NASA

Mars needs money

At today’s hearing on NASA’s proposed FY09 science budget, there’s likely to be some discussion on the future of NASA’s Mars exploration program, and the perception that Mars exploration may be getting a lower priority in the years to come. After the Mars Science Laboratory mission is launched next year, the next NASA Mars mission won’t be until 2013, when a Mars Scout orbiter mission is launched (a mission planned for 2011, but delayed last year after a conflict of interest was discovered during the review process.) After that, the schedule is vague, with the possibility of a sample return mission towards the end of the next decade.

That is not sitting well with some in the planetary science community. NASA administrator set off some comments on this in a line in his speech Monday at the Lunar and Planetary Science Conference in Houston. “Then, within the budget for planetary sciences, we attempted to address the major concerns as expressed by the recent National Research Council ‘report card’ for our planetary exploration efforts,” his prepared remarks read. “We received an ‘A’ for our Mars program, a ‘D’ for our outer planets program, and a ‘C’ for our Research & Analysis efforts. We have rebalanced the planetary science portfolio accordingly.”

According to one account of the speech and Q&A session that followed, several people argued that NASA’s Mars program should not be penalized financially just because it is doing better than other agency science programs. “If my child came home with an A, a C and a D, my answer would not be to lower the A. I would say get an A in everything!” one person said. Griffin appeared unswayed: “When as a golfer my putting sucks (his word) I don’t spend all my time on the driving range,” Griffin responded, according to the account.

78 comments to Mars needs money

  • Ray

    Administrator Griffin used the same logic when moving funds from robotic exploration to Shuttle/ISS/ESAS. He said something along the lines that the robotic side was doing a good job, so we needed to shift money to those programs. Personally I also think it’s not just an issue of human vs. robots, but also big vs. small – very big programs tend to be unmanageable, at least at NASA, and require extrodinarily good planning.

    I like to think of it in non-space-agency terms. What would a business do if one part was making money, but another was losing money? There’s a similar argument with funding schools. Maybe you have to look at in on a case-by-case basis. Will the increased money just cause more of the same behavior that caused the poor ranking? Will the decreased funding cause failure of the productive program or effort? I tend to think that incentives are important. Will the shift be a reward to the problem child, and a punishment for success? Will it be a case of lowering the show-off “A” student to the lowest common denominator?

    You may come up with different answers with the Mars vs. R&A vs. outer planets discussion, robotic vs. Shuttle/ISS/ESAS, and various other similar decisions.

  • MarkWhittington

    “I like to think of it in non-space-agency terms. What would a business do if one part was making money, but another was losing money?”

    The problem is that NASA is not a business nor should it be. The only alternative is to increase NASA’s budget. While there seems to be a move to do that in Congress, I would not hold my breath.

  • The People

    I like to think of it in non-space-agency terms. What would a business do if one part was making money, but another was losing money?

    The Jack Welch Rule says that you get rid of the part that is functioning poorly. This makes good business sense, and is a bedrock Republican ideal. That’s why I can’t believe that this Administration is sanctioning such a socialist approach to the implementation of VSE!

    The new Griffin paradigm: steal from the successful, and give to the marginal performers. Who said communism was dead?!

  • Dennis Wingo

    There is a fundamental question to be asked here. What else needs to be done at Mars before humans go there? I agree with the current missions but after?

    I for one would like to see both a Phobos and Demios lander.

    What else?

  • Dennis, I agree, and would answer that with “not a whole lot.” I certainly would not waste the vast sums of money that a sample return would cost unless it included a significant demonstration of local resource use and were directly related near-term human flights. If the goal is to send humans (and do real surface field geology), then send humans.

    As for Mars versus other science, I agree that Mars probably has had more than its share of the resources. We should be spending a larger portion of our automated budget on places we cannot send human scientists in the foreseeable future (e.g., Europa), and concentrate on sending scientists to the places they can go to (the moon, near-Earth asteroids, PhD, then Mars.)

    I also agree that PhD missions should have a much higher priority, especially as we prepare for and execute human missions.

    — Donald

  • The business analogy is not a good one. Education is better. Try this one on for size…

    If my child has an A, C, and D, I’m going to spend more of my time helping them with the C and D to improve it. This will obviously take away my time to work with the child on the A.

    NASA has a fixed amount of cash. If they got an A for Mars exploration, but a D on outer planets, shouldn’t we be focusing more on the outer planets then? Or would you prefer to put the extra resources towards earning an A+ and leave the D?

  • Charles Phillips

    Fellow Budget Scrutinizers –

    The discussion here is enlightening, in that it shows more about our expectations than our program management skills.

    The US space exploration efforts, as much as I am a fan, are not a business nor are they a school system.

    Can we afford to have any part of the exploration effort less than an A? It is a (biting my lip here) luxury not a necessity. Perhaps we should adjust our efforts to match our budget! If the direction of the President (via intermediaries) is to do some Mars exploration and outer planets exploration – we should balance the budget with them to perhaps do less (but very well) at Mars and more (and still very well) in the outer planets.

    We cannot afford to leave students behind (though of course we do) but we can afford to defer some Mars or Lunar or Jupiter (etc) exploration.

    If we cannot get additional money, we should adjust our expectations and efforts accordingly.

    Charles

  • MarkWhittington wrote @ March 13th, 2008 at 8:03 am:

    The problem is that NASA is not a business nor should it be. The only alternative is to increase NASA’s budget. While there seems to be a move to do that in Congress, I would not hold my breath.

    Until I’m “blue in the face” Mark..

    Charles Phillips :
    Can we afford to have any part of the exploration effort less than an A? It is a (biting my lip here) luxury not a necessity.

    I like to make the argument that it is a necessity, but for reasons that can be difficult for some to “wrap their head around” or “sink their teeth into”.
    Try this one: There are answers to questions we have not even asked yet, just waiting for us to discover. Some of these questions and answers have the power to fundamentally change how we see ourselves and our place in the universe. Follow that with a fact, one that cannot be argued against. Space exploration is our future, the human race will move out into space, it is an inevitability and a monumental undertaking. So I say to you all, the ISS needs to represent the first step in the worlds governments “beating swords into plowshares”
    side note:
    I was terribly disappointed at the response given to the young journalist who asked if China would be included in ISS. It was something like.. we haven’t given it much thought…next.

    Charles:
    If we cannot get additional money, we should adjust our expectations and efforts accordingly.

    I appreciate your points, and I can certainly relate. Lets re-double our efforts, I’m not ready to throw in the towel just yet.

  • George Schmidt

    It sounds like most of the readers feel that NASA should not be treated as a business. This may be true for the science side. However, shouldn’t the practice on the other component of exploration, namely opening the frontier to the promise of resource utilization and human settlement, be conducted within a business, profit-making framework? After all, this is what drove the voyages of the great explorers and the settlement of new colonies.

  • “There is a fundamental question to be asked here. What else needs to be done at Mars before humans go there? I agree with the current missions but after?

    I for one would like to see both a Phobos and Demios lander.

    What else?”

    NASA asked the National Academies this question back in 2001-2. The resulting report, “Safe on Mars”, can be found here (add http://www):

    .nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309084261

    And in terms of tasks for robotic precursor missions, here’s the relevant recommendations from the report’s executive summary:

    “Recommendation: NASA should map the three-dimensional terrain morphology of landing operation zones for human missions to characterize their features at sufficient resolution to assure safe landing and human and rover locomotion.

    Recommendation: To ensure that humans and critical rover systems can land on and traverse the Martian surface in a safe, efficient, and timely manner, NASA should characterize the range of mechanical properties of the Martian regolith at the landing site or comparable terrain. Specifically, in situ experiments should be performed to determine the regolith’s aggregate strength, stability, and sinkage properties, including bearing strength, bulk modulus, yield strength, and internal friction angle.

    Recommendation: NASA should determine, in advance of human missions to Mars, rock size distribution and shapes in situ, at the landing site or on comparable terrain, in order to predict human and rover trafficability.

    Recommendation: NASA should determine the adhesive properties of Martian soil and airborne dust in order to evaluate the effects of dust adhesion on critical systems. This characterization must be conducted in situ by means of experiments to measure airborne dust adhesion.

    Recommendation: In order to validate the radiation transport codes, thereby ensuring the accuracy of radiation dose predictions, NASA should perform experiments to measure the absorbed dose in a tissue-equivalent material on Mars at a location representative of the expected landing site, including altitude and bulk elemental composition of the surface. The experiments should distinguish the radiation dose contribution induced by charged particles from that induced by neutrons. These experiments should be made a priority in the Mars exploration program.

