The NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) formally announced in the last week that it will be shutting down at the end of August. That decision has been criticized by some as evidence that NASA is not being sufficiently forward thinking, devoting too much attention to near-term projects. NASA administrator Mike Griffin addressed that issue during a Q&A session after a speech he gave Friday at the Heinlein Centennial in Kansas City. First, he noted this nearsightedness is not limited to NASA alone:
Right now, nowhere in the country is there, to the best of my knowledge, a significant push in any agency or department of the federal government for advanced technology R&D in any field. I think that’s regrettable, but it is so. We consistently have advanced technology money—I won’t say cut from our budget, since our budget is going up. But Congressional preferences and, frankly, even administration preferences over the last several administrations have been to focus on current missions and current capabilities rather than setting aside money for technology development.
He added that it is “simply a fact” that NASA has been authorized to do more than it has been given funding to accomplish. “So I have to pay attention to nearer-term commitments, like it or not—many people don’t, I mean, many do not—but I have to pay attention to nearer-term commitments that have been specifically called out in our authorizing and appropriating legislation, such as finish the space station and so a certain array of science missions and so on and so forth.”
However, it seemed from his comments that he would like to spend more money on advanced technology work, if sufficient funding was there. Back in the 1960s, he said, NASA spent about 6% of its budget on space and communications technology development and another 6% on aeronautics technology work. “We’re spending today about 3.1 or 3.2 percent on technology, most of that in aeronautics,” he said. “I will spend the rest of my life reminding people that NASA doesn’t get to pick its agenda.”
While it is true that Griffin doesn’t get to pick NASA’s agenda, he sure did pick an awfully expensive and inefficient way of carrying out his interpretation of NASA’s agenda. I find it at least a little disingenuous for Griffin to be bemoaning the tight budgets at NASA, when it is the architecture that he chose that’s sucking all the air out of the room. It isn’t the only approach out there, and in fact isn’t even the best architecture from the point of view of accomplishing the goals set out in NASA’s authorizing legislation. Acting as though ESAS is the only possibility, and that poor Mikey doesn’t have anything he can do is…well…self-serving at best.
~Jon
Griffin said it would cost $104 billion to replace STS with a significantly safer and cheaper system to operate and return to the moon by 2020, how much cheaper and more efficiently does Jonathan Goff say it can be done?
The consensus among critics of the Bush Admin’s approach to the lunar effort is that it was a mistake to develop Ares. This was supposed to be a simple adaptation of existing hardware but has instead turned into virtually building a new rocket at a cost of billions and billions. They believe it would have been far less complicated and expensive to human rate an existing rocket like Atlas V, whose development was already paid for by the Air Force. (Several of the commerical space companies are likely to use this option.)
They believe Griffin’s biggest mistake was spending a lot of money to produce a redundant launcher. Some critics believe that NSA basically lied when it said that adapting an existing EELV wasn’t feasible. And the sense is that there was heavily political pressure to keep the shuttle assembly line open and maintain jobs in various centers.
The sheer cost of all of this – plus large deficits and tight federal budgets for non-defense related discretionary spending – means that the whole project may not be sustainable. My guess is that Bush – loathe to admit error and change course – will muddle through what’s left of his term and leave his successor something to sort out.
I could be wrong. Maybe they’ll do something before he departs office.
Ciclops,
It’s not just my opinion, but the opinion of several other groups, including the CBO among others, that it could be done a lot cheaper. Not all shuttle replacements involved creating all new vehicles and maintaining huge standing armies. Some options like making CEV small enough to launch on existing and near-term launchers, and then investing some money into dry-launch technologies could likely have replaced the shuttle with something much safer and cheaper for much less than that $100B number. And it could probably get us back to the moon several years sooner, since we wouldn’t need to develop several all new launch vehicles in additional to all the translunar and lunar hardware.
$100B is an obscene amount of money. That’s more than 20x what both LM and Boeing spent on Delta IV and Atlas V combined. That included developing a whole new family of rockets, building new factories, new pads, and new infrastructure. I don’t know what Boeing’s number would be, but the Atlas V part of ULA says they only need $100M to modify their Atlas V for manned launch. They still need a capsule on top of that, but there’s no reason that has to be a $10B+ project. $100B is just an obscene amount of money compared to what it will deliver.
If Griffin were talking about say $10-20B for a shuttle replacement, and getting hardware to allow 2-4 moon missions per year, that’d more reasonable, and I wouldn’t complain so loud. But taking 15+ years and $100B+ to do a slightly upgraded rehash of Apollo is a waste.
And it’s one that Griffin has a lot more choice in than his handwringing makes it sound like.
~Jon
The problem is that no one who is down on Ares seems to be able to prove that any other approach is better or even fesible. One can inveigh all they want about how “wasteful” the current approach is, but until they can make a case for some other way, they have mounted a fight that they are going to lose.
Coimplicating this situation is that fact that fighting seems to have broken out among the various proponents of other approaches (sort of like I predicted.) Over on the Nasa spaceflightnews board, a guy calling himself Ross who has been pushing something called Direct Launch posted an analysis he says proves that the EELV approach, once one takes into account all the costs (including ground infrastructure), is more expensive than both Direct Launch and Ares.
I am confident that the EELV folks will dispute this.
Mark,
How would one “prove” to you that something is better or feasible? You accept paper studies from NASA that have been shown to be based on faulty data and questionable assumptions (ESAS), but don’t seem to accept engineering/financial analyses from other groups. Why is ESAS sufficient proof, but DIRECT for instance, insufficient? Also, “better” to whom? In my book the transportation architecture that more effectively promotes and encourages the commercial development of cislunar space, and that accomplishes more for less money would be better. But for Alabama Senators, “better” is defined as “more jobs in Alabama regardless of what the outcome is”. So, who’s definition of better are we using.
