — who would have guessed that Mr. Bush, who up to that point had shown even less interest in spaceflight than most presidents, would have come up with the VSE? With the growing trend for other nations to participate in human spaceflight, the game is no longer ours and the Russians alone, and I think there are developing geopolitical changes that may force the next administrations hand. I find it hard to believe that any United States administration would stay put while somebody else mounted a mission to the moon, especially if it was viewed as leading tward an eventual base. In the situation we find ourselves in, I think our goal should be to get as much capability as we can, and let the future cards fall where they may.

    Sorry, but I see no value at all in seeing the glass as, say, three-quarters empty when there is any chance of viewing it has one-quarter full.

    — Donald

  • anonymous

    “And this is a bad outcome?”

    Not from the commercial human space flight perspective, but from an exploration, NASA, and taxpayer perspective, it would be a helluva waste of dollars, time, and political opportunity.

    “who would have guessed that Mr. Bush, who up to that point had shown even less interest in spaceflight than most presidents, would have come up with the VSE?”

    It’s not that surprising that a major realignment of NASA’s human space flight programs came out of the Columbia accident. And it’s not even that surprising that Bush initially bought into a realignment towards exploration (even lunar exploration), given the recommendations of the CAIB. (After all, besides more LEO or the Moon, what else is realistically on the table for NASA human space flight in any reasonable timeframe?) What I think is a little surprising (or a lucky coincidence of history) is that NASA had an Administrator at the time (O’Keefe) who could recognize the budget environment at the time, put together an affordable exploration plan, and not pull another SEI that killed the exploration effort in the crib. Given all of NASA’s other failed attempts to get human space exploration going again, that’s what a little remarkable to me. And I think it’s rather tragic that Griffin has pretty much wasted that somewhat remarkable opportunity with a return to outdated Apollo- and SEI-type technical and political plans.

    “With the growing trend for other nations to participate in human spaceflight, the game is no longer ours and the Russians alone, and I think there are developing geopolitical changes that may force the next administrations hand. I find it hard to believe that any United States administration would stay put while somebody else mounted a mission to the moon, especially if it was viewed as leading tward an eventual base.”

    I don’t disagree that would be the response of a future Administration if that scenario came true. But given that China is moving at a snail’s pace, that the Ruskies are broke, and that India is way behind the 8-ball, I just don’t give that scenario a high probability of happening over the next, say, 15-20 years. And, by that time, it’s hard to say whether Orion will still be as relevant and useful given the march of technology (the avionics will be as outdated as Shuttle’s are today, if nothing else) or as budgetarily advantageous given the commercial human LEO alternatives that are more and more likely to emerge over such a long timeframe.

    “Sorry, but I see no value at all in seeing the glass as, say, three-quarters empty when there is any chance of viewing it has one-quarter full.”

    Although Griffin’s wasted near-term political opportunity gets my ire up, when projecting these scenarios, I’m honestly giving my 2 cent analysis from a dispassionate viewpoint. I’m hoping neither for nor against future NASA human space exploration efforts — just looking at the realities and where that logically leads us (or at least me).

    FWIW…

  • vanilla

    And barring a major reduction in capability, Orion will still be too big to launch safely on common commercial LVs, making the costs of continuing Ares 1 development versus developing a human-rated variant of a commercial LV that only NASA may use a wash in the cost analysis.

    This is one of the beauties of L2 rendezvous. It reduces the gross mass of the CEV by about 1/3rd, with no other change to things. This should improve launch options, or at least free up margin on Ares 1. And it does this while increasing the capability and extensibility of the lunar architecture.

  • Anonymous: What I think is a little surprising (or a lucky coincidence of history) is that NASA had an Administrator at the time (O’Keefe) who could recognize the budget environment at the time, put together an affordable exploration plan, and not pull another SEI that killed the exploration effort in the crib.

    One-hundred percent agreement.

    And I think it’s rather tragic that Griffin has pretty much wasted that somewhat remarkable opportunity with a return to outdated Apollo- and SEI-type technical and political plans

    And, unfortunately, I’m increasingly certain that I agree with you on this. (Though long-term inmates here will recall that I’ve always opposed “the stick” and felt we should have used the EELVs.)

    And it’s not even that surprising that Bush initially bought into a realignment towards exploration (even lunar exploration), given the recommendations of the CAIB. (After all, besides more LEO or the Moon, what else is realistically on the table for NASA human space flight in any reasonable timeframe?)

    This kinda re-states my point (or at least what I intended to say). We keep coming back to this, because that’s what’s politically, technologically, and economically realistic. I suspect we’ll come back to it again.

    I never really expected this to happen in the next fifteen or twenty years anyway.