    Recommendation: In order to evaluate if hexavalent chromium on Mars poses a threat to astronaut health, NASA should conduct a precursor in situ measurement to determine if hexavalent chromium is present in Martian soil or airborne dust at more than 150 parts per million (ppm). This measurement may take place anywhere on Mars where well-mixed, uniform airborne dust is present. If such a measurement is not possible, a sample of airborne dust and fine particles of Martian soil must be returned to Earth for evaluation.

    Recommendation: In order to evaluate the potential corrosive effects of Martian soil and airborne dust on humans and critical systems in a humidified environment, NASA should measure the pH and buffer capacity of soil and airborne dust either via an in situ experiment or on Earth with returned samples of soil and airborne dust collected from the Martian atmosphere.

    Recommendation: The committee recommends that NASA establish zones of minimal biologic risk (ZMBRs) with respect to the possible presence of Martian life during human missions to Mars. In order to do so, NASA should conduct a precursor in situ experiment at a location as reasonably close to the human mission landing sites as possible to determine if organic carbon is present. The measurement should be on materials from the surface and down to a depth to which astronauts may be exposed. If no organic carbon is detected at or above the life detection threshold, the landing site may be considered a ZMBR. If no measurement technique can be used to determine if organic carbon is present above the life detection threshold, or if organic carbon is detected above that threshold, a sample should be returned to Earth for characterization prior to sending humans to Mars.”

    Note that the report and recommendations above focus just on the astronaut safety/mission success issues. All this says nothing of the even bigger robotic engineering testbeds that would likely be sent in advance of a Mars human mission commitment; e.g., aerobraking, precision landing, power source, ISRU, and/or precision rendezvous.

    “Dennis, I agree, and would answer that with ‘not a whole lot.’

    I don’t mean to pick on Mr. Robertson, but this is a very naive and/or uneducated position. As the report above shows, from very high resolution mapping, to surface properties, to corrosive dust, to toxic chemicals, to radiation exposure, to potential foreign biologies, there is much that will have to be learned from robotic precursors and returned samples before a Mars human mission decision can be credibly made. And again, this says nothing of the various engineering testbeds (specifics depending on the architecture) that will probably also have to be sent and validated ahead of a credible Mars human mission decision.

    “I certainly would not waste the vast sums of money that a sample return would cost unless it included a significant demonstration of local resource use and were directly related near-term human flights.”

    The report above puts Mars sample return on the critical path for a Mars human mission decision, regardless of curiousity-driven science or ISRU testbeds.

    Moreover, it’s rather silly to argue that a few billion dollars of savings from the deferment of a Mars mission will have a significant impact on the schedule for human space flight development projects costing tens to hundreds of billions of dollars each.

    The problem is not that Alan Stern wants to spend $3.5 billion on a Mars sample return mission. The problem is that Mike Griffin insists on spending almost ten times that amount just getting NASA astronauts back to LEO.

    We once had a Mars Exploration Program with a budget that approached $700 million per year. We once had a Vision for Exploration that included placeholders not only for important Mars science missions, but an equal number of placeholders for Mars human precursor missions.

    Now we have a Mars Exploration Program with an annual budget measured in the $300 million range, with no human precursor missions, and a less than credible budget and technology plan for achieving the program’s remaining science goals.

    All to keep a duplicative and technically crippled rocket on a schedule that only has a 65% chance (if that) of delivering an oversized human capsule to low-Earth orbit a year later than the VSE dictated.

    Sigh… my kingdom for NASA Administrator that can size and plan a human space flight development program to live within its means…

    FWIW…

  • Bob Mahoney

    The human race moving out into space is NOT inevitable. Such an argument is as fallacious as “Manifest Destiny” was for settling the American West. The West was settled because many Americans chose to do so for emotional, political, religious, and economic reasons.

    Transforming our civilization into a full-fledged spacefaring one will also only occur if many persons make particular choices. Sitting back to wait for “the inevitable,” or even suggesting such a complacent notion, is just one possible mindset (of many) that could prevent it from happening.

  • Al Fansome

    WHITTINGTON: The only alternative is to increase NASA’s budget.

    Only if you have no imagination.

    There are win-win-win alternatives that are outside-the-nine-dots.

    – Al

  • Dennis Wingo

    Anonymous.space

    You answered the question in the exact manner that I hoped. Since we are not going to send humans to the Moon for another 20-25 years, I would posit that those missions are not needed at this time. This is what Dr. Marburger was trying to say.

    The Phobos prospector is a far more important mission as if we are able to find significant amounts of water on Phobos, it changes everything for Mars mission planning. It changes the duration of the mission, increases the available delta V by possibly as much as an order of magnitude, and provides an outpost and safe haven in Martian orbit for any human mission.

    Deimos has a far lower likelyhood of having the water but there could be a lot of metals and other minerals available there.

    As for general budgetary concerns we need to send a LOT of rovers to the Moon, which is where we are going next anyway. We also need to send multiple missions to the Near Earth objects to do a resource survey of the most attractive ones from a delta v perspective.

    All of these have priority over any human factors related missions to Mars at this time. We do need to keep an active imaging orbiter with multispectral imaging just to keep tabs on the planet long term. We need the same for lunar orbit as well.

    FWIW

  • “You answered the question in the exact manner that I hoped. Since we are not going to send humans to the Moon for another 20-25 years, I would posit that those missions are not needed at this time. This is what Dr. Marburger was trying to say.”

    A couple points:

    1) If we really were going to Mars in the next couple of decades, this is not a credible statement. Backing up from when key trades and decisions need to be made on the Mars human architecture and systems, the number and complexity of robotic precursors needed, their associated development and operational timelines, and the time necessary to understand their data and samples would all demand that these missions have started yesterday.

    2) However, in all honesty, I don’t think it’s credible (either technically or budgetarily) to argue that we are going sending astronauts to Mars in the next couple of decades, in which case your argument is valid from a purely human space exploration/development point-of-view. That said, while they’re laudable, Dr. Marburger’s statements about the economic development of the Moon are not credible either, especially in light of Griffin’s ESAS/Constellation architecture and its utter lack of investment in anything (whether it’s lower cost space transportation, in-space propellant management, lunar resources, ISRU, commercial involvement, etc.) sustainable and/or economically useful. Heck, even on those things that Marburger can have some direct influence on (e.g., activities to amend lunar and other treaties to potentially make development more economically attractive), there’s been zero action. It’s, unfortunately, all talk.

    Again, it all comes back to the enormous costs and low return of NASA’s past and current approaches to human space flight. It’s ludicrous to argue over the meager scraps left in the Mars Exploration Program — or even the older, higher funding for the program — when we’re spending tens of billions of dollars just getting a capsule back into low-Earth orbit. If we want to fix NASA’s human space flight programs, then we should fix NASA’s human space flight programs, not carve yet more muscle out of very successful robotic programs that are answering high priority science questions at orders of magnitude less cost and are on the critical path for human space exploration in the long-run anyway.

    The old Mars versus Moon and human versus robot arguments are not germane and cloud the real issue — identifying and pursuing a higher value and sustainable approach for human space exploration and development with the almost $10 billion that NASA spends on those activities every year.

    My 2 cents… FWIW…

  • Watchnasatv: There are answers to questions we have not even asked yet, just waiting for us to discover. Some of these questions and answers have the power to fundamentally change how we see ourselves and our place in the universe.

    While I agree with your whole statement, I especially agree with this. Very well put.

    George Schmidt: However, shouldn’t the practice on the other component of exploration, namely opening the frontier to the promise of resource utilization and human settlement, be conducted within a business, profit-making framework? After all, this is what drove the voyages of the great explorers and the settlement of new colonies.

    Not at all. While exploration of the past evolved toward businesses, the immediate motivation was greed for gold (Spain in the Americas) that had little to do with anything we would recognize as a business, religious fervor (convert the heathens), ideology (manifest destiny), strategic competition — business, per say, was at the bottom of the list, probably even after science.

    Anonymous: These recommendations may be a recipe for absolute safety, they are also a recipe for spending infinite money without actually achieving the goal — a human base on Mars that can conduct real scientific (amongst many other types of) expeditions over the Martian surface. A lot of the data to collect this information already exists (e.g., the MERs should have provided good data on the mechanical properties at their location; what is the current telescope in orbit for if it cannot determine rock distributions and sizes? etc.) without the need for a lot of future automated missions, and a lot of the rest can be gathered during the first mission itself. I might buy better knowledge of the active chemical properties of Martian regolith, the dust and radiation properties, and a prior demonstration of gathering the return fuel on site, which may or may not require a sample return. However, all of this data should be obtainable on a single mission (maybe with two spacecraft for redundancy) optimized to prepare for a human base. It should not require an infinite series of automated flights that do not directly lead toward what I believe should be the goal.

    NASA establish zones of minimal biologic risk (ZMBRs) with respect to the possible presence of Martian life during human missions to Mars.