Waving your arms claiming that nobody has “proven” that their system is “better” or “feasible” is kind of disingenuous. In my opinion, several groups have “proven” that their concepts are better/feasible. Such as the CE&R reports done by Boeing, Lockheed, and several others. Or DIRECT.
I guess my problem is that I’m not sure that any set of data would constitute “proof” to you if you didn’t already agree with the proposition at the start.
As for disagreements between other approaches, that’s just engineering. I’m probably one of the loudest advocates on that forum for using an architecture that uses existing or near-term available boosters (such as EELV). I’ll admit wholeheartedly that DIRECT comes closer to meeting the goals of the VSE than Ares I/V. However at the same time, I disagree with Ross that an EELV/commercial-launch based architecture would be less economical than DIRECT.
So, did the fact that there was disagreement between EOR and LOR approaches during Apollo mean that we should stick with building NOVA, avoiding learning how to do orbital rendezvous, and stick with a direct ascent type architecture? No. Just because one option is clearly lousy by many standards (Ares I/V) doesn’t mean that there won’t be disagreement on which of the alternatives is best. And it especially doesn’t mean sticking with the obviously worst alternative just because its opponents aren’t marching in lockstep.
~Jon
“how much cheaper and more efficiently does Jonathan Goff say it can be done?”
“The problem is that no one who is down on Ares seems to be able to prove that any other approach is better or even fesible.”
Let’s use some common sense here, folks. In the EELV development program, the USAF got two intermediate-lift launch vehicles out of a $1 billion investment. NASA itself is providing only $278 million to Space-X under the COTS program to develop a lifter and capsule that does the same basic job as Ares 1/Orion. Yet Ares 1/Orion is projected to cost on the order of $20-25 BILLION to complete.
Mr. Goff is right. It’s short-sighted at best and two-faced at worst for Griffin to argue that he can’t afford a little $5 million per year advanced studies program when he’s made these kinds of choices. Heck, even if we accept Ares 1/Orion costs, at a run-rate of about $3 billion per year, Griffin could stretch the Ares 1/Orion IOC date by one lousy working day and come up with enough spare change (~$12 million) to keep NIAC funded.
Sheesh…
Anonymous,
Mr. Goff is right. It’s short-sighted at best and two-faced at worst for Griffin to argue that he can’t afford a little $5 million per year advanced studies program when he’s made these kinds of choices. Heck, even if we accept Ares 1/Orion costs, at a run-rate of about $3 billion per year, Griffin could stretch the Ares 1/Orion IOC date by one lousy working day and come up with enough spare change (~$12 million) to keep NIAC funded.
And if they stretched it by 2 working days they might actually be able to properly fund the Centennial Challenges…heck I think the CC guys and NAIC guys wouldn’t mind splitting One Shaft Working Day Equivalence (OSWDE) between the each other…
~Jon
Jon, Anon – Thanks for making my point. If Ares opponents can agree on very little aside the proposition that Ares sucks, then they’re really spinning their wheels. They need to make a better case that “in my opinion” ect.
Mark,
And you’re making mine. Both EELV families were fielded for about $1B investment from the DoD (including development, factories, launch facilities, etc), and Ares I is going to take at least $10B direct government investment. Ares I is looking like it won’t even provide as much payload as either EELV heavy. And it will take at least another 5-10 years to field…
So Ares I is obviously a bad answer. Wasting lots of time and lots of money for a less capable system that is only *theoretically* safer.
While I may disagree with the DIRECT guys about whether DIRECT would be better than a more commercial approach, we all agree that either would be better than Ares.
So of course this means we should solider on with the worst approach, because the opposition can’t agree on which of the plethora of better approaches should be taken.
~Jon
“Jon, Anon – Thanks for making my point.”
How did I make your point? I simply pointed out that comparable past and ongoing launch vehicle and human capsule developments are orders of magnitude cheaper than Ares 1/Orion. That has nothing to do what vehicles should succeed Ares 1/Orion, and, moreover, I never indicated that I preferred any particular solution.
“If Ares opponents can agree on very little aside the proposition that Ares sucks, then they’re really spinning their wheels.”
Not at all. On the contrary, I’d strongly support a small capsule/EELV-derived solution or a DIRECT 2/Jupiter 120 solution. Either of those options will free up billions of dollars in the near-term, reduce costs over the long-term, shorten the post-Shuttle human space flight gap by years, and have far better demonstrated reliability and safety than Ares 1/Orion.
Ares 1/Orion “sucks” precisely because it is so much more costly, more time-consuming, and now more technically and operationally risky than other solutions. Continuing to pursue the worst possible option when there are multiple better options to choose from is the very definition of programmatic insanity.
anonymous wrote: NASA itself is providing only $278 million to Space-X under the COTS program to develop a lifter and capsule that does the same basic job as Ares 1/Orion. Yet Ares 1/Orion is projected to cost on the order of $20-25 BILLION to complete.
Yes let’s use some common sense and some honesty here folks. Some time ago Musk said he had spent about $200m on Falcon 1, they also have another $100m contract from USAF, add to that the $278m from NASA and the matching funding that SpaceX must raise from the market gives a total of about $900m, let’s say $1 billion for SpaceX COTS. And what does that buy? A few tons of cargo lift to the ISS on a launch vehicle system that has so far has a record of total failure.
Now Orion’s development contract is $4.3 billion, but let’s say $5 billion. Ares I upper stage development contract is about $900m, first stage development contract with ATK is not public but let’s say $1 billion and then there is the avionics and other smaller contracts. Grand total say $3 billion, but let’s call it $4 billion. So total development cost of Ares I/Orion is about $9 billion. And what does it buy? Far safer, more reliable and less costly human access to space and return capability from LEO, the Moon and Mars, and key elements of the Ares V launch vehicle needed for RTTM and Mars. Human spaceflight is expensive and missions to the Moon are much more so.
clclops, I’ve been trying to find evidence through Google that Musk has spent $200 million on his company so far. Would you have a citation for that figure?