    And, by that time, it’s hard to say whether Orion will still be as relevant and useful given the march of technology (the avionics will be as outdated as Shuttle’s are today, if nothing else) or as budgetarily advantageous given the commercial human LEO alternatives that are more and more likely to emerge over such a long timeframe.

    The Shuttle was designed some thirty years ago, and the Soyuz forty, and the latter is the leading commercial human vehicle. The diesel-electric train engine dates from WW-II, and except for bells and whistles, today’s automobiles are little different from those nearly a century ago. When Boeing tried a radical change in commercial airframes, they were shot out of the water by their customers.

    Once a capability exists, fulfills its mission, and has a market (economic or political), it tends to stick around. I’d turn your statement on its head and say that if Orion isn’t around twenty (or fifty) years from now, we’re wasting money re-developing capabilities we should have designed in in the first place. Anything beyond Orion should be an evolution or a radical departure.

    given the commercial human LEO alternatives that are more and more likely to emerge over such a long timeframe.

    While I remain very hopeful (maybe too much so), I’ll believe these when I see them. SpaceX is not installing confidence, so far. And, none of these will be designed for deep space missions, at least at first. . . .

    — Donald

  • anonymous

    “The Shuttle was designed some thirty years ago, and the Soyuz forty, and the latter is the leading commercial human vehicle. The diesel-electric train engine dates from WW-II, and except for bells and whistles, today’s automobiles are little different from those nearly a century ago. When Boeing tried a radical change in commercial airframes, they were shot out of the water by their customers.”

    The problem with these analogies is that it depends on what timeframe you look at. In the railway industry, just roll the clock back a decade from the timeframe you’re quoting, and the railways are dominated by Lima’s Super-Power steam concept and various simple and Mallet-type steam locomotives. Go back just a few years before the first Boeing 707, and the jet revolution is in a major state of flux with early failures of the deHavilland Comet. Heck, we can even look at what’s happening to the automobile today, as hybrid and electric engines challenge the primacy of the internal combustion engine.

    I’m not predicting any particular paradigm shift in spacecraft technology –or even such a paradigm shift at all — in the coming years or decades. I’m just stating that it really comes down to your timeframe when looking at these historical examples. What you see as a static state that tells us to squeeze every ounce of utility from a given technology regardless of its shortcomings or flaws, I see as a step function that tells us to keep our plans flexible enough to integrate radical technology improvements into our capabilities, even if it means discarding an existing technology platform long before we leverage all of its potential utility.

    Of course, not surprisingly, the good Dr. Griffin disagrees with me on this:

    http://aviationweek.typepad.com/space/2007/03/human_space_exp.htm

    With regards to Orion specifically, I’d also note that if the current human lunar return plan dies with the next election, no lunar deep space version of Orion will be built. Orion comes in four flavors — unpressurized cargo, pressurized cargo, ISS transport, and lunar transport. While there is a good deal of commonality between the last three variants, only the first three variants are currently being pursued. The lunar variant is unlikely to be fully designed, developed, and produced unless Ares V, LSAM, and the rest go forward, too. So I’d question how much of an operational, or even prototype, deep space human capsule we’ll actually get out of Orion should NASA’s breakout from LEO get stalled again.

    And here’s a good editorial from a smart guy who knows from his long experience as a congressional staffer why such stalling is likely to happen:

    http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070312/full/446244a.html

    FWIW…

  • anonymous

    “This is one of the beauties of L2 rendezvous.”

    If only ESAS had more seriously examined such options…

  • Ferris Valyn

    A few questions for more than one person.

    Im gonna start with Donald, and work my way up.

    And, none of these will be designed for deep space missions, at least at first. . .
    I’d argue thats not entirely true. Bigelow’s modules could easily be adapted for long duration, deep spaceflight. Adminitaly, they can’t land on earth, but at a bare minimum, we do already have soyuz which can be used for transporation to and back. Anyway, Im just saying.

    Secondly anonymous,
    I think Ares 1/Orion will continue to plod along even after Griffin is gone (too much Ares 1/Orion camel nose under the tent and Shuttle retirement and ISS servicing largely dependent on Ares 1/Orion).
    Does that mean you think that COTS will be canceled, or will fail, or the government won’t follow through and use private industry? BTW, just for clarification, I mean the government program, not the Dragon capsule or the CXV, or the actual hardware, since you seem at least somewhat optimistic about them latter on in your post.