    Almost certainly, this is almost anywhere on the surface away from the poles. As I argued here (http://www.donaldfrobertson.com/marstrn.html) it will be far too easy to use this issue as an excuse for doing nothing.

    it’s rather silly to argue that a few billion dollars of savings from the deferment of a Mars mission will have a significant impact on the schedule for human space flight development projects costing tens to hundreds of billions of dollars each.

    I don’t disagree with this, if it is limited to one or a finite small number of missions, and if it is oriented toward answering the finite list of questions we really do need answered. But, that is not the real recommendation. With respect, Anonymous, I think you (and most of the space community) need to look a little less at reports and a little more at this history of exploration and what it has taken and what it will really take. Even Apollo would never have been possible without huge risks — and note that they did it without comprehensive maps of the moon or a full understanding of the surface properties, most of which was obtained during the missions themselves. If the Apollo engineers had followed that list of recommendations, I expect we would not have been to the moon to this date.

    Backing up from when key trades and decisions need to be made on the Mars human architecture and systems, the number and complexity of robotic precursors needed, their associated development and operational timelines, and the time necessary to understand their data and samples would all demand that these missions have started yesterday.

    Exactly. That is why this country probably will never go to Mars, at least as the initial pioneers, and why we’re unlikely even to go back to the moon, unless it is entirely through private efforts (unlikely in the immediate future for human landing missions). We’d rather keep NASA bases in Southern states happy and studying exploring and pretending to explore with supposedly cheaper robots. I’m not sure why he thinks a large number of rovers are necessary on the moon — their tasks would better be accomplished by expeditions from a polar base — but I agree with everything else Dennis says.

    I don’t really expect that Western civilizations are really politically capable of taking the kinds of risks required really to visit and colonize Mars, rather than conduct a series of infinitely recursive precursors, but a “safe” mission is not possible no matter how many precursors we do. If we are ever going to send humans to Mars and try to really understand the planet, we need to take some risks and go. Otherwise, we should stop wasting our money pretending to do Martian science now. I hope that at some point in near term future history, some culture will arise on Earth both capable of getting to Mars and willing to take the required risks.

    — Donald

  • Dennis Wingo

    anonymous.space

    I don’t disagree with you that the ESAS architecture is the wrong way to go, no matter what the destination. The problem with ESAS, as it was with FLO, and SEI was that the up front capital costs that NASA has are too high for the congress to fund. Therefore it is incumbent upon us who are in a position to have some influence to come up with alternatives that are within the capital budgets that the congress is willing to fund, along with a long term plan that is consistent with the guidance from the president and OSTP.

    To me this has been the greatest failing of ESAS, in that in ignoring ISRU, they tore the guts out of the vision right away. Dr. Griffin said that building a rocket was his job but that is incorrect, his job was to implement the plan that he was given by his superiors. A rocket is a vital part of that but it is not the plan.

    It is inevitable that the ESAS architecture is going to go away as it is not consistent with the VSE and congress is already not funding it. The same disconnect that doomed SEI is at work for ESAS as the implementation of the VSE. Therefore the question is; what will work?

    In terms of Mars, a focus on ISRU is imperative at this time. Worrying about all of this human factors science is counterproductive. We must figure out ways of lowering the costs of the flights to Mars and ISRU has the highest gain of anything out there. This is why I advocate Phobos and Deimos missions and ANY rovers going to Mars in the near future must also have ISRU resource identification as their primary goal. Without this you have unworkable plans, that cost far too much for the American taxpayer to buy into. Sorry, but this is the pain of 20 years of working on these plans talking.

  • Dennis: In terms of Mars, a focus on ISRU is imperative at this time. Worrying about all of this human factors science is counterproductive. We must figure out ways of lowering the costs of the flights to Mars and ISRU has the highest gain of anything out there. This is why I advocate Phobos and Deimos missions and ANY rovers going to Mars in the near future must also have ISRU resource identification as their primary goal. Without this you have unworkable plans, that cost far too much for the American taxpayer to buy into.

    I agree, one-hundred percent.

    — Donald

  • anonymous.space

    “These recommendations may be a recipe for absolute safety,”

    They’re not recommendations for absolute safety. They’re recommendations about which known risks need quantifying in order to make safety tradeoffs against human Mars mission cost/schedule/content.

    It’s not a matter of designing a perfectly safe Mars human mission. That can’t be done.

    It’s a matter of having a clue as to what risks we are taking on when making decisions about the design of a Mars human mission.

    “It should not require an infinite series of automated flights”

    No one said it would. But depending on where we want to send crews on Mars (i.e., whether we can leverage data from existing lander missions), obtaining these datasets and samples will require something more than a couple precursor missions.

    “a lot of the rest can be gathered during the first mission itself”

    Simply not true. Unless we have quantified these issues enough to design around them, threats like system-clogging adhesive dust, corrosive compounds, DNA-damaging high-energy neutrons, metabolism-impairing toxins, and respiration-impairing genotoxic carcinogens will cripple and/or kill astronauts and/or the systems that support them on that first mission.

    “that do not directly lead toward what I believe should be the goal.”

    Our beliefs have nothing to do with it. It’s a hard, cold reality that there are multiple unquantified threats — any one of which is capable of crippling and/or killing a Mars crew and/or mission regardless of where the astronauts and engineering team hail from — that can only be addressed through a series of robotic precursors.

    “With respect, Anonymous, I think you (and most of the space community) need to look a little less at reports and a little more at this history of exploration and what it has taken and what it will really take”

    And with all due respect, history does not bear on these technical issues. Polynesians, Vikings, and New World explorers never had to deal with environments where the trace compounds in the air that they breathed or the ambient radiation coming from the sky above could kill them in short order.

    It’s a given that we have to take risks in exploration. But we shouldn’t take stupid risks with known astronaut-killing/mission-ending threats, especially ones that we can quantify at low cost robotically relative to the investments that we will have to make in the human-scale systems.

    “‘Backing up from when key trades and decisions need to be made on the Mars human architecture and systems, the number and complexity of robotic precursors needed, their associated development and operational timelines, and the time necessary to understand their data and samples would all demand that these missions have started yesterday.’

    Exactly. That is why this country probably will never go to Mars, at least as the initial pioneers, and why we’re unlikely even to go back to the moon, unless it is entirely through private efforts (unlikely in the immediate future for human landing missions).”

    You’re misportraying my words. Mr. Wingo argued that we could wait to send robotic precursors if the first Mars human mission is 20-25 years out. I’m not arguing whether it’s good or bad to send humans to Mars in that timeframe. I’m just arguing that it’s not possible in that timeframe given that we’re not investing now in the necessary robotic precursors (among other things).

    It’s going to take at least a 10-15 years to design and develop the systems for the actual human Mars mission. And it’s going to take at least another 10-15 years to build and operate the robotic precursor missions and analyze the data and samples necessary to inform those design decisions. Based on that timeline and assuming the launch of the first Mars human mission in 20-25 years, we need to be investing in those precursor missions now (which happens to be what the VSE laid out to begin with). It’s simply not credible to claim that we can put off robotic precursor missions if we want to send humans to Mars in the next 20-25 years. But that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t go in 20-25 years, only that we can’t given what we’re investing (or not investing) in.

    “I don’t really expect that Western civilizations are really politically capable of taking the kinds of risks required really to visit and colonize Mars”

    This is not a political issue. It’s a technical one. Again, threats like system-clogging adhesive dust, corrosive compounds, DNA-damaging high-energy neutrons, metabolism-impairing poisons, and respiration-impairing genotoxic carcinogens will cripple and/or kill astronauts and/or the systems that support them regardless of their nationality and the political system that sent them.

    “but a “safe” mission is not possible no matter how many precursors we do. If we are ever going to send humans to Mars and try to really understand the planet, we need to take some risks and go.”

    Again, no one argued that there is such a thing as a safe Mars human mission. But there is such a thing as a very unsafe Mars human mission. Any system (including the human elements) that is designed without quantifying and taking into account known, mission-ending risks falls into that category. It’s like designing a ocean-going vessel without knowing how high the waves are, how many sunny days there are likely to be, how much food/water we need to store on the ship, or how we’ll get back on course after a bad storm.

    You’re arguing a technical subject using historical and political analogies that have nothing to do with the realities and unknowns at hand. And you’re doing so from a position of extreme technical naivete and/or lack of technical information. If you want to debate minimum exposure levels for hexavalent chromium or high-energy neutrons, by all means, read the report, do your homework, and send me an email (obviously too technical for this forum). But all the hopes, wishes, and tortured logic of space cadets (myself included) won’t quantify these known, mission-ending threats. Only investments in the necessary precursor missions will.

    FWIW…

  • Kevin Matalin

    “In terms of Mars, a focus on ISRU is imperative at this time.”