Sure. During the 2nd space exploration conference Musk said SpaceX has invested a little over $100m in development so far and will probably spend about another $200m on Falcon 9 and Dragon. So that’s about $300m. No written citation but see and hear him say that around 1:40 hours into the video of the conference
“A few tons of cargo lift to the ISS on a launch vehicle system”
Incorrect. Both systems have the same basic requirements. Lift, docking, and return to/from the ISS of a pressurized capsule, just like Ares 1/Orion.
“that has so far has a record of total failure.”
Incorrect. This statement confuses Falcon 1 and Falcon 9. Falcon 9 has not been built, nevertheless flown.
“So total development cost of Ares I/Orion is about $9 billion.”
Incorrect. This estimate is too low by at least more than a factor of two and possibly by more than a factor of three.
In the FY08 budget for Constellation, available on page ESMD-14 in the “FY 2008 Budget Request Full Document” link here:
http://www.nasa.gov/about/budget/index.html
The FY06-FY12 total for the “Crew Exploration Vehicle” (Orion), the “Crew Launch Vehicle” (Ares 1), and associated “Ground Operations” and “Mission Operations” development comes to $20,028.7 million or $20 billion in round figures. That’s a hard number (no estimating involved) straight out of the NASA budget, and it’s already more than a factor of two greater than the $9 billion estimate.
Of course, that’s not the full cost because Ares 1/Orion IOC is in FY15. With a run-rate of about $4 billion in FY12 and assuming a normal development curve with spending tailing off in FY13, FY 14, and FY15, we’re probably looking at another $5 billion or so total from those years, bringing the total for Ares 1/Orion development up to $25 billion.
Even that doesn’t tell the whole story because Griffin redirected a couple billion in the FY04 and FY05 budgets to Ares 1/Orion. Call it $26-27 billion.
And that budget only provides a 65% probability of meeting the 2015 IOC. Using standard industry practices and budgeting at 80% probability, we’re most likely looking at a 2017 IOC and another few billion dollars. Call it $30 billion total. This number is an estimate and is less hard than the $20 billion figure that comes straight out of the FY08 NASA budget. But based on the considerations above, it’s arguably the most realistic and accurate case, and it’s more than a factor of three greater than the $9 billion estimate.
$20-30 billion in taxpayer dollars is just an insane amount of development spending for a LEO (actually suborbital) launch vehicle and human capsule in this day and age. It’s a factor of about 100 greater than what the taxpayer is spending to get an equivalent capability in Falcon 9/Dragon ($278 million), and it’s a factor of 20 or so greater than what the taxpayer spend to get two (2!) intermediate launch vehicles in the EELV development program ($1 billion).
Don’t get me wrong — I’m not saying Ares 1/Orion should be as cheap as Falcon 9/Dragon or as EELV. I could see an argument for them being twice as expensive or so. But 20-100 times more expensive! Good gawd… forget space policy, taxpayers shouldn’t stand for such wastefulness on the grounds of fiscal policy alone.
“Far safer, more reliable”
Based on what analysis? With the changes to 5-segment and a new upper stage, Ares 1 lost most of the safety benefits associated with using Shuttle heritage hardware. She’s a new build — actually, just based on the one semi-successful Falcon 1 flight test, Falcon 9 arguably has more proven Falcon 1 heritage hardware than Ares 1 has proven Shuttle heritage hardware. On top of that, Orion has negative mass margin for the next eight-plus years of design/development and requires the removal of safety features like radiation shielding and redundant systems just to get back to minimal mass margins.
It is no longer possible to claim that Ares 1/Orion is safer than the other options. Too many sacrifices have been made.
“and less costly human access to space”
Based on what analysis? Annual operating costs for Ares 1/Orion approach two billion dollars. The equivalent number of Falcon 9/Dragon or single-stick EELV launches for a year of ISS operations are a fraction of that.
“and return capability from LEO, the Moon and Mars,”
Ares 1/Orion has negative mass margin for the lunar mission. It ain’t going to the Moon or Mars anytime soon. And even if it were, any number of single stick LV/pressurized capsule designs could accomplish the same mission.
“and key elements of the Ares V launch vehicle needed for RTTM and Mars.”
Which most likely will never get built because we’re spending at least $20 billion on Ares 1/Orion through FY12, forcing the start of Ares V development into the FY11, at which time the next White House and multiple Congresses will have had ample and repeated opportunities to kill it.
anonymous wrote (re SpaceX): “Both systems have the same basic requirements. Lift, docking, and return to/from the ISS of a pressurized capsule, just like Ares 1/Orion.”
Wrong. SpaceX COTS contract clearly states that they will deliver 1,400 kg of pressurized and 1,700 kg of unpressurized cargo to ISS for Capability A-C, achieving this will give them $278m of NASA funding if they meet all the milestones. Orion/Ares I is no longer a cargo carrier for the ISS, its function is to provide safe, reliable and affordable crew access to LEO and return from LEO and beyond. Apples and Pears.
Yes the 2008 Budget request is a good source, it shows the breakdown for Ares I DDT&E (thru 2012) on ESMD-14 as $4.6 billion. Adding the new $4.3 billion Orion DDT&E LM contract (thru 2013) gives $8.9 billion for the total Orion/Ares I development cost.
Personally, I owe a huge debt to NIAC.
I am sad that they are closing, and i think it is a mistake that they were not funded.
I think it is also a mistake that Cent. Challenge is not fully developed as well.
those 2 programs, side-by-side, had the potential to shake things up a bit… and maybe that is why they are not in the budget, because some people dont want things ‘shaken’ all that much.
I suspect that, had it been a priority (and not a ‘lip-service’ project) that the money would have been there. it is clear that neither NIAC nor CC have that level of priority.
and i dont want to resort to ‘conspiracy theories’ but i know – first hand – that there are not many people in senior positions that like the Space Elevator idea… and maybe NIAC was chopped as backlash. does anyone have any ideas about that.
take care. mjl
“Apples and Pears.”
