Yesterday’s Senate hearing wasn’t exactly a lovefest for Griffin: there were a number of tough questions from the two senators in attendance, Bill Nelson and Kay Bailey Hutchison, touching on everything from shuttle retirement plans to the impending US reliance on Russian spacecraft for ISS access to potential layoffs at KSC after the shuttle retirement to questions about how to get one experiment, the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer, to the station given there’s no room for it on the shuttle manifest. And the solutions Griffin offered to some of the problems, like ISS access, didn’t seem convincing to the senators: Griffin spoke with guarded optimism about COTS, noting the progress SpaceX is making, but Nelson was openly skeptical that a commercial ISS access option would be ready by 2010, noting the long development time for the European ATV and Japanese HTV vehicles.
As the hearing dragged on, it appeared that Griffin became increasingly frustrated. “We are where we are as the result of prior decisions made by prior administrations and prior Congresses,” he said at one point late in the hearing, as Nelson quizzed him on NASA’s need to rely on Russia for ISS access once the shuttle is retired. “I don’t like it, and I consider it to be unseemingly in the extreme and unwise strategically for the United States to be dependent on any other nation for any other thing. I could not be more clear on that. This is where we are, and I’m doing the best I can to chart our course out of it. I did not get us into this position; I’m doing the best I can to get out of it. And if you think I like it, you would be wrong.”
Nelson asked, in response, “So what do I do, besides pray?”
Griffin: “I guess you need to hire somebody smarter than me, because I have not been able to figure out a better one. I take responsibility for the plan we have, going forward. I don’t have a better one. I share your concern… I don’t have a better plan. I’m sorry.”
There was, though, a bit of levity in the hearing as Sen. Hutchison took note of Griffin’s stark assessments:
Hutchison: “Dr. Griffin, like Sen. Nelson, I’ve worked with you for a long time. I respect you. I think you’ve done enormous things for NASA. But you are not an encourager.”
Griffin: “Yes, Senator, I’m sorry that I’m not an encourager. I want to never, ever, ever promise you something that I can’t deliver.”
A little later:
Nelson: “We need to get Dr. Griffin to be an encourager.”
Hutchison: “He is – notoriously – an engineer.”
You know what happens in the private sector when you tell the bosses (or at least the check writers) “I guess you need to hire somebody smarter than me, because I have not been able to figure out a better one.”? They hire someone smarter, or at least smart enough not to say things like that. Jeez.
Griffin: “I guess you need to hire somebody smarter than me, because I have not been able to figure out a better one. I take responsibility for the plan we have, going forward. I don’t have a better one. I share your concern… I don’t have a better plan. I’m sorry.â€
Griffin: “Yes, Senator, I’m sorry that I’m not an encourager. I want to never, ever, ever promise you something that I can’t deliver.â€
Then next line of questions should have been this.
“Is the Ares-I something you think you can still deliver given the serious technical problems being discussed by NASA engineers as we speak?â€
Follow-up
“Given this don’t you think it would be prudent to have a back up should Ares-I fail, given what is at stake here?”
“Have you heard of the DIRECT concept?â€
“Could you provide a copy to my staff of your recent internal evaluation of DIRECT?â€
While this didn’t happen at the meeting hopefully it did after the meeting between the respective support staff.
Hope springs eternal.
So Griffin needs a better plan for Constellation and the gap, and doesn’t have one.
Meanwhile, the Direct launcher folks seem to have a pretty convincing one that handles the technical, political, budget, and schedule issues. It has sure seen the rounds inside some circles in NASA, but according to Griffin’s “Ask the Administrator” answer last month “we are not examining this concept further at this time”. And a month ago he was telling the NASA workforce that the Constellation architecture was set in stone because “I don’t wish to alter it”.
And besides Direct, it is pretty obvious that a CEV (CEV-lite?) on EELV would also take care of that nasty little gap issue at the lowest cost possible (although it might not take care of some of the political “workforce retention” and “shuttle infrastructure” issues that are spelled out in the NASA Authorization Act as the official law of the land ).
C’mon Mike, which is it – there’s no better plan, or you’re just too much in love with your own plan to consider anything else.
Quotes from:
(http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2007/10/todays_ask_the_16.html)
(http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=25596).
(Yay for Keith for his great work in keeping us all informed about NASA and keeping all this info handy for everyone. Boo for Keith for not considering that Direct is at least a better idea than the current Constellation mess, even if it isn’t as simple and inexpensive as CEV on EELV.)
Flame on? (No, just some good serious discussion, please)
Hmm. It seems that some people wanted Griffin to–well–lie and claim to be more optimistic than he was and tell the Senators what they wanted to hear. I think we had far too much of that during the 1990s.
The gap issue could be taken care of at the lowest cost possible by purchasing rides on the Progress, Soyuz, and ATV. Or NASA and industry could spend maybe $500 million more to integrate an EELV with an unmanned cargo ship in a way that immediately makes the future relevancy of such a solution suspect given the expected lifetime of the space station and the overlap in capabilities with it and CEV. No offense to SpaceHab, but that company has thus far proven that it lives and dies with the Shuttle. The gap should not be politicized in such a way that NASA is pushed to find a service that lives and dies with the Station.
I’m guessing Griffin feels hemmed by the government’s 23-year-old commitment to finishing a space station that we don’t really have money to use for much of anything. The latest plan on completion was approved by Bush before Griffin was hired, but it’s hard for Griffin to blame the boss he’s still working for.
As for the moon, Griffin made architectural decisions that probably won’t work out very well. There was reportedly heavy political pressure to try to keep the existing shuttle force in place. I imagine you can’t go before Congress and blame it and the White House for pressuring for that, either.
Otherwise, this seems like another cry for help. Like the time he casually dismissed the destruction of public records in the IG case. Hey, anyone have an update on that?