    Mars Sample Return is already an incredibly complex mission from a technology perspective. Landing on Mars is difficult. Getting off of the surface has never been done. Autonomous rendezvous at Mars has never been done. And that is not even mentioning the science that they want to do. And you’re saying that on top of that you want to add an ISRU requirement?

    If you want to do ISRU on Mars, that is _not_ a science mission, and it should not be done on a science mission, or out of the science budget. Pay for it out of the Exploration budget. Otherwise, you just add another elephant to the rowboat and sink it and all the animals drown.

    This is just the classic anti-science attitude among the exploration fans, they don’t care about it, and they simply want to take its money.

  • anonymous.space

    “In terms of Mars, a focus on ISRU is imperative at this time.”

    Like Mr. Robertson, I don’t disagree with Mr. Wingo’s placing a high priority on ISRU and/or other enabling/high-leverage technologies for human exploration missions. They are correct that such innovations may be the only way to pursue such ambitious goals affordably and in the absence of a major external budget driver.

    But those precursors go hand-in-hand with the precursors necessary to quantify the known technical threats to the mission and astronauts. A mission must be both affordable and have a reasonably quantified and reasonably decent chance of mission success. Even setting aside the value of human life, NASA can’t blow tens of billions of taxpayer dollars on a mission that ends in failure because of a threat that experts knew about decades beforehand but which NASA failed to quantify. It would be one thing if failure was induced something that no one thought about (unknown unknowns). It’s entirely another if failure was induced by a known threat that could have been quantified by investing a small fraction of the program’s total dollars (known unknowns). The National Academies report is about the latter, not the former. (By definition, it can’t be about the former — even experts can’t identify unknown unknowns.)

    I’d also argue that science-driven robotic missions are also critical to providing a strong enough rationale for such an expensive undertaking as a human Mars mission. But that’s something I’ve debated ad nauseum with Mr. Robertson in other threads and won’t repeat here.

    Again, and I know I’m beating a dead horse here, the fundamental problem is not the choice between these different robotic precursor investments. The problem is that NASA is not investing in any of these things, for Mars, or even the Moon, despite the fact that NASA is suppossed to be pursuing a Vision for Space Exploration. Instead, we’re putting practially all of our “exploration budget” into a duplicative and incredibly expensive, intermediate-class LEO launcher. Unless and until NASA starts pursuing affordable and sustainable approaches to human space flight, arguments about different precursor mission investments, different human mission targets, and robotic versus human balance are theoretical at best. There’s never going to be dollars in the budget for human exploration activities, otherwise.

    FWIW…

  • Al Fansome

    KEVIN MATALIN: This is just the classic anti-science attitude among the exploration fans, they don’t care about it, and they simply want to take its money.

    Kevin,

    That is a little over the top.

    As I read it, Mr. Wingo’s fundamental argument is not “Let’s take money from SMD” for exploration purposes (although aligning the two strategically is a good idea.)

    He is arguing that we really can’t explore in a sustainable & affordable way without things like ISRU, and propellant depots.

    I totally agree.

    Now, if we demonstrated the Mars ISRU technology first in a “relevant environment”, it would go a LONG ways to improving the MSR mission. The operational advantages of Mars ISRU are significant. The primary reason the MSR program does not want use it is because it adds technical risk and complexity to a science mission. And for good reason — most spacecraft mission failures were caused by inserting unproven technology into the operational spacecraft. Just talk to the Air Force Space & Missiles Command.

    IMO, we need an “X spacecraft” to demonstrate Mars ISRU technology.

    This, obviously, would be part of ESMD’s budget, not SMD’s. That is, if ESMD actually had a real budget for developing, testing and proving new strategic technology.

    FWIW,

    – Al

  • Anonymous: You’re arguing a technical subject using historical and political analogies that have nothing to do with the realities and unknowns at hand.

    While it is true that I am not an engineer or a biologist, I do have experience as a field archaeologist, and any politically sustainable Mars program (and please note that I don’t even think Mars should be our first, or even our third, goal) must be quick, dirty, and cheap. If we are not capable of doing that, we are not capable of going to Mars — as ESAS is proving for the moon right now — and somebody else (hopefully) will do it in our stead. Earlier deep sea explorers did have to deal with extremely dangerous and deadly environments (including toxic and nutritional issues, remember Scurvy?), and we can learn something from studying their examples. The chief thing I believe we should learn is that the Polynesians, et al, leanred by doing, not by endlessly studying, and this includes Apollo. We will not learn how to deal with even the known threats on Mars by staying at home and studying them; we will learn how to deal with them by _having_ to deal with them, by being there or rapidly on the way.

    We’ve sent a lot of automated missions to Mars. We will _never_ know all there is to know about Mars. At some point (maybe not now, but soon), we need to draw the line and say we have enough information and it’s time to take the leap. I’d say the way forward is to design one or two missions specifically to answer the highest-risk questions, conduct a couple of PhD missions to try to find local resources in orbit . . . and then go.

    Or not. . . .

    Kevin: If you want to do ISRU on Mars, that is _not_ a science mission,

    Is that still true if it actually increases the political chances of mission success by reducing mass and thus cost? What if that’s the only way the mission can be done?

    Mars Sample Return is already an incredibly complex mission from a technology perspective. Landing on Mars is difficult. Getting off of the surface has never been done. Autonomous rendezvous at Mars has never been done.

    Which is exactly why we shouldn’t be doing this if it can possibly be avoided. We can’t even reliably automate rendezvous and docking in Earth orbit. These are issues far better addressed by human missions.

    — Donald

  • Kevin Matalin

    “Is that still true if it actually increases the political chances of mission success by reducing mass and thus cost? What if that’s the only way the mission can be done?”

    It’s not going to do this. It increases technical complexity and will require testing ahead of time. That increases cost, for a mission that is already very expensive. And if you make the science program pay for it, it looks like a science mission that is very expensive and therefore a target for killing.

    If you want to pay for ISRU development from the exploration budget and then use it for science, then that’s okay. But you’re talking about things that will easily collapse the Mars science program.

  • Dennis Wingo

    You’re misportraying my words. Mr. Wingo argued that we could wait to send robotic precursors if the first Mars human mission is 20-25 years out. I’m not arguing whether it’s good or bad to send humans to Mars in that timeframe. I’m just arguing that it’s not possible in that timeframe given that we’re not investing now in the necessary robotic precursors (among other things).

    No I did not say that at all. I said that since human missions to Mars are 20-25 years away, we don’t have to spend money on those missions that you laid out from the decadal survey in this decade, they can go in the next one, much closer to the time of the mission.

    If folks like Dr. Leif Svalgaard and others are right (the evidence is pointing in that direction) and that we are going into an era of historically low solar activity, the data that we take during solar cycle 24 will be irrelevant to the data that would need to be taken again during solar cycle 25. The radiation environment will be much different then. What most people don’t realize is that the worst solar outbreak within the technological era came during a time of low solar activity through a massive coronal hole in 1859. If that happened during a Mars mission, by by crew and computers on the spacecraft AND on the Earth.

    Therefore I have a science grounded reason for not wanting to fund those missions now.

    As for the fight between ESMD and SMD related to ISRU experiments, this is the height of folly. Phobos represents a Carbonaceous Chondrite asteroid, which from what we know from meteoric samples that have hit the Earth (the Tagish lake meteorite for example) are far more representative of the precursors to life that existed in the early history of our solar system. Finding water might actually find amino acids and other life precursors in far better shape than anything on the Martian surface. The water is a bonus and helps to tell us about the thermal environment over time at Mars orbit, so there is a distinct science reason to go there that in the near term trumps human factors (which are all exploration related so you just negated your own argument by the way).

    We do need a resource survey of the inner solar system and this also brings a huge number of scientific benefits as well as completing a resource survey. You imply that I would like to take money from the science budget and apply it to exploration. I would counter that too many of the science experiments shy away from dual purpose missions because it is not pure science. This dichotomy must no longer be tolerated as without development, there is no exploration, and without development and exploration, the science budget will always be at the mercy of shifting priorities.

    In terms of the Moon, science and ISRU development is served by further missions to the surface. I know that some scientists think that they have learned everything about the Moon but nothing is further from the truth.

  • Kevin Matalin

    “I said that since human missions to Mars are 20-25 years away, we don’t have to spend money on those missions that you laid out from the decadal survey in this decade”

    Anonymous.space did not quote the decadal survey, he quoted the “Safe on Mars” study. I hope that you understand the difference between them.

    And his point is correct–if you set the human Mars landing in 2030, then you start designing that spacecraft in 2020 (if not earlier). You need the required data for humans on Mars by 2017 or so (because you need three years to understand it fully). So you land by 2015 (to collect a couple of years of data-at least one Mars-year). And so you start designing the robot spacecraft by 2009 or so.