This is not an apples and oranges comparison. At best, they’re different kinds of apples. Again, both have to deliver a pressurized capsule capable of human spaceflight to the ISS and return that capsule intact and safely. They’re both going to conduct unmanned test flights. While one may be delivering cargo during its initial missions and the other delivering crew during its initial missions, they’re the same basic types of systems, doing the same basic jobs, to the same destinations. If one remained exclusively a cargo vehicle and one remained exclusively a crewed vehicle, at best that would explain a difference in cost to the taxpayer of a factor of two, maybe a few when we throw in the overhead associated with government and big areospace work. But that’s not what’s planned, and moreover there’s a factor of 100 difference in cost to the taxpayer between these two sets of vehicles.
Even if we set aside a developing company and unflown vehicles like Space-X and Falcon 9/Dragon, the cost comparisons to similar USAF and big aerospace programs are just egregious. Taxpayers spent $1 billion on EELV development and got two families of intermediate launch vehicles. NASA is planning to spend $20-30 billion on Ares 1/Orion development and will get one launch vehicle and one capsule. That’s still a factor of 20+ in terms of cost to the taxpayer. The extra NASA needs for human-rating, docking, and capsule reentry may explain a difference of two or few in cost vice the EELV program. But not factors of 20 or 30.
“Yes the 2008 Budget request is a good source, it shows the breakdown for Ares I DDT&E (thru 2012)”
Ares development does not end in 2012. It ends at IOC in 2015.
“on ESMD-14 as $4.6 billion.”
There is no such figure on ESMD-14. Moreover, looking at the DDT&E alone neglects the massive production costs necessary to reach Ares 1 IOC, which are double that DDT&E figure for a total Ares 1 development cost of $14.4 billion. And that still neglects the ground and mission operations development necessary for Ares 1 to reach IOC.
“Adding the new $4.3 billion Orion DDT&E LM contract (thru 2013)”
The LockMart contract does not represent the full cost of Orion development, not by a long shot. That figure neglects NASA activities through the 2015 IOC, production necessary to reach IOC, and associated ground and mission operations development.
anonymous wrote: Again, both have to deliver a pressurized capsule capable of human spaceflight to the ISS and return that capsule intact and safely.
The COTS contract SpaceX has with NASA does not require a “capsule capable of human spaceflight”, it only requires one capable of carrying cargo to ISS, and disposing of and returning cargo from ISS. Crew services are defined as Capability D and are not part of the $278m contract, SpaceX want another $308m to demonstrate that. SpaceX are contracted to perform the first of three demonstration flights in Q2 2008, if they can do it with that budget it will be an extraordinary achievement especially as they are still recovering from their two failed launches. Meanwhile NASA continue with the development of Orion/Ares I for human exploration beyond LEO. We’ll see what happens.
Regarding the additional cost of LM engineering development support up to IOC, if it extends beyond 2013 that should not be significant as Orion development is on schedule for completion by 2013.
(Opps yes, the reference to the $4.6b development cost for Ares I is on page ESMD-31)
“The COTS contract SpaceX has with NASA does not require a “capsule capable of human spaceflightâ€, it only requires one capable of carrying cargo to ISS, and disposing of and returning cargo from ISS. Crew services are defined as Capability D and are not part of the $278m contract,”
It’s not a contract; it’s a Space Act Agreement or SAA, which is handled very differently under procurement law. More to the point, the basic demonstration — show that an unmanned, pressurized capsule can be delivered to and from the ISS intact and safely — is practically identical to an unmanned Orion test flight.
“SpaceX want another $308m to demonstrate that.”
Assuming that figure is accurate, we’re looking at a total cost to the taxpayer of only $586 million for Space X/Dragon. At $20-30 billion, Ares 1/Orion development is still 35 to 50 times more expensive for the same capability.
Two times, five times, maybe even ten times more expensive is understandable when comparing a government program to an entrepreneurial project. But 35 times? And 20 times more than a comparable USAF/big aerospace program? Please…
“Orion development is on schedule for completion by 2013″
Not by any industry standard for good budgeting and management it’s not. It’s a joke to advertise a delivery date that’s funded at the 50 percent level.
Moreover, the program is currently plagued by schedule delays and another round of looming content cuts arising from mass margin redesigns forced on Orion by Ares 1 underperformance. See this thread:
http://www.spacepolitics.com/2007/06/28/full-committee-approves-nasa-budget-bill-still-no-miracle/#comments
“Opps yes, the reference to the $4.6b development cost for Ares I is on page ESMD-31″
No, ESMD-31 quotes a cost of $4.6 billion for “DDT&E”, not development. Per that very same page, production is another $9.2 billion, bringing the total for Ares 1 development through IOC to $13.8 billion, a figure very consistent with the $20 billion total for Ares 1/Orion development in the FY06-FY12 budget on ESMD-14.
This discussion is not getting anywhere except further away from the topic of NIAC funding. NIAC should be continued even if its funding has to be cut.
Now to briefly address your points:
Yes clearly if SpaceX can deliver cargo to ISS cheaper than other suppliers, it would be most welcome. Furthermore if they can develop cargo services and safe, reliable crew capability for such a small development cost then SpaceX will have truly revolutionized launch vehicle engineering. However, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and so far SpaceX have only produced evidence to the contrary. Time will tell.
Orion/Ares IOC is currently Mar 2015, the Sep 2013 date is what NASA are working towards. What confidence level are SpaceX using for achieving their 2008 Q2/Q3 first demo flight date? Exactly, SpaceX do not reveal such internal details unlike NASA.
Orion/Ares I has slipped its IOC date 6 months because of funding cuts, its performance is fine as are its margins according to NASA. Unsubstantiated rumors and comments on web sites such as NSF are not evidence either.
BTW DDT&E means Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation, it’s synonymous with development, and development is not synonymous with production.
“I am sad that they are closing, and i think it is a mistake that they were not funded.