    Finally, and hopefully no one will mind if I go slightly off topic, Stephen Metschan, I have to admit not having read your entire proposal through in its entirity – I’ve only skimmed it, so if I mis characterize your proposal, feel free to correct me. But from what I’ve read and seen (and your comments over at Nasaspaceflight) you’ve seen to indicate your not particularly optimistic when it comes to commerical spaceflight (im not just refering to space tourism here, although that is one aspect). I am pretty certain you don’t mention SpaceX, or the Falcon, or Kistler and its K-1, or Bigelow’s modules. Do you think most of these will fail, and don’t offer any usable items? Or was your study to far along when the companies started advancing? Or what?

  • anonymous

    “Does that mean you think that COTS will be canceled, or will fail, or the government won’t follow through and use private industry?”

    It depends on who’s defining “failure” and what their definition is.

    With its current underfunded budget, I do not believe that COTS Phase 1 (Cargo) can deliver all of the ISS cargo transport capabilities that NASA needs. COTS Phase 1 involved three different types of cargo transport capabilities:

    – Unpressurized cargo delivery
    – Pressurized cargo delivery
    – Cargo return

    And all of these capabilities require rendezvous and docking. To develop all of these capabilities, NASA has provided each competitor about $250 million. They must cost-share whatever the remaining amount is to develop their specific vehicles through private financing.

    By comparison, the Air Force provided each competitor in the EELV program about $500 million and all they had to do was develop what is essentially an unpressurized cargo delivery capability with no rendezvous and docking requirement.

    It’s a WAG, but if you just count up the types of cargo delivery and add in the rendezvous and docking requirement, COTS Phase 1 is about two to four times more difficult than EELV. And NASA is funding COTS with half the dollars of EELV, which arguably makes COTS four to eight times more difficult than EELV. I certainly believe that Kistler, Space-X, and other start-ups can be smarter, leaner, and meaner than Boeing or LockMart. But can they be four to eight times better? I sincerely wish them the best, but I don’t think so.

    To be brutally honest, when we look at the costs of rendezvous and docking demonstration missions, like DART and the recently launched Orbital Express, which alone reach several hundreds of millions of dollars, I’m not sure that COTS Phase 1 can succeed in delivering even one of the desired ISS transport capabilities, especially since Kistler and Space-X also have launch vehicle developments to fund to get that rendezvous and docking system into space.

    I also seriously question Kistler and Space-X’s ability to raise substantial amounts of private sector financing when NASA is spending billions of taxpayer dollars building an in-house competitor in Ares 1. Griffin can talk all he likes about standing down government capabilities like Ares 1 if the private sector delivers. But the reality is that this decision will not be his to make — it will be up to a future NASA Administrator (and Congress and White House). Even if the politics surrounding NASA jobs were not at stake, private financiers would have to be dumb as rocks to accept the risks associated with the decisions of unknown future NASA managers and federal politicians.

    So… Do I think COTS Phase 1 can deliver all of the desired ISS cargo transport capabilities without additional NASA funding? No, almost certainly not. Do I think COTS Phase 1 will deliver any, even one, of the desired ISS transport capabilities without additional NASA funding? Probably not. I’d give it less than 50/50. Do I think NASA will cough up additional funding for COTS? No, not as long as Griffin is at the helm, and given the budget squeeze, probably not after the next election, either. Do I think that there will be a COTS Phase 2 for crew transport? No, if COTS fails to deliver on all or even most ISS cargo transport capabilities during Phase 1, there will be another commercial backlash among NASA human space flight managers and no Phase 2.

    But all this is measuring COTS success from the NASA or ISS perspective.

    If you look at COTS from the broad industry perspective, even if NASA gets no ISS servicing out of the effort, Kistler or Space-X or someone else can still leverage the development towards new launchers. Even getting one new U.S. medium satellite launcher that was not developed by a military contractor into the market would have huge implications going forward. It would be a major proof-of-concept for commercial space and could dramatically reshape the market, depending on its desirability and affordability. Given enough time, such a launcher and other developments started under COTS could certainly lead to private orbital human space flight capabilities. It won’t happen by 2014 and I think the odds are still less than 50/50 by 2020. But when we start looking at 2025 or 2030, I think the likelihood shifts in the other direction. That will be the actual success and legacy of COTS.

    Hope this helps.

  • Monte Davis

    What you see as a static state that tells us to squeeze every ounce of utility from a given technology regardless of its shortcomings or flaws, I see as a step function that tells us to keep our plans flexible enough to integrate radical technology improvements into our capabilities, even if it means discarding an existing technology platform long before we leverage all of its potential utility.