    So, pick your date for a human landing and then walk back by a couple of decades.

    “so there is a distinct science reason to go there that in the near term”

    Go find the decadal survey and locate the justification that supports your above assertion.

  • Paul F. Dietz

    If that happened during a Mars mission, by by crew and computers on the spacecraft AND on the Earth.

    Explain to me how computers on the Earth would be affected. Only tiny amounts of radiation from such a flare would penetrate the atmosphere to reach the ground (which is the equivalent of 30 feet of water in thickness, at sea level).

  • Someone

    With all due respect, NO WHERE in the VSE is there a SPECIFC DATE for a human mission to Mars. The President merely stated ” With the experience and knowledge gained on the moon, we will then be ready to take the next steps of space exploration: human missions to Mars and to worlds beyond.”The only definite dates given are for the first manned flight of the CEV, 2014, and the return of Americans to the Moon, 2020.

    Since CEV is already behind schedule for the first CEV date Griffin would be making the correct decision in cutting funding for robotic Mars missions to advance the ESAS since there is no American space goal of sending humans to Mars in 2030 as argued here. Indeed, like the Chinese lunar program, that is only a desirable policy outcome at some distant future date. Human missions to Mars could well be 2040, 2050, even 2070 and still not in conflict with the VSE. This is also why Congress putting a prohibition on research on human missions to Mars is not in conflict with support for the VSE or ESAS. Indeed, it could be seen as a reminder to NASA to keep focused on the actual VSE timetable.

    So there is no justification in the VSE for NASA to spend any additional money on robotic missions to Mars until after humans return to the Moon. Actually one could argue that spending on robotic Mars missions is in direct conflict with a national space policy based on the VSE. It should also be noted that the reports discussed, the Decadal Survey and Safe on Mars are merely recommendations, not national space policy, so Griffin has no obligation to follow them.

    So if it will take twenty years of robotic missions to prepare for human missions to Mars they could well start after the Lunar return in 2020 and not conflict with the VSE.

  • “With all due respect, NO WHERE in the VSE is there a SPECIFC DATE for a human mission to Mars.”

    Incorrect. There is no specific date, but human Mars missions do appear in the post-2020 timeframe in the roadmap on page 5 of the VSE document.

    Moreover, a page of text (page 9) is dedicated to robotic and human Mars missions. In the third paragraph, the document specifically states that:

    “Starting in 2011, NASA will also launch the first in a new series of human precursor missions to Mars. These robotic testbeds will test the technologies — such as improved aerodynamic entry, Mars orbital rendezvous and docking, precision landing, resource extraction and utilization, and optical communications — that can greatly enhance future robotic capabilities and are key to enabling future human Mars missions. These missions will also obtain critical data for future human missions on chemical hazards, resource locations, and research sites. They may prepare resources and sites in preparation for human landings.”

    I don’t know how it could be any more clear than that. Of course, that whole line of Mars missions was wiped out by Ares I/Orion costs, along with most of the Mars science mission line. Not only are we not sending the first human Mars precursor mission in 2011, we’re sending no robotic Mars missions during the 2011 window.

    “Since CEV is already behind schedule for the first CEV date Griffin would be making the correct decision”

    No, the “correct” decision would be to pursue a human LEO transport system that fits within the available budget instead of raiding other VSE programs, eliminating practically all exploration spending at NASA, and reducing the VSE to a LEO transport replacement program.

    “This is also why Congress putting a prohibition on research on human missions to Mars”

    Also incorrect. The Mars prohibition says nothing about focusing on the Moon and was introduced appease a specific legislator who opposes funding for the VSE and NASA overall. It has nothing substantive to do with any Moon versus Mars debate.

    “one could argue that spending on robotic Mars missions is in direct conflict with a national space policy based on the VSE”

    Two points:

    1) The VSE is “a national space policy”.

    2) Not spending funding on robotic Mars missions is in direct conflict with the VSE, which on page 9, calls for two lines of robotic Mars missions, one for science and one for human precursor missions.

    “It should also be noted that the reports discussed, the Decadal Survey and Safe on Mars are merely recommendations, not national space policy, so Griffin has no obligation to follow them.”

    This is a silly claim, for two reasons.

    1) NASA pays for those studies. The National Academies don’t undertake these studies unless NASA wants the advice and is paying for it.

    2) Moreover, these studies represent the expert consensus views of the relevant technical disciplines. To ignore them is to introduce unnecessary mission-ending threats (Safe on Mars) into human space activities or pay for science missions (various decadal surveys) that researchers are not interested in or that are not technically valid.

    FWIW…

  • Tom

    @PFD: Explain to me how computers on the Earth would be affected. Only tiny amounts of radiation from such a flare would penetrate the atmosphere to reach the ground (which is the equivalent of 30 feet of water in thickness, at sea level).

    Here’s a quick summary:

    http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/mystery_monday_031027.html

    In short, our then-very-minorly wired world ran into some serious problems. The electrical grid of today (along with any wired networks) would have serious problems.

  • Dennis Wingo

    Paul

    An aricle from space.com

    http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/mystery_monday_031027.html which Tom referenced.

    Here is another one

    http://www.tgo.uit.no/saba/sabathesis/Ef2.html

    The induced currents were so strong that the telegraph operators were able to send messages with the “celestial power” alone. There are other reports of telegraph offices catching on fire due to the induced currents.

    It would do a major number on today’s power and computer infrastructure.

  • Dennis Wingo

    2) Not spending funding on robotic Mars missions is in direct conflict with the VSE, which on page 9, calls for two lines of robotic Mars missions, one for science and one for human precursor missions.

    Which again begs the question, how many more Mars missions do we need? Your response was to lay out several human factors related missions that are not needed until the 2020’s so why spend the money on them now? As you stated, these are ESMD missions so why is the science budget being tapped for them?

    This mad dash for Mars is ill considered when placed into the appropriate context of national needs. A dash to Mars, without other infrastructure on the Moon and probably NEO’s (including Phobos/Deimos) will end up exactly where the Apollo program ended.

    I don’t think that you understand the level of anger in the population right now concerning government policy and a lark to Mars is more than likely to lead to the demise of the entire exploration program.

    We must put Mars into the proper context of a well thought out and executed scientific and economic development program that has as its goal the creation of a solar system spanning (starting in the inner solar system) applications program. This applications program will work toward the development of the resources of the solar system for the betterment of life here on the Earth and the creation of opportunities for the spread of mankind throughout the solar system.

    Without a more encompassing goal than science and “inspiration” the VSE is doomed to the fate of SEI.

  • […] creating big fireballs, there’s a debate larger than how Florida’s Brevard County–or even how the Mars program–pays the bills. The debate at Space Politics is a lively place to end. Look, there’s no […]

  • Someone

    The VSE “document” you talk about is not the same as the President’s speech. No Where in that speech is there a date given for a human mission to Mars. NASA may have penciled one in when transferring the President’s goals into a timetable, but it has less meaning then the firm date given for a lunar return in the speech.

    And just because NASA asks the NAS for advice doesn’t mean they must follow it. Especially if it is in conflict with more important agency objectives like a lunar return. And don”t forget that NAS is merely one group of “experts” with a vested interest in pushing a specfic agenda, in this case Mars. NASA has other interests besides the narrow agenda of NAS it must address as well, ones that more directly impact its future budget than NAS does. Also if I recall both of those reports predate the VSE, making their recommendations outdated anyway.

  • “Your response was to lay out several human factors related missions that are not needed until the 2020’s”

    If we go by your (Mr. Wingo’s) timeline of a first human Mars mission launch 20-25 years from now (circa 2030-35), then those robotic precursors would have to start now.

    By optimistic Apollo standards, it will take at least 10-15 years to develop a human Mars architecture and its associated vehicles and systems. That means we would have to quantify the threats laid out in the “Safe on Mars” report by about 2020-25 to inform the engineering decisions going into that human Mars architecture and design around those threats in the associated vehicles and systems. Backing up from there, developing and operating the series of robotic Mars precursor missions (which include some ambitious missions like Mars sample return) and analyzing their data is going to take another 10-15 years. That puts us at today, or even yesterday.

    In sum, we’re looking at a total timeline of 20-30 years to mount a human Mars mission, including both the development of the actual human architecture and the robotic precursors necessary to inform the design decisions going into that architecture.

    It’s simply not credible to state that we can wait on Mars robotic precursor missions if your (Mr. Wingo’s) timeline for a human Mars mission is 20-25 years from now. We’re looking at 20-30 years of work that would have to start now (or yesterday).

    I don’t know how I (or Mr. Matalin) can make it any plainer than that.