I think it is also a mistake that Cent. Challenge is not fully developed as well.
those 2 programs, side-by-side, had the potential to shake things up a bit…”
Agreed. Any R&D agency cuts off its nose to spite its face when it terminates funding for very small, high-leverage, high-innovation programs like these to feed much larger, standard operational and development programs or (worse) institutional problems.
“and maybe that is why they are not in the budget, because some people dont want things ’shaken’ all that much.”
Maybe, but I don’t think either program ever approached a level where they actually threatened entrenched interests. Maybe if bigger prizes were seriously pursued for achievements like the first orbital flight of a private human space transport vehicle or the first commercial lunar or NEO robotic landing. Those would directly threaten established revenue streams in big aerospace. But advanced concept studies and ground-based technology demonstration prizes don’t threaten much of anyone.
“I suspect that, had it been a priority (and not a ‘lip-service’ project) that the money would have been there. it is clear that neither NIAC nor CC have that level of priority.”
The problem is the mentality of most R&D agencies and corporations that this kind of high-risk, high-reward work is discretionary, while the low-risk, mainstream work is not. And at some level they’re right. But no high-tech organization can take it to an extreme as NASA has done in recent years, stamp out most sources of innovation, and expect to remain a high-tech organization over the long-term.
“and i dont want to resort to ‘conspiracy theories’ but i know – first hand – that there are not many people in senior positions that like the Space Elevator idea… and maybe NIAC was chopped as backlash. does anyone have any ideas about that.”
Again, I don’t think anyone is threatened by space elevators that won’t be built for decades. I’m sure some folks in power question their technical viability, but since elevators only made up a small portion of these two programs, I doubt that was a reason for their cancellation.
I would guess it was just more of the usual — feeding the beast of Shuttle/ISS operations, Constellation development costs, and NASA institutional problems.
cIclops,
BTW DDT&E means Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation, it’s synonymous with development, and development is not synonymous with production.
Then you’re not doing a fair apples to apples comparison. The COTS money that SpaceX is getting for Falcon IX/Dragon includes those very ground ops, production, and mission ops development up through the demo flights. Ares I/Orion cannot get to IOC without also paying for the “ground ops, production, and mission ops development”, so counting it against SpaceX and not counting it against Ares I/Orion seems disengenuous.
~Jon
“However, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and so far SpaceX have only produced evidence to the contrary.”
The USAF got two intermediate launch vehicles from big aerospace/defense companies for $1 billion ($500 million each) worth of taxpayer investment. It’s not an extraordinary claim that an entrepreneurial company could deliver a launch vehicle and pressurized docking/return capsule for an amount of taxpayer investment that’s roughly half the amount spent on one of those vehicles.
What’s an extraordinary claim is that NASA needs $20-30 billion, an amount that represents a factor of 20 to 100 over the the USAF and Space-X cases, to produce a roughly equivalent capability.
Factors of two or a few are not extraordinary. Factors of 20 or more are.
“Orion/Ares IOC is currently Mar 2015, the Sep 2013 date is what NASA are working towards.”
And since they require large budgets that can only be funded at levels predicting a 65- and 50-percent chance of success, those dates are jokes at best and misleading at worst. Based on a standard, 80-percent chance of success, these programs’ budgets put IOC somewhere out in 2017.
“What confidence level are SpaceX using for achieving their 2008 Q2/Q3 first demo flight date? Exactly, SpaceX do not reveal such internal details unlike NASA.”
So? That doesn’t change the fact that NASA is advertising IOC dates for multi-ten-billion-dollar, mainline programs that have only 50- or 65-percent chances of success.
“Orion/Ares I… performance is fine as are its margins according to NASA.”
Performance margin is adequate (assuming Orion acts as a third-stage to achieve orbit after the suborbital loft of Ares I), but the system has negative mass margin for design/development. That’s why LockMart’s Orion team has undertaken a mass-saving exercise that’s threatening the schedule and looking at drastic options like removing fault tolerant strings and radiation shielding.
See the presentation at http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=24647.
“Unsubstantiated rumors and comments on web sites such as NSF are not evidence either.”
I’d urge anyone interested in the topic of Ares I/Orion program performance to subscribe to Level 2, if they don’t already.
Even then, we don’t have to rely on nasaspaceflight.com. Documents detailing these programs’ long-standing and ongoing mass/performance problems are popping up on non-subscription sites like nasawatch.com.
“BTW DDT&E means Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation, it’s synonymous with development, and development is not synonymous with production.”
You have to be kidding. ESMD-31 states very clearly:
“Ares-1 received Authority To Proceed (ATP) in September 2005, with a total DEVELOPMENT [emphasis added] budget of $14.4 billion. This includes $4.6 billion for Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) and $9.2 billion for production.”
How much more clear can it be? Of course development includes production.
Oy vey…
Other than noting the stupendous inflation between 7 Jul when “Ares 1/Orion is projected to cost on the order of $20-25 BILLION to complete” and 9 Jul when “NASA needs $20-30 billion” there is little more to respond to as it’s all repetition of previous points.
Hopefully in about 14 months from now we’ll see a Dragon capsule in LEO and later in Sep 2013, Orion with crew onboard at ISS.
“Other than noting the stupendous inflation between 7 Jul when “Ares 1/Orion is projected to cost on the order of $20-25 BILLION to complete†and 9 Jul when “NASA needs $20-30 billion†there is little more to respond to as it’s all repetition of previous points.”
The only difference in my calculations between these two threads is that I realized in this thread that I wasn’t accounting for the fact that Ares I/Orion is budgeted at the 65% level for the 2015 IOC. Assuming a more realistic 80% funding level or bounce in the IOC out to 2017 and we’re looking at an additional delta of another few billion dollars.
Again, the $20 billion figure is a very firm number straight out of NASA’s FY08 budget. I’ll readily admit that any delta above $20 billion is an estimate, but whatever the exact amount, it’s going to be measured in a handful or two of billions of dollars to account for the fiscal years (prior to 2006, 2013-15, and any 2016+ spending to accound for the 65% budgeting) not covered in the FY08 budget.