Oh, but someone else will be hired to replace him, of course. Unfortunately this will not happen before elections but whats another year of waste of money, opportunities and engineering talent for NASA with decades already behind them ?
Senator Nelson was 100% correct in his concern with predicting what the geo-politics will be 4-5 years from now with Russia.
Also, anyone who doesn’t want to repeat what happened after Apollo will support some form of an STS derived approach. The question is what is the ‘best’ STS derived approach we can come up with based on the money we have to eliminate the gap. Unfortunately time is running out on even the best STS based plan’s ability to minimize the pain of transitioning from Shuttle/ISS to the VSE.
We might be able to get back some of the time wasted chasing Ares-I with a few more Space Shuttle flights after 2010 as was strongly hinted at in the meeting. The J-2 engine development is the pacing item for the Ares-I which DIRECT will not need until the after the ISS support is up and running.
By retaining the Shuttle’s external tank dimensions we could even construct the first Jupiter core tanks even while the current Space Shuttle tanks are being fabricated on the same line. That way we could get an Jupiter core in the rocket test stand up and running with existing RS-68 engines. In addition, because we have the same foot print as the STS stack we could use the current launch infrastructure at KSC to get a few test flights in even while Space Shuttle operations are in their final stages. Ideally we would have no gap what so ever for KSC operations.
The objectives of the VSE should not be confused with a solution that just delivers a crew to the ISS which the EELV’s can handle today. I agree that this job could be done very safely and inexpensively by even the single core variants of the Atlas or Delta because we don’t need a large/heavy lunar class service module for the ISS mission. This would also simplify Orion development effort significantly helping to speed up its on dock time.
The bigger question is does the U.S. want to send astronauts to explore beyond Earth orbit? If the answer is yes than we need to transition our ‘existing’ (as close to as is as possible) heavy lift infrastructure and workforce towards this objective while leveraging everything we can get from the existing EELV systems.
If the VSE is not our objective then post Columbia we have to ask the question again; what is it that we are doing with astronauts in Earth orbit that is worth the blood and treasure we are expending? regardless of how expedient and cost effective an ISS EELV only solution to the Space Shuttle would be.
The Jupiter-120 (Ares-II) is less of a paper rocket and will be two years and billions of dollars from now even if we continue to work on the Ares-I. Here is why.
We have existing RS-68 engines vs. the Ares-I J-2X
We have an existing 8.4m Core manufacturing facility vs. new 5.5m core for Ares-I.
We use the proven 4-Segment SRB vs. the Ares-I 5-Segment SRB
We use the proven STS SRB-side mounted configuration vs. Ares-I inline configuration.
We use the existing foot print at the VAB and at the Launch Pad vs. Ares-I all new
The primary modifications will be the aft thrust structure, gage changes along the tank’s length and modification to forward LOX tank to take payload at the top. At the end we will have a vehicle with about 2x the lift capacity and 8x the volume capacity of anything in the world today. Add a second stage and a 2xJupiter-232 architecture delivers more mass into orbit using a common launch system than the ESAS 1.5 plan.
Stephen – as much as I am a supporter of Direct (and I really am), I think its a mistake to say that the only way to avoid the mistakes we made after Apollo is to use STS derivatives. First, we aren’t getting rid of every rocket, and hoping for one – I do think that you could make an EELV approach that would work wonders. Alternatively, there is some real possiblities utlizing a COTS based approach (I’d love to know why Sen. Nelson is so skeptacle of Musk).
That said, I do think there is some good reasons to consider Direct (it offers a fairly quick path to Heavy Lift, which isn’t necassarily bad, and there is the whole “shuttle workforce” thing, which tends to be an elephant in the room).
Two years to fund and develop an EELV derived minimal system to assuage NASA concerns of being unable to service the space station for a few years? I say not worth it. As Senator Nelson points out, there’s no guarantee that such a system will be developed in time and so is an invitation for failure. NASA should focus on CEV (perhaps direct only), support a COTS solution (and not some minimal quick-fix EELV or not), and leave it up to capitalism to bridge the gap.
Jeff: As the hearing dragged on, it appeared that Griffin became increasingly frustrated.
All other things aside, this alone demonstrates (again) why Dr. Griffin was an inappropriate choice to lead NASA. It is never wise to get testy with your boss when asking for more money. He has made powerful unnecessary enemies for the NASA and the VSE (let alone ESAS) just by opening his mouth. He needed to read and fully accept Jeff’s logo at the top of Space Politics Because sometimes the most important orbit is the Beltway…. Political success is far, far more important to returning to Earth’s moon or going anywhere else than any technology or architecture. A NASA Administer who does not understand that, has no chance of achieving the goal.
Ferris, I think many of us are overly focused on the launch system and forget that most of the expensive components of space exploration (even for the unmanned programs) is not the launch but the operations and spacecraft development costs. This is where the higher mass margins and volume of the Jupiter vs. EELV will really pay off. Reducing this portion of the spacecraft development expense by even 20% will effectively ‘pay’ for the launch.
Also if we distribute STS based Jupiter launch system element work strategically we could effectively create a National launch system with both a strong federal and private political support base that should be able to weather the upcoming discretionary budget storm brought on by a the significant demographics shift ahead of us.
Engaging in the Atlas vs. Delta vs. NASA debate will just divide our forces.
If we don’t hang together we will hang separately.
If SpaceX achieves even half of what they are attempting to do the lower end of the EELV market will be severely under cut almost requiring the EELV companies to move into the Jupiter and sell those expanded capabilities to their current customers. Then again SpaceX will only ever be one or two launch failures away from a business failure until they get about twenty successful launches under their belt vs. the ability of the EELV operators to self-insure after a launch failure.
Again it comes back to the spacecraft/mission expense not the launch cost as the primary driver of decisions and affordability.