    This “choice” is too broad and abstract to tell us much without details and numbers for a specific case: i.e., how radical is “radical?” You know better than most of us that space technologies tend to be very tightly integrated — they have to be, because they’re operating in extreme corners of engineering and economic trade space. Changes in one subsystem ripple through everything else. During STS’ second decade, a lot of people pointed out that its computer systems were N years behind off-the-shelf PC capabilities — as if an upgrade were a matter of swapping out a motherboard and using faster RAM, and NASA was just too damn dumb to keep up with Intel and Gateway.

    I’ve long argued that it would have taken many design and testing iterations to get from the 1970 state of the art to what STS was supposed to achieve in one. It would be great to live in a world where NASA could have treated reusability as an X-goal and started work on STS 2.0 in 1981, STS 3.0 in 1984, etc. Unfortunately, we live in one where STS 1.0 was declared “operational” after four flights, and in 1984 it was “On to Space Station Freedom!”

  • Anonymous: Even getting one new U.S. medium satellite launcher that was not developed by a military contractor into the market would have huge implications going forward. It would be a major proof-of-concept for commercial space and could dramatically reshape the market, depending on its desirability and affordability.

    While I do not disagree with most of your COTS analysis, I would argue that Orbital Science’s Pegassus does not encourage one to hope for any “dramatically reshape[d]” market. (Yes, I know, Pegassus received significant military DARPA money, but it was conceived as a radical departure toward low-cost launch.) Likewise, the Taurus-XL was conceived as an Operational Responsive Launch Vehicle (and I think it was even successfully demonstrated as such), so why are we trying again now?

    Maybe these things really are as hard as the old boys say. In any case, I wish the COTS competators every success, and we should definitely give them more money (albeit with strings attached), but neither we nor the government should count on them being fully successful.

    — Donald

  • On second thought and the other hand, Orbital Sciences does demonstrate that a successful business can be created out of less than complete success. I fear that we are nowhere near your radical improvement in space technology, and that incremental improvement is what we have to look forward to at least in our lifetimes, so a partially successful COTS effort would leave us with a new domestic competitor in the launch industry and maybe a somewhat cheaper or better product. That is far from perfect, but it’s worth trying for.

    — Donald

  • anonymous

    “This “choice” is too broad and abstract to tell us much without details and numbers for a specific case: i.e., how radical is “radical?””

    Agreed. It’s going to come down to the cost-benefit analysis in the specific case. I’m just saying that depending on where we’re at along the technology innovation S-curve or in the technology adoption cycle, the analysis often tells you to ditch your old platforms in favor of new capabilities.

    “During STS’ second decade, a lot of people pointed out that its computer systems were N years behind off-the-shelf PC capabilities — as if an upgrade were a matter of swapping out a motherboard and using faster RAM, and NASA was just too damn dumb to keep up with Intel and Gateway.”

    Absolutely. The difficulty and cost of upgrading space systems, especially the way we do human space flight systems, is so high that we usually forgo the effort and expense altogether and wind up with wildly obsolesent systems. Or we end up wasting mountains of dollars just trying to keep the system’s shrinking supply chain intact, rather than doing the intelligent thing, throw it away, and start anew. I don’t know what the exact number is, but if you added up all the billions that NASA has spent on Shuttle “upgrades” over the years (really just preserving or replacing elements of the Shuttle supply chain that had withered as the state of technology and non-NASA customers had moved on), we probably could have built Ares 1/Orion or a couple EELV/small capsule systems by now.

    Of course, the Shuttle, as a patently unsafe system, is a special case. Cost-benefit doesn’t really apply here — it should have been retired after the Challenger accident.

    “I’ve long argued that it would have taken many design and testing iterations to get from the 1970 state of the art to what STS was supposed to achieve in one. It would be great to live in a world where NASA could have treated reusability as an X-goal and started work on STS 2.0 in 1981, STS 3.0 in 1984, etc.”

    While I think Shuttle was too ungainly and inherently too unsafe to warrant further iteration, I agree with your sentiment here. Build it small, operate it until lessons are learned and some degree of utility achieved, then build a new capability that’s responsive to how your mission needs have changed and that can incorporate a new generation of technological advances, and discard the old.

    I think Griffin’s recent Aviation Week blog essay is rather extreme and a little insane in this respect. To borrow from the Washington Post letter to the editor, it’s the height of aerospace engineering hubris to assume that you can design a couple launch vehicles today that will be responsive to changes in human space exploration goals, needs, budgets, and technology base for the next 50 years. I understand his arguments with respect to aircraft examples like DC-9 or B-52, but those were exceptions to the norm. Out of hundreds, maybe thousands, of aircraft developments, only a couple handfuls have that kind of longevity. To assume that NASA (or anyone) can hit a similar home run with only one or two at-bats is pretty ludicrous.