FWIW…
cIclops,
Hopefully in about 14 months from now we’ll see a Dragon capsule in LEO and later in Sep 2013, Orion with crew onboard at ISS.
If I were a gambling man, I’d put the odds of Dragon reaching ISS before 2010 as substantially better than a crewed Orion reaching ISS even by 2015. The 2013 number is just plain ridiculous. There would have to be such a string of miracles that it’s farcical on its face. In order for that to work, there would have to be no development snags, Shuttle would have to fly flawlessly from here on out and retire exactly on time, and they would have to speed up their test-flight program. I think anyone who believes that 2013 date is being naive.
~Jon
If I were a gambling man, I’d put the odds of Dragon reaching ISS before 2010 as substantially better than a crewed Orion reaching ISS even by 2015.
Not sure that’s a good bet, but I’d certainly bet that Dragon will beat Orion (assuming that NASA allows it to dock).
IMHO, the real question is will the crewed Dragon fly before Orion (rather than the cargo version). I’ve already got 10 bucks saying it wil.
BTW, before anyone comments, I do realize the crewed vs cargo dragon isn’t hugely different, but there is something to be said for a vehicle actually containing people.
Thanks clclops, hadn’t seen the proceedings from that conference. Illuminating.
Several key points are being missed, I think, when the original issue we started out with is advanced space research and technology (or, lack thereof, nowadays).
In the 33 years I”ve been in the Agency, it is only in these recent times that NASA does not have a single top-level official and organization for space tech R&D. There is one for Aero R&D; but no longer for space. That fact alone – no head of space R&D at NASA HQ – is the best indicator of how far we’ve fallen. Not having an advocate at the top levels for space R&D is building in a culture of eating the seed corn, and not growing what will be needed.
Recently, when Jeff Greason of XCOR was asked *What do we want NASA to be?” He said that while he really couldn’t answer that; what we DO need is a a NACA for space. NASA has gotten out of the R&D business. R&D sections throughout NASA are being shutdown. The AF and DARPA are still doing R&D but they have a very narrow focus on military applications.
This withdrawal from civil R&D has happened without an explicit Congressional mandate – without even an Administration mandate – and is purely the decision of current NASA managers. It is not something they have been forced to do. It has just occurred without anyone consciously planning it. Very few people in Congress realize what has happened.
NASA’s biggest problem right now is not money – it’s attitude. We have more money than all the other civilian space programs in the world; but our R&D efforts are shrinking the fastest. And what that means is that if – if – the US gets back to the moon, it will not be going back, to stay. We simply will not have the tools and technology to enable either the government, or American industry, to be able to afford to stay.
Dave,
Good analysis, I hadn’t thought of it in those specific terms before. I wish there was a way to either require NASA to get back into the space R&D business, or if that isn’t feasible (or maybe it isn’t even desireable to have *them* do it anymore), or to form a new agency or organization of some sort to pick up the slack. Anyone have any bright ideas?
~Jon
This withdrawal from civil R&D has happened without an explicit Congressional mandate – without even an Administration mandate – and is purely the decision of current NASA managers. It is not something they have been forced to do. It has just occurred without anyone consciously planning it. Very few people in Congress realize what has happened.
This is true. The entire In-Space Propulsion Program (under the Science Mission Directorate) has been slated for shutdown. This group has been developing ion engine, aerocapture, solar sail, and tether technology for the past six years at NASA, with a budget ranging from $20M to $60M per year. Now it is being cancelled even as its deliverables are nearing flight-ready status.
Perhaps a little look at reality would be beneficial in evaluating the success/failure of NIAC. Using NIAC numbers from the following source:
http://www.niac.usra.edu/files/misc/NIAC_ROI.pdf
NIAC has invested upwards of $30.5M ($9.5M Phase 1, $21M Phase 2) and highlights approximately $21.2M in follow-on funding in what appears to be their top 12 successes. Of that $21M follow-on funding, only about $10M is non-Govt. dollars. Investing $30M (or $41M if you count the additional Govt. funding) to attract $10M in private funding is not a very good ROI. I would have expected to see a 3-to-1 or 4-to1 ROI at the minimum, at least for 1 or 2 of the earliest Phase 2 projects by this point in time. It also doesn’t appear (at least based on this summary) that any of the projects are beyond even the earliest development phases. While not surprising based on the funding levels, one would think that some of the earliest Phase 2 efforts would have advanced to the point where they could be considered viable for application to a mission (TRL5 level). It may well be that a few of these efforts will yet see a real ROI, but the track record isn’t there yet.
“Investing $30M (or $41M if you count the additional Govt. funding) to attract $10M in private funding is not a very good ROI.”
An advanced studies program should not be judged solely (or even at all) by a cost-sharing metric. By definition, advanced studies involve high-risk concepts that will usually not attract private investment. (It’s actually quite impressive that NIAC achieved a 1-to-4 cost-sharing ratio.) Advanced studies are first and foremost about uncovering concepts that can give an agency or organization breakthrough capabilities, not a for-profit metric like ROI. (And even cost-sharing on standard development projects shouldn’t be measured by ROI.)
Prizes, however, should demonstrate leveraged investment. If an R&D agency puts up a prize with X value, it should see some multiple of X in terms of the total investment by the teams pursuing the prize. Some of that investment may just be sweat equity, but regardless, a prize that attracts less than its value (less than X) is potentially a poorly constructed competition.
FWIW…
“This withdrawal from civil R&D has happened without an explicit Congressional mandate – without even an Administration mandate – and is purely the decision of current NASA managers. It is not something they have been forced to do. It has just occurred without anyone consciously planning it.”
Agreed. When the “D” eats the “R” in an R&D agency like NASA, it’s time to reconsider the scope and cost of the “D”.