NASA should focus on CEV (perhaps direct only), support a COTS solution (and not some minimal quick-fix EELV or not), and leave it up to capitalism to bridge the gap.
And then proceed to develop a launch vehicle and mission architecture which duplicates existing capabilities, at enormous taxpayer expense, with which will not be able to compete, when they finally come on line, eight years hence.
jml says “Boo for Keith for not considering that Direct is at least a better idea than the current Constellation mess, even if it isn’t as simple and inexpensive as CEV on EELV.)”
I prefer “simple and inexpensive” … as do many other people right now. Mike Griffin has already shown that “complex and expensive” just gets more complex and expensive.
As for Direct and workforce – if your goal is to keep the marching army employed by using this Direct idea then we’re not going to get back to the Moon. Simply unaffordable to keep such a large workforce – period.
Astonished, request clarification as to your astonishment.
With a fixed $500 million expense, the taxpayer expense is not a future variable WRT COTS. Neither the VSE nor any COTS solution will duplicate existing capability. The VSE derives from the heritage of all prior NASA development. A commercial manned/cargo launch and delivery capability has never existed in the U.S. A COTS solution, just like a VSE solution, can incorporate and build upon existing technology. If that includes an EELV, then great. The purpose of COTS is to “stimulate the commercial space transportation market to help develop safe, reliable, and cost effective access to and from low-Earth orbit” not to be a band-aid to the schedule wounds for U.S. cargo delivery to the ISS (that’s all I was meaning to say).
I tend to believe that any short term solution would tend to not be amenable to near-future market demands outside cargo delivery to the ISS.
Neither the VSE nor any COTS solution will duplicate existing capability.
I must admit, I am further astonished. I thought I had maxed out, but I am.
VSE is not a capability, ESAS is a plan for some capabilities. ESAS is what I am referring to, not COTS. COTS has simply become plan C, after plan B, the EELVs. Plan A is dead. Direct is dead too, it’s just slimmed down ESAS.
The purpose of COTS is to “stimulate the commercial space transportation market to help develop safe, reliable, and cost effective access to and from low-Earth orbit†not to be a band-aid to the schedule wounds for U.S. cargo delivery to the ISS (that’s all I was meaning to say).
The fatal schedule wound is to VSE and ESAS, we already have plenty of access to the ISS. The problem is now much greater than the original motivation for COTS, because soon we will lose another heavy lift capability in the space shuttle, and we are just getting ready to write off ESAS as providing any future capability to go anywhere, let alone the moon. We can no longer afford to return to the moon with humans, not with ESAS, not with EELVs and certainly not with COTS. Nor is there any reason to anymore.
Wouldn’t it be great if we could stimulate the commercialization of the orbital space transportation industry, revitalize our EELV production capabilities with much higher flight rates, solve our upcoming ISS resupply and reboost problems, cooperate with an existing COTS competitor and our EELV upper stage to low earth orbit capabilities, and produce a sustainable infrastructure which would revitalize Earth sciences and reduce the costs of grandiose space exploration projects, all at the same time?
With the astonishing array of space infrastructure assets laid out before US, it would have to take a very unique individual to screw that simple goal up.
Sure, you can’t blame Griffin, he demonstrably does not have the launch vehicle architecture analysis and design skills to pull something like that off, and he ignored the many people and organizations that do, with deceit. But you can blame yourself for letting this happen and not speaking out, and letting the failure process fester for two full years, to its inevitable failure.
A 30 day COTS proposal timeline is simply not enough time to examine all available launch vehicle architectures to come up with that one scenario that hits the sweet spot. We all know now that takes at 60 days to perform.
Sorry, I just couldn’t resist that. I can’t possibly complete a launch vehicle architecture study in 30 days, or 60 days, or even two years, but what I can do is forward the outline that I do have to NASA, based upon decades of intense launch vehicle architecture studies I have made, publish it, and disseminate it to the principles of the industry, which must now save NASA from the mess that George W. Bush and Michael Griffin has made of it.
Maybe we could hire someone who has designed a rocket at least once before in his life. Too obvious? I recall another “notorious engineer”. He was known for designing airplanes rather than collecting degrees.
I gotta agree with Keith that “simple and inexpensive†does sound like an awfully good idea. EELV does look like the best solution if NASA’s goal for manned space flight is to be the operator of Crewed missions to the ISS and LEO. (rather than what Griffin considers the “unseemingly” ideas of having someone else operate those rides for us.)
Keith or Stephen: Correct me if I’m wrong, but I thought the Direct idea would pare down the costs of the STS standing army somewhat by not requiring all the orbiter and SSME and payload processing tasks (and reduce the workforce gently using “natural attrition” rather than mass layoffs). Yeah, it would still require all the jobs needed in Utah for the SRB’s and in Michoud for the ET/Core, and for most everything that has to do with operations at LC-39 and the VAB. But at least it would free up some dollars for other purposes – perhaps even building and operating silly things like an EDS and an LSAM. Would the dollars saved by this partial workforce reduction really be enough to accomplish those sort of other purposes? I’m not sure that the answer is yes, unless we adopt another of Griffin’s strategies: a really long term “go-as-you-pay” approach.
Sadly it looks like astonished is quite right to say that we are about to lose our heavy lift capability and that we as a society don’t see any reason to carry out the VSE’s objectives of mars, moon, and beyond. I wish it wasn’t so.
That’s the reason why Direct’s ESAS-light seems appealing to me. Financially and politically, it just might have a chance to survive and maybe eventually get us beyond LEO. If not, yep, Plan B is EELV and Plan C is COTS and plan D is to beg the Russians to help us out.
A handful of thoughts:
1) The EELV vs. DIRECT (and vs. COTS) debate is arguably a year or more premature. As is obvious from this hearing, even though Congress is dissatisfied with the current approach and timeline, they are practically impotent to make any substantive changes to improve it, in terms of either funding or technical details. The decision on what replaces Ares I/Orion will be up to the next White House some 14 or more months from now. And that decision will be driven by factors that are external to the options that are on the table.