    Every other rocket engineer wants to be the next Werner von Braun who lays out the grand space exploration plan for generations to come, and it’s fine to dream. But folks in positions of power like Griffin have got to let go of that way of doing business and adapt much more realistic, flexible, and sustainable planning strategies.

  • anonymous

    “While I do not disagree with most of your COTS analysis, I would argue that Orbital Science’s Pegassus does not encourage one to hope for any “dramatically reshape[d]” market.”

    The problem with Pegasus is that it was too small to address the vast majority of the commercial satellite business. The Pegasus market consists of small NASA research satellites and some small communications and remote sensing satellites also built by Orbital. I think the same will hold true for Falcon 1 and the other DARPA vehicles currently under development. The sweet spot(s) for the commercial satellite launch business are much heavier than what these small launchers can deliver.

    The converse of this is that first non-military U.S. launch vehicle that is big enough to address these markets (potentially Kistler K-1, Falcon 9, etc.) has an opportunity to steal lots of business that’s currently going overseas, if priced attractively. That would fundamentally restructure the market and provide an ongoing line of business upon which other markets, eventually even commercial orbital human space flight, could be explored/built.

    “Likewise, the Taurus-XL was conceived as an Operational Responsive Launch Vehicle (and I think it was even successfully demonstrated as such), so why are we trying again now?”

    From a military perspective, having an operationally responsive launch vehicle is not enough to actually field operationally responsive space systems. The military has to fundamentally rethink and restructure how it procures, builds, and qualifies satellites. That’s a much bigger challenge than the launch vehicle, and I’m not sure it’s going to happen anytime soon. I’d also note that when the military talks about operationally responsive satellites, they’re also on the small side and not consistent with the size of larger commercial satellites. (And again, that’s why Falcon 1 and the other DARPA vehicles currently under development are unlikely to garner a significant number of commercial payloads, even if they’re successfully fielded.)

    But from a near-term commercial space perspective, operational responsiveness is beside the point. We don’t have to have an operationally responsive vehicle to address the sweet spot(s) in the commercial satellite launch business. The only reason operational responsiveness enters into the commercial discussion is if it’s synonymous with the low cost and (maybe) reusability necessary to achieve certain future commercial space markets. I’m agnostic on the connectivity between operational responsiveness, reusability, and low cost and will leave that discussion to the true believers and atheists out there.

    “On second thought and the other hand, Orbital Sciences does demonstrate that a successful business can be created out of less than complete success.”

    Yes, and I think this is what will happen with Kistler and/or Space-X. Pegasus failed to address the commercial market, but did prove useful for NASA science payloads and internal payloads. Similarly, I think an underfunded COTS program will fail to address most, or all, ISS needs, but the K-1 and Falcon 9 launch vehicles will still prove useful for the commercial satellite market and unmanned NASA and military payloads.

    “a partially successful COTS effort would leave us with a new domestic competitor in the launch industry and maybe a somewhat cheaper or better product. That is far from perfect, but it’s worth trying for.”

    My hope is that a commercial proof-of-concept would finally kick off the first true cycle of private sector launch vehicle development and innovation, something that is sorely missing and much needed in the overall space sector.

  • One other thought. Whilst Rocketplane Kistler is probably dependent on COTS funding for the near term (I kinda wrote them off when Orbital Sciences dropped out, though I’d love to be proven wrong), SpaceX may not be. If it ever flies, the Falcon-1 will earn revenue, though my guess is not at a profit if he sticks to his advertised price, and certainly not at an amortized profit. As the OSC customers and possibly some foreign customers transition, it may earn a lot of revenue. Likewise, Elon has paid for significant development up front and appears prepared to continue. I wonder if SpaceX can survive through a first COTS flight on COTS funding, Falcon-1 revenue, and Elon’s money alone.

    If and when success is achieved, especially of a Falcon-9, the markets may cough up additional funds — but he has to get there. Any guesses of the odds of that happening?

    Based on these funding sources, my guess is that his chances are relatively low, and getting lower with every Falcon-1 delay. But I would give him the best chance of any of the five other COTS contendors that survived the first down-select.

    — Donald

  • al Fansome

    DONALD: If and when success is achieved, especially of a Falcon-9, the markets may cough up additional funds — but he has to get there.

    Don,

    I would only change “may” to “will cough up additional funds, if Elon wants”.

    If Elon proves his system will work, because he already has a backlog of customers he will be able to generate additional funding from the markets. He will also sign up a lot more customers. In particular there is a LOT of money in the DoD & commercial markets for a Falcon 9 class system.

    The same is true for Kistler … since they will have a much lower price point for creating new markets & new customers (and new investors) if they truly develop a fully reusable system.

    Their challenges are getting there.

    – Al

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