“This is true. The entire In-Space Propulsion Program (under the Science Mission Directorate) has been slated for shutdown. This group has been developing ion engine, aerocapture, solar sail, and tether technology for the past six years at NASA, with a budget ranging from $20M to $60M per year. Now it is being cancelled even as its deliverables are nearing flight-ready status.”
This is a real shame.
“This group has been developing ion engine, aerocapture, solar sail, and tether technology for the past six years at NASA, with a budget ranging from $20M to $60M per year. Now it is being cancelled even as its deliverables are nearing flight-ready status.â€
In concept, yes this is a bad sign. However, there are two things that temper my disappointment. First, it is a MSFC run program that had its genesis as part of the SLI program that was a complete failure. ISPP has not been run much better. Second, the technologies they are pursuing no longer fit the goals of the ISPP. Ion engines are now commercial flight products and there is significant overlap with the efforts of GRC for higher power ion engines. MSFC should no longer be involved with this effort as it has proceeded past the basic R&D level. Aerocapture is a natural extension of aerobraking and is well understood by industry. Solar sails have (in my opinion) such a limited potential role for any future mission application as to be a waste of time. Tethers have flown as space experiments on a number of occasions nad have yet to show any level of success. It is time to give them up. I would rather see ISPP continue, but with the charter to develop NEP and NTP as propulsion technologies that are high $ investments, high development efforts that the commercial sector cannot pursue.
“First, it is a MSFC run program that had its genesis as part of the SLI program that was a complete failure.”
I’m nitpicking, but ISPP was not part of SLI. SLI was run out of the old Aerospace Technology Enterprise while ISPP was a Space Science Enterprise initiative.
MSFC management is another issue.
“Second, the technologies they are pursuing no longer fit the goals of the ISPP.”
ISPP was/is not about paving the way for commercial applications or human space flight. Rather, it was propulsion work to support more capable, more aggressive, and faster space science missions. In that context — such as major leaps in SEP size and performance for interplanetary robotic missions and solar sails for propellentless Sun/Earth observation missions — the program’s investments are very relevant. I’d also quibble technically regarding assertions about single-pass aerocapture (at Earth or Mars) and long tethers being ready for commercial prime-time.
Whether NASA’s ISPP investments should have been focused on commercial applications or human space flight instead of science missions is another argument. But against the goals of the ISPP program as laid out, ISPP investments were highly relevant to a new generation of space science missions.
“”I would rather see ISPP continue, but with the charter to develop NEP and NTP as propulsion technologies that are high $ investments, high development efforts that the commercial sector cannot pursue.”
Major investments are important over the long-run in this area. Unfortunately, Griffin sacrificed Project Prometheus (the major NEP initiative under the VSE) on the ESAS/Ares I/Orion altar very early in his tenure as Administrator.
I wish there was a way to either require NASA to get back into the space R&D business, or if that isn’t feasible (or maybe it isn’t even desireable to have *them* do it anymore), or to form a new agency or organization of some sort to pick up the slack. Anyone have any bright ideas?
~Jon
Since you asked………
Most of non-science, non-aero NASA is being very intentionally turned into a single program office; ie, not only go to Moon, then Mars; but do that in one and only one way (or so it seems to me). What we’re talking about is needed is the stuff that won’t fit in that increasingly-narrow, increasingly less-flexible paradigm.
A separate – totally separate – office that is, by definition, to remain outside the mainstream, is needed; something that can’t be arbitrarily rated. Basically, something that is a cross between NACA(for space) and DARPA, in one group; and run the way Tether runs DARPA today.(ie, small; flexible; no one allowed to make a career out of the space-DARPA, etc. )
DARPA survives in spite of it being inside DOD. Congress has clearly and traditionally drawn a line around it; and it has had excellent people run it in the past (and in my view, right now), who really make the most with relatively little.
Just re-constituting another Mission Directorate for this stuff will get raided and killed in the current NASA. But drawing a line around it – call it DARPA-S (for space) or whatever, with it’s own separate budget line – is what is needed. Congress is moving on doing this – or at least they think they are – with the provision moving through Congress right now to create a “DARPA-E” in the Department of Energy.
Heck, call it ‘SARPA’ – Space Advanced Research Projects Agency. You heard it here first.
“I’m nitpicking, but ISPP was not part of SLI. SLI was run out of the old Aerospace Technology Enterprise while ISPP was a Space Science Enterprise initiative.”
You are correct in how the two programs were managed. My reference was more to how funding for SLI was achieved. If my memory is correct, to secure congressional support for SLI, ISPP was initiated and promises made as to the level of funding that would be allocated to this area. Once approved, dollars were quickly allocated to SLI while ISPP funding was placed on the back burner. It wasn’t until a number of members of Congress threatened to pull SLI funding if ISPP wasn’t ramped up that ISPP actually began to get dollars and started to look at potential technologies.
“I’d also quibble technically regarding assertions about single-pass aerocapture (at Earth or Mars) and long tethers being ready for commercial prime-time.”
I am not sure where the quibble is. As for single-pass aerocapture, it comes down to how much risk you are willing to take. In the case of Mars missions, the two extremes (aerobraking in the case of MRO and ballistic entry (MER, Phoenix)) are practiced. It is a function of taking what has been learned from these two approaches and applying to a single-pass aerocapture. It is less of a technical risk (overheating, higher than expected aerodynamic loads, etc.) than a mission risk. Aerobraking gives you multiple chances to get it right and a failure at the wrong time does not end the mission. Ballistic entry ensures you reach your destination (the surface) and it comes down to designing for the landing. Aerocapture is a one-shot deal, either you get it right the first time or the mission is over. As for tethers, I would agree. They are a long way from being ready for any mission application and in my opinion, never will be. I would include solar sails in this category as well.
I would argue that cancellation of the JIMO aspect of Prometheus was the right thing to do. While the reactor development costs were in the range of $3.5B, the development costs for the rest of the S/C were $4.8B. The S/C development costs have for the most part been overlooked and the finger pointed at the Rx as the reason for the program’s demise. I would argue that a small, capable space reactor could be developed and fielded for less than $2B for either Lunar surface power or as a small NEP power source. To me, that is a worthy investment of NASA R&D dollars.