For example, if the next White House defers or terminates the human lunar return effort, then there will be little demand for a heavy lift booster like DIRECT (or Ares V). At that point, an EELV/CTV alternative would likely be the most attractive option, given that the costs of Ares I make no sense without Ares V (along with all the duplication of effort, technical, and schedule issues surrounding Ares I). But even in the absence of a heavy lift need, there are scenarios where EELV . If the RpK COTS money goes to Space-X and Space-X continues to perform (and Bigelow even awards Space-X a contract), their may be little need to human-rate an EELV (except maybe as a backup to Falcon 9/Dragon).
The point is that we’re arguing today about the merits of different options without knowing what tomorrow’s criteria will be for judging those merits. Until we know those criteria, the efforts of the proponents of all these alternatives are arguably better spent continuing to prepare their alternatives, pointing out the problems with Ares I/Orion, and finding common ground on the need to prepare for change.
2) In the vein of preparing for change, something that could be done now that is within the werewithal of Congressional (or White House) staff is to direct NASA to fund an independent analysis of alternatives. Griffin has not made good use of his PA&E (Program Analysis and Evaluation) office, but there’s no reason Congress and the White House shouldn’t set aside some millions in the FY08 budget (whether its in an appropriations bill, omnibus bill, or continuing resolution) and direct that office to contract with the Aerospace Corporation or another good, independent study shop for a serious, year-long analysis of alternatives. Again, the analysis should not seek to find the one, best solution, but rather which solutions work best under different requirements, criteria, and assumptions. This would prevent a repeat of Griffin/ESAS, where the next White House is relying solely on the personality of a new NASA Administrator and another rushed, flawed, and internally biased NASA study. Regardless of whether we’re DIRECT, EELV, newspace, or flying saucer advocates, a serious, independent analysis of alternatives to ESAS/Ares I/Orion is something that everyone can probably agree on. It would be the highest value investment that the taxpayer could possibly make in NASA’s future right now.
3) Congress has got to come to grips with the reality that no matter what replaces the Space Shuttle, there will be substantial workforce dislocations. Even with Shuttle-derived vehicles like Ares I/V and DIRECT, whole elements of the Shuttle Transportation System are going away (e.g., the orbiter) along with their positions. Some of those workers may have skills or be retrainable to the new vehicles or other activities. But no doubt, many contractors, and likely even some civil servants, will be out of a job.
Rather than uselessly wringing their hands over the potential jobs impact, Congress (and the White House) need to demand real workforce plans (with numbers!) from NASA showing what civil servant and contractor skills they have, what skills they’ll need, what positions will transfer, what will be done with the remainder, what the alternatives are, and what the benefits/drawbacks (including costs) of those alternatives are. No doubt, such workforce plans will change after the election. But NASA has had years since the VSE and ESAS to develop such a plan, and it’s high time NASA started getting some practice with real H/R management. Either we stop managing NASA’s human space flight activities like they are entitlement programs, or we give up on government-sponsored human space exploration/development in the United States. It’s just that simple.
4) Congress has also got to come to grips with the reality that extending Space Shuttle operations does no good and actually has significant potential for crippling harm. Unless Congress thinks that it can throw another $4-5 billion per year at NASA after 2010 (and obviously Congress can’t even come up with another $1 billion), extended Shuttle operations will only bleed money from Shuttle’s replacement, deferring, but not closing, the “gap”. Worse, extending the operations of an inherently unsafe vehicle is a dangerous crapshoot. Personally, if I were a member of the nation’s political leadership, I would want to be on the record for arguing that NASA should get off the Space Shuttle as soon as possible. The last thing any Congressman should want to be associated with, even for the sake of Florida or Texas votes, is the loss of a third orbiter and Space Shuttle crew. Either we get NASA off the Space Shuttle ASAP or we spend billions of taxpayer dollars for the purpose of potentially killing more astronauts. It’s just that simple.
5) Finally, concerns about Putin aside, the “gap” is not the biggest problem, or even a real problem, with NASA’s human space flight programs today. Even after the Shuttle is retired, the ISS has backup after backup — from Ares I/Orion (or whatever replaces them) to COTS to ATV/HTV to Soyuz/Progress — to keep it sustained. And unlike the Apollo/Shuttle gap, the post-Shuttle human space flight workforce will have plenty of activities before Shuttle’s replacement is operational to keep its skills sharp — from ISS and foreign vehicle operations to Ares I/Orion testing (or testing for whatever replaces them) to COTS testing and operations. It may be “unseemly” to Griffin not to fly astronauts for a handful of years, but we did it before, under far worse conditions, and during a Cold War to boot, and the stars did not fall out of the sky.
The biggest problem with NASA’s human space flight programs today is that we’re on a path to go from one inherently unreliable and unsafe ETO system (the Space Shuttle) to another inherently unreliable and unsafe, maybe even unflyable, ETO system (Ares I/Orion). Even if we set aside complaints about Ares I’s duplication of EELV capabilities, the high cost of Ares I/Orion relative to alternatives, and the associated schedule impact, there are huge technical issues associated with Ares I/Orion safety that Congress, the White House, and even NASA’s institutional offices and advisory boards (Safety and Mission Assurance, Chief Engineer, and Program Analysis and Evaluation, NASA Advisory Council, etc.) have got to start paying attention to and pushing back on (despite Griffin’s recent edict to the contrary). If I was a political leader, appointee, manager, staffer, or advisor in any of these institutions, the last thing that I would want on my record was an explicit or tacit endorsement of vehicles that variously lack or have lost adequate performance and mass margins, adequate rigidity and stability in flight, redundant systems, critical abort modes, the ability to track key safety trends, traceability to known safe systems, radiation shielding, etc. I don’t expect Griffin, Exploration Systems, or Constellation management to stand up and be counted on these issues — their egos are too invested — but it’s high time for the individuals in the institutions that write the checks and provide oversight to do so.