    Now if you’ve mistyped or I’ve misunderstood, and what you’re actually arguing is that a human Mars mission should not launch 20-25 years from now and instead should be planned for 35 years or more from now, then that’s a different argument. What I’ve argued above is an issue of technical credibility — that robotic precursors would have to start now to support a human Mars mission 20-25 years from now. But if you are actually starting from a baseline 35+ years from now for a human Mars mission, then there is no conflict with the timeline and the robotic precursor missions can wait.

    Personally, I think it’s pretty sad that we had a series of robotic Mars precursors (and robotic lunar precursors) in the VSE, which have been lost to Ares I/Orion costs. But that’s another thread.

    “As you stated, these are ESMD missions so why is the science budget being tapped for them?”

    I never stated that the SMD budget is being tapped for robotic Mars precursors. They were in the VSE, but have been wiped out and aren’t being funded by NASA at all (ESMD or SMD). Same goes for the lunar precursor line.

    On top of that, the line of Mars science missions is also getting cut by more than half. We’re actually not sending any missions, for science or as human precursors, to Mars during the 2011 window.

    “This mad dash for Mars is ill considered”

    I think we may be in violent agreement here. You posited a human Mars mission 20-25 years from now. I would agree with that timeline IF we were making investments in the necessary robotic precursors. But we’re not, so it’s going to take even longer than that.

    FWIW…

  • “The VSE ‘document’ you talk about is not the same as the President’s speech… NASA may have penciled one in when transferring the President’s goals into a timetable”

    They are part and parcel of the same document, which was negotiated between NASA and the White House and which the White House cleared for publication (just like any strategic planning document for any federal department or agency).

    The VSE was released simultaneous with the President’s speech. NASA did not go back in and “pencil in” additional dates. They couldn’t.

    “And just because NASA asks the NAS for advice doesn’t mean they must follow it.”

    While true, this is again a silly statement. The National Academies provides independent, expert advice on technical matters. To ignore that advice is to ignore technical reality as best the top scientists and engineers in the nation can ascertain it. To do so (e.g., develop a human Mars mission without quantifying the mission-ending threats identified in “Safe on Mars”) would be foolish in the extreme.

    “And don”t forget that NAS is merely one group of “experts” with a vested interest in pushing a specfic agenda,”

    Two points:

    1) The National Academy of Science (NAS) is just one part of the National Academies, which also includes the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), the Institute of Medicine (IOM), and their operating arm, the National Research Council (NRC). The NAS and the National Academies are not the same thing, and we should not use the terms interchangeably.

    2) The National Academies has no agenda. From the website for the NRC, the part of the National Academies that undertakes these studies:

    “The National Research Council (NRC) functions under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), and the Institute of Medicine (IOM). The NAS, NAE, IOM, and NRC are part of a private, nonprofit institution that provides science, technology and health policy advice under a congressional charter signed by President Abraham Lincoln that was originally granted to the NAS in 1863. Under this charter, the NRC was established in 1916, the NAE in 1964, and the IOM in 1970. The four organizations are collectively referred to as the National Academies.

    The mission of the NRC is to improve government decision making and public policy, increase public education and understanding, and promote the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge in matters involving science, engineering, technology, and health. The institution takes this charge seriously and works to inform policies and actions that have the power to improve the lives of people in the U.S. and around the world.

    The NRC is committed to providing elected leaders, policy makers, and the public with expert advice based on sound scientific evidence. The NRC does not receive direct federal appropriations for its work. Individual projects are funded by federal agencies, foundations, other governmental and private sources, and the institution’s endowment. The work is made possible by 6,000 of the world’s top scientists, engineers, and other professionals who volunteer their time without compensation to serve on committees and participate in activities. The NRC is administered jointly by the NAS, NAE, and the IOM through the NRC Governing Board.

    The core services involve collecting, analyzing, and sharing information and knowledge. The independence of the institution, combined with its unique ability to convene experts, allows it to be responsive to a host of requests.”

    On top of all this, NRC reports are also peer-reviewed. It’s the gold-standard for independence and technical expertise.

    “in this case Mars… the narrow agenda of NAS”

    The National Academies has no “Mars” or other “narrow agenda”. For example, the NRC has also performed recent lunar studies for NASA, including “The Scientific Context for Exploration of the Moon” in 2007. (Not to mention the independent, expert advice that the National Academies provides in all the technical areas outside the civil space arena.)

    “Also if I recall both of those reports predate the VSE, making their recommendations outdated anyway.”

    The VSE is a policy and planning document. It doesn’t change the fact that we don’t know how much hexavalent chromium is on Mars, how many high-energy neutrons reach the surface of Mars, etc. Technical realities never become “outdated”.

    FWIW…

  • Dennis Wingo

    anonymous space

    There is a fundamental issue that you have not addressed here which is the why and the what of Mars. If we are just going to Mars to pick up a few rocks and maybe find a fossil, I would say that it is not worth the trip. Mars must be part of an integrated plan for the development of the economic resources of the inner solar system.

    Within that context, the way that we go to Mars as well as the purposes for being there, change dramatically. It goes from being Apollo on steroids to a sustainable architecture that includes the Moon, the NEO’s and Mars as part of an integrated whole. Mars then moves from an object of scientific curiosity to a place where people will live, work, and build a civilization.

    Without the Moon none of this will happen as the Moon is where we learn to live off the planet and begin to build industries that then lowers the cost for the rest of the integrated whole.

    Therefore the science goals and missions change dramatically. After the lunar infrastructure begins to be built up, multiple missions to Mars per opposition become possible and affordable and therefore we can postpone them until such time as they are actually needed, rather than decades before.

    If you argument is that you need the data to do your planning well ahead of time, I would posit that it is far more important to do that for the Moon now, as it is the immediate target and we need far more than “a good map” to enable the resource exploitation of our nearest neighbor.

  • Dennis Wingo

    anonymous space

    If what you say about the NAS were true, the guidance provided by the president’s speech and Dr. Marburger’s direction would have carried more weight and would have guided their recommendations. Both the president and Dr. Marburger insisted that ISRU and economic development of the solar system are core values of the effort but NONE of the points from the NAS that you have repeated here have even the mere mention of either. Therefore the criticisms leveled by others here have a basis in fact.

  • Someone

    BTW, the VSE document is not even posted on the NASA website anymore. Which shows its importance. While the Presidents speech is still posted at the WH. That gives you a sense of its relative importance.

    As for you long passionate speech in defense of the NAS, gee, you would almost think you work for them. Really, they are just ONE opinion among MANY as to what NASA needs to be doing. And if anything their “Safe on Mars” document showed how foolish it is to be rushing Mars only a few years after returning to the Moon. Perhaps that is why the Presdient did noty name a date? And the NAS does have an agenda to promote just as other such groups, in this case “pure” science. The is no reason for NASA to give their opion any more weight then other similar groups seeking to raid its budget for their agenda. Nor is pure science the only reason for a space program.

    And IF, as you state, it will take 20-30 years to prepare the way for Humans to goto Mars, and the national space policy is to plan a Mars mission only after lunar expeirence is gain, its makes it all the more likley that the Mars mission should slip to 2050 time frame. And human mission ot the moons of Mars make much more sense.

  • Kevin Matalin

    “And just because NASA asks the NAS for advice doesn’t mean they must follow it. Especially if it is in conflict with more important agency objectives like a lunar return. And don”t forget that NAS is merely one group of “experts” with a vested interest in pushing a specfic agenda, in this case Mars. NASA has other interests besides the narrow agenda of NAS it must address as well, ones that more directly impact its future budget than NAS does. Also if I recall both of those reports predate the VSE, making their recommendations outdated anyway.”

    Somebody needs to throw a caution flag into this debate. There’s a lot of misstatements flying about.

    Here’s a suggestion: before making comments like the above, read at least the summaries of the cited reports. In the case of the “Safe on Mars” study, NASA _asked_ the NRC for the advice in order to assist in planning human missions. Yeah, they don’t _have_ to follow it, but they’d be rather stupid to ask the experts and then ignore them. (In addition, one thing that happens with NRC reports is that Congress gives them a lot of credibility, so NASA can ignore them, but will have to _explain_ why they are doing so.)

    And you should consider the context of that report. The context is limited to a human Mars mission. If NASA decides not to pursue one, then it does not need to take that advice.

    As for the decadal survey, I think you and Mr. Wingo really don’t know what those reports are or how they work. Please go read the summaries for both reports.

  • “There is a fundamental issue that you have not addressed here”

    And I didn’t intend to. Aside from a couple passing references, I never wrote about the why of humans to Mars. I was just correcting factual and technical inconsistencies about what activities needed to take place before the design and development of a human Mars mission could take place and the overall timeline for such a mission. That’s all.