GUESS who says: “NIAC has invested upwards of $30.5M ($9.5M Phase 1, $21M Phase 2) and highlights approximately $21.2M in follow-on funding in what appears to be their top 12 successes. Of that $21M follow-on funding, only about $10M is non-Govt. dollars. Investing $30M (or $41M if you count the additional Govt. funding) to attract $10M in private funding is not a very good ROI. I would have expected to see a 3-to-1 or 4-to1 ROI at the minimum, at least for 1 or 2 of the earliest Phase 2 projects by this point in time. It also doesn’t appear (at least based on this summary) that any of the projects are beyond even the earliest development phases. While not surprising based on the funding levels, one would think that some of the earliest Phase 2 efforts would have advanced to the point where they could be considered viable for application to a mission (TRL5 level). It may well be that a few of these efforts will yet see a real ROI, but the track record isn’t there yet.”
Keep in mind that the funding criterion for a NIAC project is that it has a ten to 40 year development time frame. The twelve examples in the report you cite include at least five that were funded only within the last couple of years. Keep in mind also that some of the earliest funded NIAC projects include the Space Elevator, a pretty ambitious undertaking by any standard.
If you read further in the document cited, you will see instances of earlier concepts that have so far brought in 3-4 times more in additional funding, for example the promising electromagnetic formation flying effort, and tether work.
” I wish there was a way to either require NASA to get back into the space R&D business, or if that isn’t feasible (or maybe it isn’t even desireable to have *them* do it anymore), or to form a new agency or organization of some sort to pick up the slack. Anyone have any bright ideas?”
With due respect to NASA, there are a number of us who have agitated for an advanced concepts organization that is truly national in scope and continues to focus on audacious concepts for our future in space. NIAC may be on its deathbed, but its work is not over.
Diana, nice summary. Thanks for your effort!
To expand on your ideas, and respond to GuessWho, i would like to point out that the charter of NIAC was to explore ideas that were considered 25-50 years out (or further, using caves as habitats on mars is a long ways from here) on a TRL scale. Point in fact; that NO BODY, including the original Space Elevator study team (which I was a part of, in the last year of a 2.5 year program) thought that the SE could be built so ‘quickly’.
So, to say that NIAC had a poor ROI is to not give it enough credit.
That it has ANY ROI for projects – this early in the TRL scale – is to be commended…
I have heard NIAC referred to as the “Hail Mary” division of NASA, specifically because EVERYTHING it granted funds to was (by design and intention) a long shot… What they did was grant funds to wild/crazy/unrealistic project, and in a few cases, it was proven (on paper, not in the markets, yet) that some of the wild/crazy/unrealistic projects were in fact achievable.
And these researchers broke new ground and opened up new opportunities. The SE being (admittedly) perhaps the most unlikely in a set of many unlikely projects.
Whether the SE is ever built or not, is beside the point. Certainly I think it will be, much sooner than the official NASA claim of “300 years, to never…” What we have achieved so far are (developing) breakthroughs in communications (www.tetheredtowers.com is just in the birthing process), robotics, nanotech, and that is just the beginning. For us to succeed, eventually we will have to have additional breakthroughs in material sciences, lasers, solar cells and computing/AI.
In terms of real world results, NIAC did what it was designed to do – it was a catalyst for breakthrough technology.
In terms of raw dollars and sense (pun on purpose) I can confirm from my own experience that of the $570k that was granted this project, more than $7M has been spent or is budgeted and pledged. Beyond that, more than 800 researchers have spent countless hours and have added to the body of knowledge. These hours were volunteered, so while that is not ‘trackable’ in real dollars, it has real value).
Is that a lot of money compared to a project of this scope? No. Is that a lot of money, compared to NASA’s budget? No. Is that a helluva ROI for a project that, 5 years ago no one thought possible? YES!
NIAC should continue its past and should be funded.
Take care. mjl
GUESSWHO: Investing $30M (or $41M if you count the additional Govt. funding) to attract $10M in private funding is not a very good ROI.
GuessWho,
Please recall, that
1) NIAC was focused on projects that were 10+ years in the future.
2) Because of the compounded discounted present value of money, that private companies have a huge incentive to focus on the near-term, and to NOT invest in anything in the long-term. For many companies, anything longer than 3 years is “long-term”. 5 years is clearly long-term for almost all private companies.
……(Historically, there are a few rare exceptions, such as AT&T and IBM, which had the luxury to invest in such projects. Most of that long-term research has disappeared, and their lab managers must now justify their research on the probability shorter-term successes, and are measured in this way.)
The fact that NIAC acquired $10M in private matching funds, on $30-41M in government funds, is pretty amazing. I would have suggested to NIAC’s managers that they expect much less.
The appropriate way to measure NIAC’s “effectiveness” is how effectively it advanced new technology & technology concepts (like how Mr. Cowing recently highlighted the skin tight space suit.)
The availability of new tech is the REAL output that needs to be measured. Acquiring matching funds is, at best, an indirect measure of effectiveness for all programs, and at worst can distract you from your real objective. In all cases, the amount of matching funds should not be used as a primary tool to judge the effectiveness (e.g., ROI).
You can apply this same policy to other programs, such as COTS, or the EELV … both of which have/had private investment.
The way EELV was judged to be a success is that the DOD acquired two new highly reliable rockets that are somewhat cheaper than their predecessors. Reliability is what the DOD really cared about, since they launch billion-dollar satellites. The DOD is pretty pleased with themselves (and the EELV) at the moment with over 50 successful flights in a row.
For COTS, the “success” we all really care about is measured by whether at least one of the two COTS winners flys successfully. If they both fail, it is irrelevant how much “matching funds” they had.
The same is true of NIAC.
– Al