My 2 cents… FWIW.
Those are really good plans, but you forgot plan E (for you know who).
When we aren’t inventing, analyzing and occasionally destroying launch vehicle architectures, we occasionally think about what we might do with those architectures, once they ultimately become successful (by that I mean as in economically sustainable). I’ll leave that up to your imaginations.
You’d be surprised what private industry and market economics might be capable of accomplishing, in the way of grandiose space development, colonization and exploration, with all of the above plans operating in a synergistic manner, and with a whole slew of different hydrocarbon and cryogenic propulsion options available, given functioning space stations.
The goal here is the year 2015, when we get to see three new planets. If a viable multipronged commercial space transportation system is in place by then, and it certainly looks like it will be, then simple hydrocarbon based booster augmentation of existing systems will easily deliver you your goals.
MarkWhittington wrote @ November 16th, 2007 at 11:31 am
Hmm. It seems that some people wanted Griffin to–well–lie and claim to be more optimistic than he was and tell the Senators what they wanted to hear. I think we had far too much of that during the 1990s.
Maybe so, Mark. But this is pretty much an admission by Griffin that he and Bush have done a poor job, have no good solutions, and are likely to leave a train wreck for their successors. And Griffin largely failed to take responsibility for any of it.
Aside from that, his candor was refreshing.
Ultimately, the biggest problem is the Senate arguing over the scraps they send NASA when they’re dumping over a Trillion Dollars into these wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Regardless of how you see Griffin’s assessment, and the grilling he received, his candor is the only positive thing in this science-fearing legislature. I can guarantee that less then 1% of these morons in congress can pass a simple high school science exam. All our legislative policy decisions are based on individuals who know show no interest in the sciences. Not only are we faced with a Congress that’s largely ignorant of scientific matters, but an Executive branch that goes out if its way to purposely manipulate data, misrepresent scientific principles, and uphold a childish belief in a supernatural entity answering to prayers and interfering in human affairs. If it all wasn’t so sad, it would be laughable.
This seems relevant to the ISS gap Ares/COTS parts of the discussion:
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=1244
First Stage Design Problems Arise For NASA’s Ares 1 Rocket
(covers a possible oscillation problem with the Ares 1 first stage, possible 14-16 month delay beyond March 2015 for first Ares 1 launch carrying people because of problems announced earlier, and comforting reassurances by ESMD … see the link for details).
Keith said: “As for Direct and workforce – if your goal is to keep the marching army employed by using this Direct idea then we’re not going to get back to the Moon. Simply unaffordable to keep such a large workforce – period.”
It needs to be pointed out that no matter which launch system is used, EELV, DIRECT, or something from India or China, once a full blown lunar exploration program is underway, the workforce to support that will be much larger than the current STS workforce. Decimating that workforce now would only do 2 things:
1. Save a lot of money during the transition from STS to VSE.
2. Require NASA to attempt to rehire almost everybody and then double that number. The trouble is that they won’t be available anymore. They will have moved away and gotten other jobs so they could pay their mortgages and by their groceries.
A Lunar VSE workforce will need to be massive, and completely independant of what launch system is used.
once a full blown lunar exploration program is underway, the workforce to support that will be much larger than the current STS workforce.
Ahem. Why is that so? We have a new software paradigm. It’s called ‘open source’. Orbiter space flight simulator comes to mind. The workforce could be distributed over the internet. They might even decide to work for free.
Where do you think computing technology is going to be in the year 2015?
I posit your Apollo paradigm is obsolete. It’s just too bad Michael Griffin and his development team are the last guys in the world to realize that. Besides the actual rockets, software and payroll are next costly on the list.
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=1244
So we’re now looking at 2016 – 2017 before Orion can fly on Ares-I? That is what’s unseemly.
Atlas or Delta could have Orion docked to ISS before Shuttle retires if they got the green light today. Let EELV fly to ISS and let NASA develop and field the heavy lift needed by the VSE.
Let EELV fly to ISS and let NASA develop and field the heavy lift needed by the VSE.
So you propose to let the same incompetent launch vehicle design team that bought you the Stick, attempt to deliver for you a heavy lift launch vehicle?
Are you voting for Bush again in 2008 as well?
Hope springs eternal.
No, it doesn’t, thank you.
We’ve already seen the kind of rockets that hope, faith and prayer delivers.
“So you propose to let the same incompetent launch vehicle design team that bought you the Stick, attempt to deliver for you a heavy lift launch vehicle? Are you voting for Bush again in 2008 as well?”
Don’t confuse the competent design engines working on Ares-I that just do what they’re told with the totally incompetent leadership at the top telling them to build this glorified bottle rocket. Get rid of both Griffin and Bush and replace them with someone who will actually listen to the rocket designers instead of telling them what to do without regard to what they know. And for the record, if Bush was running again in ’08 I would NOT vote for him. He’s the worst chief executive this country has had since the King of England, imho.
“Ahem. Why is that so? We have a new software paradigm. It’s called ‘open source’. Orbiter space flight simulator comes to mind. The workforce could be distributed over the internet. They might even decide to work for free.”
Yes, I bet lots of space geeks would love to do that…….and then they would wake up to the reality of rocket engineering.
The Apollo/Shuttle army defines US spaceflight. If it goes away then space for Americans will be the same as for the Europeans: lots of robots and a low-key orbital program. Same as for Russia and China.