    “It goes from being Apollo on steroids to a sustainable architecture that includes the Moon, the NEO’s and Mars as part of an integrated whole.”

    Although I’m sure that we’d differ on some the implementation details, at a general level, I agree with your (Mr. Wingo’s) statement. ESAS and Apollo-on-steroids is an empty implementation of the VSE.

    I could follow up on some of the other statements in your last post, and we could nitpick endlessly over the relative priority of ISRU versus science, or Moon versus Mars, or timeline X versus timeline Y. But when ESAS and Apollo-on-steroids has reduced the VSE to little more than the development of another enormously expensive, technically crippled, and worse, duplicative LEO launch system, it seems like a waste of time to debate those details.

    The point is that despite having been handed a golden opportunity by the Bush Administration, NASA is once again not investing in any capabilities for human space exploration or development beyond LEO — at the Moon, Mars, or anywhere else. Until that changes, I think we’re just wasting our breath on these other details.

    “If what you say about the NAS were true, the guidance provided by the president’s speech and Dr. Marburger’s direction would have carried more weight and would have guided their recommendations. Both the president and Dr. Marburger insisted that ISRU and economic development of the solar system are core values of the effort but NONE of the points from the NAS that you have repeated here have even the mere mention of either.”

    Again, the National Academies only brings groups of experts together and studies what NASA pays the National Academies to study (or what Congress or the White House tell NASA to pay the National Academies to study). If NASA (or Congress or the White House) don’t want any advice or recommendations on lunar ISRU, then the National Academies is not going to go out and write a report on lunar ISRU just for the fun of it.

    We shouldn’t blame the National Academies for NASA’s inability to follow through on White House direction, or the White House’s failure to police NASA on the direction provided. The National Academies only produces independent, expert, technical advice — it doesn’t give policy direction to or provide management oversight of federal agencies. If we think NASA needs to follow through on some of the ISRU-related details of the VSE, the Aldridge Commission, or Marburger’s Goddard speeches, then we should blame NASA’s senior management and its White House overseers, not the National Academies.

    Don’t look for scapegoats among uninvolved bystanders. Put the blame where it belongs.

    My 2 cents… FWIW…

  • Vladislaw

    A lot of those recommendation are just make work for NASA.

    Recommendation: NASA should determine, in advance of human missions to Mars, rock size distribution and shapes in situ, at the landing site or on comparable terrain, in order to predict human and rover trafficability.

    Recommendation: NASA should determine the adhesive properties of Martian soil and airborne dust in order to evaluate the effects of dust adhesion on critical systems. This characterization must be conducted in situ by means of experiments to measure airborne dust adhesion.

    Recommendation: In order to evaluate the potential corrosive effects of Martian soil and airborne dust on humans and critical systems in a humidified environment, NASA should measure the pH and buffer capacity of soil and airborne dust either via an in situ experiment or on Earth with returned samples of soil and airborne dust collected from the Martian atmosphere.

    ============================

    You want to know the effects of dust on machinery? Here’s a thought, point one of the rover cameras at itself.

  • Vladislaw

    I didn’t say that to be flippant, but to get something funded, a one to two year process, design it, another year or two, build it, another 2-5 years, launch it, another year, have it run on mars 3-5 years, you are looking at 10-15 years to find out if dust sticks on a machine? The rovers are providing that data and have been for three years. I think we can safely assume we can land certain materials on mars.

    Lets get on with it already.

  • “BTW, the VSE document is not even posted on the NASA website anymore.”

    Wrong. On NASA’s exploration homepage (the top site on Google when one searches for the “Vision for Space Exploration”), there are two links on the right-hand menu to PDF versions of the VSE (one low-res and one high-res):

    http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/main/index.html

    And FWIW, these links are ranked higher on the page than the links to the relevant White House pages.

    I have to say that I’m getting a little exasperated with your (Someone’s) argument. First you argued that the lunar content in the VSE trumps everything. But when it was pointed out that the VSE contains Mars content as well, you changed your argument to say that only part of the VSE was important. And then it was pointed out to you that the White House signed off on the entire VSE and rolled it out at the same time as the President’s speech. So now you’ve done an full 180 from your original argument and stated that the entire VSE isn’t important because it doesn’t exist on any official NASA website — when in fact it does (in spades).

    So which is it? Is the VSE important or not? Is only part of the VSE important or not? Does the VSE exist or not in your world? What argument and falsehood do you want to go with next?

    I’m not trying to be mean. But in the future, before interjecting yourself into a discussion, make sure you’ve done your homework and have your facts straight before offering a line of argument. And have some consistency to your argument. Either stick to your argument when you can offer more logic and evidence to support it, or, if another poster proves you wrong and you have no good rebuttal, then have the decency to admit that you were wrong and drop the argument. Don’t keep shifting your argument from one wrong mistruth to another in a vain attempt to find something that you’re right about. That’s a waste of your time and the time of the other posters.

    “Really, they are just ONE opinion among MANY as to what NASA needs to be doing.”

    I don’t know why it’s so hard to understand this, but I’ll try again.

    The National Academies or its operating arm, the National Research Council (NRC) only provides independent, expert advice on technical matters of importance to the nation. For example, in “Safe on Mars”, the NRC was not asked and did not provide an “opinion” on when NASA should send astronauts to Mars (or anywhere else). The NRC was only asked about what key threats to a human Mars mission needed quantifying before NASA could proceed with the development of such a mission, and how NASA should, in broad terms, to go about quantifying those threats.

    That’s very different from policy or planning document, like the VSE, which says that those robotic precursors to a human Mars mission should start in 2011. If you have a problem with the timeline, then you have a beef with the VSE, not “Safe on Mars”. If you have a technical issue with the threats to

    I hope that’s clear, because I can’t make it any clearer.

    “And the NAS does have an agenda to promote just as other such groups, in this case “pure” science.”

    Patently wrong. Two points:

    1) Again, it’s the National Academies or its operational arm, the National Research Council (NRC) that produces these reports, not the National Academy of Science (NAS). The NAS is just the membership arm for scientists in the overall National Academies. The NAS does not produce reports by itself. There are also membership arms for engineers (National Academy of Engineering or NAE) and medical doctors (Institute of Medicine or IOM). The NRC draws variously from all three (the NAS, the NAE, and the IOM) to produce its reports.

    2) Just from the way the NRC builds panels of experts, there can be no bias, for or against, “‘pure’ science” (whatever that is) in NRC reports. In fact, in a report like “Safe on Mars” and many other reports for NASA, there are not only scientists from the NAS on the expert panels, but engineers from the NAE and medical doctors from the IOM. A report on how to keep astronauts and their support systems functioning on Mars would especially not be credible unless it had all three broad disciplines (Mars experts, aerospace engineering experts, and medical experts), not to mention numerous subdisciplines, represented on the panel.

    “The is no reason for NASA to give their opion any more weight then other similar groups seeking to raid its budget for their agenda.”

    The NRC is a non-profit organization whose sole product is independent, expert advice on technical matters. Even if they could “raid” NASA’s budget for some mythical “agenda”, they couldn’t do anything with the money anyway. Their charter doesn’t allow them to.

    “Nor is pure science the only reason for a space program.”

    Who said it was? That may be your argument, but that’s not an argument that’s been offered by anyone else in this thread.

    “And IF, as you state, it will take 20-30 years to prepare the way for Humans to goto Mars… its makes it all the more likley that the Mars mission should slip to 2050 time frame.”

    You’re arguing with yourself. Nowhere in this thread have I stated when I think a human Mars mission should occur. I’ve only tried to correct facts and timelines with regards to what has to be done in preparation for such a mission and how long it will take to do so.

    I personally think it’s very disappointing that NASA has not pursued any of the human exploration content (lunar or Martian, robotic precursor or human systems, etc.) laid out in the VSE. With poorly thought out implementation strategies (Apollo-on-steroids) and enormously and needlessly expensive, duplicative, and technically crippled systems (Ares I and Orion), Griffin and ESAS have passed up a golden opportunity to get NASA back into the human space exploration/development business beyond LEO before the Bush Administration goes out of power. Another opportunity like this probably won’t come again for another 10-20 years, if that.

    But that doesn’t mean that I think that a human Mars mission has to happen in 2030 or 2035 (or pick whatever date you want). I’m only arguing that we’re currently forgoing the option to have a human Mars mission occur in that timeframe because we’re not making the investments we need to make in order to prepare for it.

    And I’d even entertain arguments that we should forgo those Mars investments if (big “IF”) NASA was actually making any of the sustainable lunar investments (ISRU precursors, leveraging existing launchers, etc.) that Mr. Robertson and Mr. Wingo argue so passionately about.

    But NASA is not making those investments. Instead, NASA is spending upwards of $15 billion building yet another intermediate-lift LEO launcher that the world does not need.