You need to keep Ares or Direct and its associated armies or the budgets will go, as will the Moon/Mars.
that just do what they’re told
The problem here is that NASA designers and engineers spent well over two years just doing what they were told, when there should have been a full scale revolt in the corps. I revolted in the third week in September of 2005, when I heard the news on the BBC, and I fully expected that revolt, which sadly, never materialized. I then spent two full years of my life trying my hardest to instigate that revolt, and it still never occurred. I fully expect now that it will not occur. In fact, everything I see indicates to me they will continue to fully embrace this ‘idiocy’ right through the next election cycle.
Americans are just going to sit around on their asses until the bitter end.
Our government and scientific institutions are a reflection of our populace.
America deserves the shaft, and the shaft is what they will get, unless …
Yes, I bet lots of space geeks would love to do that…….and then they would wake up to the reality of rocket engineering.
The reality of rocket engineering is we have an entire spectrum of rockets that work. What exactly don’t you understand about rockets that work?
It’s launch vehicle architectures that don’t work that I have a problem with.
Chuck2200: Atlas or Delta could have Orion docked to ISS before Shuttle retires if they got the green light today. Let EELV fly to ISS and let NASA develop and field the heavy lift needed by the VSE.
Right. In the meantime, let COTS proceed as an alternative, outside of the critical path.
All bets are off for anything beyond a Shuttle replacement now. The ESAS implementation of VSE has been so flat and uninspiring that I’m afraid that VSE will disappear completely from space policy in the next Administration. You are already seeing its slow demise, as it takes a back seat to other issues and priorities.
If NASA’s going to survive and be relevant over the next 10 years, it needs to align itself with current technological and social trends. No offense to the grandpas out there, but government-funded Apollo-style are totally out of joint with what’s needed to stimulate commercial and economic development of space.
BTW, one thing Bush could do as a saving grace to NASA is to yank Griffin, and replace him with a true space visionary, like Pete Worden or Wes Huntress. We don’t need Dr. Spock at the helm when people are looking for inspiration.
“No offense to the grandpas out there, but government-funded Apollo-style are totally out of joint with what’s needed to stimulate commercial and economic development of space.
BTW, one thing Bush could do as a saving grace to NASA is to yank Griffin, and replace him with a true space visionary, like Pete Worden or Wes Huntress. We don’t need Dr. Spock at the helm when people are looking for inspiration.”
1. Government funded: In principle I agree, but, at least for now, there is no other way because of the extremely deep pockets involved. No one but the federal government has the kinds of funds to really do this. But the funds could be put to much better use. NASA should be using the funds, not to explore, but to make exploration possible by the commercial sector. They should use their deep pockets to develop heavy lift and then make it available to the explorers. They should be using their deep pockets to develop nuclear surface power for lunar application, and then letting commercial companies copy it. It’s the commercial entities that will drive the VSE once the way is paved. NASA should be creating and paving the road, and then finding ways to get the commercial section on the road so that it can be properly exploited. Government funding builds the roads, but its commerce on the road from the commercial sector that makes the initial expenditures worth it. NASA should not be the explorers. They need to be the road builders.
2. Griffin: I couldn’t agree more. He has got far too much ego invested in a failing design that, in spite of the numbers almost screaming “kill meâ€, he continues to tell the Congress that everything will be alright. Just give him more time and more money. I used to have hopes for him, but now I’m afraid that he will single-handedly destroy the American Manned Space Program. He has got to go, and the sooner the better. I like Pete Worden as a replacement choice. He knows how to inspire teams, something totally lacking at NASA now and so desperately needed.
I used to have hopes for him, but now I’m afraid that he will single-handedly destroy the American Manned Space Program.
Have you considered the possibility yet, that killing the United States’ civilian space program may have been George W. Bush’s handler’s goal all along?
He should have become more like a televangelist–“SEND ME MONEY!”; You see congress needs to recognize that all the problems they have with NASA are because it doesn’t get any money. ISS and the shuttle I won’t miss them, but since we have international partners we shouldn’t disappoint. Overall the direction of NASA is really right on track, once the white elephants are out of the room (ISS and the Shuttle) we might actually do some exploring. And if they decide to bleed NASA even more we should all be satisfied with a well funded robotic missions that have really been NASA’s shining star since Apollo ended in 1972.
“The reality of rocket engineering is we have an entire spectrum of rockets that work. What exactly don’t you understand about rockets that work?”
That funding is what makes them go up. That in order to have realistic Moon/Mars plans you need heavy-lift. That without the Shuttle team there isn’t going to be heavy-lift, especially politically speaking.
By all means try Direct, but either that or Ares is a basic requirement unless some radical new technology comes along.
What would be left without them would be a lot of engineers with cute drawings and the same tired earth orbital doldrums, maybe spiced up a little with slutty celebrities visiting the ISS.
in order to have realistic Moon/Mars plans you need heavy-lift
Says who? Troy? I’m just guessing offhand that there are more than a few orbital fuel depot and on orbit construction enthusiasts who would disagree with your absolute pronouncements on the Internet. It’s just these sort of absolute pronouncement that has gotten NASA into this precise predicament.
slutty celebrities visiting the ISS.
As usual, I am suitably astonished. Nothing new there.
That in order to have realistic Moon/Mars plans you need heavy-lift.
Any moon/mars plan that requires heavy lift isnt realistic, especially in the absence of any decent cold war.
Well, it’s not really so absolutist as it comes off. I mean ISS assembly should have put a damper on the orbit construction thing, right? If not, maybe it could also be a consideration that the ATV/Progress/HTV carriers do not carry a huge amount of stuff compared to what they weigh and cost to build and launch. And they’re what an EELV class launcher could carry, even if stripped dow for fuel-carrying only.
It’s much cheaper and reliable to build your ship on Earth, where there’s a large team of engineers and mechanics.
I would agree that you could do the Moon cheaper using some stuff from the 1996 HLR study, but that is so limited that you cannot build a more expansive lunar base/Mars exploration program on it. It would be footprints-on-the-Moon only.
By the way, Ares was a god for the Greeks, Atlas just a hero, and Delta, well…..only a letter
It’s much cheaper and reliable to build your ship on Earth, where there’s a large team of engineers and mechanics.
And then throwing away 9/10ths of that ship and all of its engines every time you launch it, after it is very nearly to orbit, no less. Where I come from, we call that insanity. You can call it whatever you want.
By the way, Ares was a god for the Greeks, Atlas just a hero, and Delta, well…..only a letter
Ares – the god of savage war, or bloodlust, or slaughter personified.
An ancient and demonstrably obsolete and expensive god.
Delta, on the other hand, is indeed a letter, as in ΔV.
I prefer Greek letters over Greek gods.
Anonymous: The decision on what replaces Ares I/Orion will be up to the next White House some 14 or more months from now.
I’d emphasize the “or more.” Even if Ms. Clinton becomes President, and even if she is as interested in spaceflight as she is attempting to come across (a very big if), short of a complete meltdown, Ares-1/ Orion is unlikely to be very near the top of her list. The current Administration has made plenty of far bigger messes that will need to be sorted out first, whoever is President and even if that President is a Republican. Ares-1 may yet be developed through political inertia.
ISS has backup after backup — from Ares I/Orion (or whatever replaces them) to COTS to ATV/HTV to Soyuz/Progress — to keep it sustained
There’s an important lesson here. . . .
Helioprogenus: this science-fearing legislature. I can guarantee that less then 1% of these morons in congress can pass a simple high school science exam. All our legislative policy decisions are based on individuals who know show no interest in the sciences. Not only are we faced with a Congress that’s largely ignorant of scientific matters, but an Executive branch that goes out if its way to purposely manipulate data, misrepresent scientific principles, and uphold a childish belief in a supernatural entity answering to prayers and interfering in human affairs. If it all wasn’t so sad, it would be laughable.
That’s probably all true, but welcome to the real world. Politics (read human interests, as in the interests of individual competing humans) always has, and always will, trump “science.” Recall that the last few times we tried what was claimed to be “science-based government,” we ended up with the Soviet Union, Hitler’s Germany, and today’s China. Is that really what we want?
Mike Frazon: one thing Bush could do as a saving grace to NASA is to yank Griffin, and replace him with a true space visionary, like Pete Worden or Wes Huntress.
Won’t happen for the same reason Ms. Clinton will not address spaceflight right off the bat. Mr. Bush is drowning in disasters largely of his own making. Addressing what appears to be a minor problem with a program that does not really matter to anyone but a few geeks will remain near the bottom of the list. It looks like he hasn’t given it significant thought since the loss of Columbia.
Kert: Any moon/mars plan that requires heavy lift isn’t realistic, especially in the absence of any decent cold war.
I tend to agree. While heavy lift might make the job easier and / or safer in the near term, it would discourage thinking small and living off the land, both absolute requirements for a “sustainable” program of human Solar System exploration.
Spector: I mean ISS assembly should have put a damper on the orbit construction thing,
Why off Earth do you say that? So far, the Space Station construction job has been a spectacular success. Unrelated launch vehicle problems aside, there have not even been any serious setbacks until the current mission. No one has been killed or even seriously hurt.
Recall that nobody has ever tried a complex construction job in the microgravity environment that dominates the universe. This is a true first, and in many ways far more difficult than a few quick dashes to Earth’s moon — yet it is also an absolute requirement for a long-term human future in microgravity.
NASA and the Space Station have many faults, but the actual construction so far is not one of them.
— Donald
” This is a true first, and in many ways far more difficult than a few quick dashes to Earth’s moon — yet it is also an absolute requirement for a long-term human future in microgravity.”
Why, why, why? They could just have gone for heavy lift and do the job in one or two pieces. Would’ve been cheaper and more capable! The only difficulty that is being solved is a circular one, based on a flawed tiny modules design, at enormous costs and time delay.
I’m so sorry, but any launcher below 50 tonnes at least isn’t going to cut it! Small and beautiful is just a slogan, it doesn’t matter much in terms of the vastness of space.
They could just have gone for heavy lift and do the job in one or two pieces.
That, of course, is probably true, but it teaches you only about how to transit through space, rather than function in space. It’s as if we learned only how to build sea-going ships on dry land and shove them into the water, but not how to build dry-docks and oil platforms and do complex repairs on the high seas. Or, it’s as if we explored the “new world” by living in beached sailing ships, and not dismantling them to build cities.
If you go with the large-module strategy, everything has to work right every time — which, in the real universe, is not going to happen. It also means you spend the rest of your civilization living in beached ships, rather than learning how to build structures adapted to the environment in which you find yourself.
If we had not built the Space Station, once we get to Mars and the nuclear power plant fails, for example, we would not know how to recover by manually deploying large solar blankets carried in reserve, or to re-route the utilities into something else, or to rig some quick-and-dirty repair out of spare parts intended for something else. Now we have extensive real-universe experience is just those things. While it’s more expensive in the short term, in the long term it will make operations in orbit around Mars (or in the asteroid belt or anywhere in most of the universe) both easier and safer.
— Donald
had they designed the pieces to be flown on other launch vehicles besides shuttle, we would probably be done with the construction a while ago.
Reader. I wholeheartedly agree, though hindsight is always twenty-twenty. It doesn’t affect my argument, and I stated above that the problems building the Space Station have mostly occured because of launch vehicle (read Space Shuttle) problems unrelated to the actual structure of the Station.
— Donald
“I’d emphasize the ‘or more.'”
It will obviously be more than 14 months out before the future of Ares I/Orion is disposed of. But it may not be much longer. For example, if today’s news from the Obama campaign is accurate, then under an Obama White House, OMB may be instructed to kill the program in the new Administration’s very first budget amendment. Or, in another example, the Clinton campaign appears to have given some thought to NASA’s future and may have someone already in mind for the NASA Administrator’s post. If so, a new NASA Administrator might be on board and making changes relatively early compared to prior turnovers in NASA’s leadership after a Presidential election.
That said, I’d just point out that predicting the exact timing was not the intent of my earlier post. The point was that with 14 months to go at the very minimum, debates about EELVs versus SDVs like DIRECT versus clean sheet vehicles like COTS are so much wasted breath. Until we know who has won the Presidency, what their objectives are, and what other developments have occurred in the interim, we won’t know the context from which these decisions will be made. For example, if Obama wins, the best NASA can do with $500 million per year is an augmented COTS and/or a small CEV on a minimally-changed human-rated EELV, and they may not even get that. All the talk about heavy lift would be for naught in that scenario.
“Ares-1 may yet be developed through political inertia.”
Obama aside, I’d argue there’s now a better than even chance that Ares I/Orion just won’t fly from a safety or technical perspective. Even when we discount Ares I/Orion’s high costs and long development schedule versus alternatives, its slipping schedule, and its precariously funded budget, the design is just too compromised to fly safely or to fly at all. A new NASA Administrator would be crazy to go forward with all the compromises that have been made to Ares I/Orion safety (lack of redundant systems, radiation shielding, aborts over land, SRB reusability and trend tracking, etc.). Even then, Ares I now has chug/rigidity issues that will either shake the vehicle apart or incur thousands more pounds in fixes that will make it incapable of launching Orion without fundamentally revisiting Orion’s size and requirements. I’m not saying it’s a done deal, and the Constellation designers will almost certainly continue pull enough band-aids out of their pockets to keep up appearances for Griffin until after the election. But if a gun were to my head, I’d say that the Ares I/Orion design is now in a downward spiral that it cannot get out of and the next NASA Administrator and White House will be forced to choose a different path.
FWIW…
Does anybody honestly believe the Shuttle program will end in 2010? Come on folks. You know that by late 2009, we’ll be making plans to keep at least one Shuttle flying for a couple more years.
Does anybody honestly believe the Shuttle program will end in 2010? . . .
Actually, yes, or very shortly thereafter. This is one thing that Dr. Griffin has done right. As more and more Shuttle production lines are shut down and converted to something else, it gets more expensive to re-start Shuttle operations every month that goes by. While it will never beimpossible to retain the Shuttle, Dr. Griffin is making it so expensive that it won’t happen short of a real national emergency that would require the vehicle.
— Donald
I like the red herring Hutchison threw in about the HTV and ATV. Isn’t the whole point of COTS to try and stimulate something that does not ressemble business-as-usual government development bills and schedules?
anonymous.space: “I’d say that the Ares I/Orion design is now in a downward spiral that it cannot get out of and the next NASA Administrator and White House will be forced to choose a different path.”
This reminds me of X-33, only much bigger.
had they designed the pieces to be flown on other launch vehicles besides shuttle, we would probably be done with the construction a while ago.
While technically that is likely correct, programmatically it isn’t. The primary purpose of ISS was to provide something for STS to do. ISS hasn’t ever stood on its own feet.
[…] recent rocket launch. Jeff Foust at Space Politics gives a run down of NASA’s Administrator’s time in front of a Senate committee. It sounds like an uncomfortable place to be. Keith Cowing from NASA Watch has an opinion on the […]
Gerald McKeegan: Does anybody honestly believe the Shuttle program will end in 2010?
I thought that Mr. Foust’s original post on this subject, and his conclusion “Despite all the word games, it seems likely that, barring an accident of some other major change in direction for the space agency, the shuttle will remain in operation until the ISS is complete.” were right on.
The Shuttle will be retired after the ISS is completed. The definition of ISS complete might slightly change by a couple flights shorter (or even one flight longer), but it is not likely to change more than that (barring another major accident).
If we are in late 2010, and there are 2-3 additional Shuttle flights left on the manifest, I believe the easy decision is to fly those additional 2-3 Shuttle flights.
The cost of doing so will be enormous (it costs $1 Billion per quarter to extend the life of the Shuttle — and it will come on the back of NASA’s future activities. The political calculus for the President is as follows:
President’s generally like to avoid pain (no matter their political persuasion), and they are not likely to care that much about the pain of lost future activities since this kind pain is hidden as an opportunity cost.
– Al
Why, why, why? They could just have gone for heavy lift and do the job in one or two pieces. Would’ve been cheaper and more capable! The only difficulty that is being solved is a circular one, based on a flawed tiny modules design, at enormous costs and time delay.
I’m so sorry, but any launcher below 50 tonnes at least isn’t going to cut it! Small and beautiful is just a slogan, it doesn’t matter much in terms of the vastness of space.
I think that this heavy lift is cheaper is a myth. The Ares 1/5 is going to cost north of $40 billion dollars just in non recurring engineering. Even at an average cost of $250M dollars that buys 160 EELV heavy launches at 25 tons each for a thousand tons to LEO.
By that time EELV will naturally evolve to larger capability as costs decline due to much higher production rates. This has been proven time and time again in the ELV world.
There is no way that an amortized Heavy lifter can ever compete with high flight rate medium heavy vehicles.
Also, that useless space station that some whine about is the key to making the whole thing work. With frequent launches and a robust operational ability in cis lunar space, reusable Earth to Moon transit and landing vehicles can be used. If you looked at the ESAS architecture in ten years there would be 30 defunct descent stages around the base and tons of ascent vehicle trash strewn all over the moon. The launch mass penalty to ISS is only about 6.3% according to both Boeing and Lockmart so that is only about 1600 lbs drop in throw mass.
With reusable transportation systems (multiple of them) a robust monthly access by humans can be put together. This also gives an entry point for Elon to compete for cargo and human launches and opens the doors to more than four government employees to go to the Moon.
Wake up, heavy lift is dead and deservedly so.