    “And human mission ot the moons of Mars make much more sense.”

    Not that a new poster would necessarily spend the time to read past threads before throwing poorly aimed arguments at other posters on this forum (heaven forbid!), but I’ve actually been on the record in response to some of Mr. Robertson’s posts that Phobos/Deimos do make a lot of sense as either an interim human mission before taking on the risks associated with human Mars landing, surface, and ascent operations, or as a base from which to mount such expeditions. In fact, given Mars biological potential, Phobos and/or Deimos may be as close as humans get to Mars for many decades and centuries to come.

    My 2 cents… FWIW…

  • “A lot of those recommendation are just make work for NASA.”

    Just simply not true.

    NASA has to know the size distribution of boulders at landing sites so it can size the human landers and design their descent and landing systems in such a way as to stay upright if they land on a boulder or avoid landing on a boulder completely. This goes to all sorts of design decisions like how many lander legs, the size of those legs, the burn duration of the lander’s engine(s), the amount of propellant feeding those engine(s), etc. — all of which ricochets back through the mass fractions of the rest of the human Mars architecture.

    NASA also has to know the adhesive and corrosive properties of Martian dust as they apply to human support systems. Even if it was properly instrumented, just pointing a MERS camera at its wheels is not going tell engineers what the effects of Martian dust are on the metals, polymers, fabrics, filters, etc. that are unique and critical to supporting astronauts. Mars Pathfinder and MERS do not carry human support systems.

    “I didn’t say that to be flippant”

    And I’m not saying this to be flippant, but one should spend some time trying to understand these threats in some technical depth and trying to design around them on a very thin-margin system before writing them off in a few paragraphs.

    The repeated lack of even common-sense knowledge in this thread has been disturbing.

    FWIW…

  • Dennis Wingo

    anonymous space

    I pretty much agree with your first response of this latest series but the second seems to be mixing what I said with what others have so I will just let that one alone.

    As far as the third one is concerned, the resolution of the MRO camera is sufficient to find any and all boulders at its resolution (slightly less than a meter). We did just fine with that for the Apollo program and the lunar orbiters. Any better resolution is meaningless.

  • “anonymous space

    I pretty much agree with your first response of this latest series but the second seems to be mixing what I said with what others have so I will just let that one alone.”

    Apologies if I mixed your quotes in with Someone’s quotes. The second post was suppossed to be in response to Someone only.

    “As far as the third one is concerned, the resolution of the MRO camera is sufficient to find any and all boulders at its resolution (slightly less than a meter). We did just fine with that for the Apollo program and the lunar orbiters. Any better resolution is meaningless.”

    I don’t have a lot of knowledge in this particular area, but I think you’re right with one big if — if MRO takes images at a meter or less of the areas we’re interested in for a human landing before it expires. (IIRC, MRO will map only a fraction of Mars at that resolution.) I was just responding to Vladislaw’s implication that we can just ignore boulder size, which is just not the case.

    FWIW…

  • Dennis Wingo

    I don’t have a lot of knowledge in this particular area, but I think you’re right with one big if — if MRO takes images at a meter or less of the areas we’re interested in for a human landing before it expires. (IIRC, MRO will map only a fraction of Mars at that resolution.) I was just responding to Vladislaw’s implication that we can just ignore boulder size, which is just not the case.

    I have studied, in great detail, just about all of the documentation from the lunar orbiter program that was used for the planning of the Apollo landing missions and I can with great confidence assert that 1 meter resolution is fine for picking a landing site for human missions.

    MRO will continue to take images until its system dies, who knows when that is but I can guarantee you that Mike Malin will image everything that he possibly can during its mission down to 1 meter resolution. I doubt highly that a lot more will be needed anytime soon optically.

  • Brad

    The information on unmanned precursor missons for a manned Mars mission was very interesting, thanx for that. But I think the need for and timing of unmanned precursor missions is not as extreme as anonymous claims.

    If at all possible, precursor missions should be flown since it will allow the best decisionmaking regarding mission-design tradeoffs of risk vs cost. But that doesn’t mean a near term low risk mission could not be flown, it just means it would have to take more expensive tradeoffs.

    For example the most important unknown of all is of human reaction to low-G and zero-G environments during the 2+ years long length of a manned Mars mission. An adequate precursor mission to answer that question by neccessity must be a manned mission not an unmanned one. With better data we could know if it is possible to design an inexpensive Mars mission that uses long stay times on the Martian surface and zero-G conditions aboard the transit vehicle.

    But it is also possible that precursor data will show that the human body would not stand up to such low-G conditions. That could mandate an expensive mission design of a short stay on Mars plus a transit vehicle that provides near 1-g living conditions. But even without the precursor data the pessimistic possibiltiy could be assumed for a manned Mars mission; we could always choose to trade the absence of data for increased mission cost.

    I am reminded of the Apollo program, where even though unmanned precursors were flown such as the Lunar Orbiters and the Surveyor soft-landers, those precusor missions were performed in parallel to the Apollo program and not prior to design of the Apollo mission. One example of this is the landing gear of the Apollo Lunar Module which was much more massive than it really needed to be, because the engineers choose to make pessimistic assumptions because of the lack of data. This was in spite of the fact that the Surveyor soft-landing missions would be conducted prior to any Lunar Module landing.

    I’m just trying to point out that there is more than one correct way to approach the problem of putting people on Mars. It doesn’t have to take a program lasting 25+ years from the beginning to the first manned landing.

  • Ray

    It would be nice to at least get the human factors and ISRU experiments from the cancelled Mars 2001 Surveyor Lander on Mars. At least MECA is one of the parts that have turned into Phoenix.

  • Dennis Wingo

    Without ISRU, both the Moon and Mars efforts are doomed.

  • Someone

    anonymous space

    Gee, another long defense of the NAS. Maybe they do pay your salary. If not they should for defending them that way online,

    As for the VSE study. Any link to it? Or is this a treasure hunt? And what does a NASA planning document have to do with the President’s speech. The Speech is the guide, the document merely one in many reports, like the Aldridge one, of how to implement the directives of the Speech.

    Also you need to do your homwork on who NASA gets advice from. The NAS is not one only group among many.

    So, Again, the NAS “experts” are only ONE opinion of what NASA should be doing in preparing to go to Mars. NASA has studies done all the time by contractors or groups like the Aerospace Corporation. Some recommendations are good and it decides to follow them. Others are not, or are premature. The NAS falls into the later catagory.

    When NASA gets closer to looking at a manned flight to Mars in 20 years or so, then it may consider the recommendations of that 2001 study so outdated as to be useless. In any case its not something it needs to use now for planning especially as Congress has indicated NASA shouldn’t be spending money on preparing human missions to Mars. If preparing for human to go to Mars is the driving of NASA Mars mission you have just given Griffin the justification to cut them all off, saving NASA billions in future spending. And tell me, why would Congress take NASA to task for ignoring the NAS wisdom on preparing for human missions to Mars when Congress is not supportive of NASA spending money on preparing for human missions to Mars? Seems Congress could care less what NAS said 7 years and three adminsitrators ago.

    Also I think your 20 year lead time for preparing to go to Mars is far too long. You should do some homework on Apollo. Only a mere four years passed betwenn Surveyor 1 and Apollo11. And we knew far less about the Moon when Surveyor I was launched then we knew about Mars in the 1970’s, let alone what we know knew from the fleet of vehicles in orbit around it. Indeed, we didn;t even know if the lunar surface would support a lander, which was why the first photo Surveyor took from the surface of the Moon was of its landing pad.

    Now if NASA could go from zero knowledge of the Moon’s surface to landing humans there in only 4 years is a 20 year Mars program, given what we ALREADY KNOW about the Mars environment really justified? It sounds like more a raid on NASA funds for your “Experts” that are recommending a 20 year Mars research agenda. I agree with one of the other posters, it is just make work welfare for the Mars experts who put the report out.

  • “As for the VSE study. Any link to it? Or is this a treasure hunt?”

    Oy vey! Are you kidding or are you really so dense that you can’t follow even a simple internet link?

    I already provided a link in my last reply to you (Someone) above. I’ll repeat the passage here for the reading impaired:

    “On NASA’s exploration homepage (the top site on Google when one searches for the “Vision for Space Exploration”), there are two links on the right-hand menu to PDF versions of the VSE (one low-res and one high-res):

    http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/main/index.html

    And FWIW, these links are ranked higher on the page than the links to the relevant White House pages.”

    First Hint: Use your mouse to click on the link to go to the NASA webpage and then follow the instructions above to get to the PDF versions of the VSE.

    Second Hint: If the link does not work, copy and paste the web address into your web browser and hit “enter” to go to the NASA webpage. Against, follow the instructions above to get to the PDF versions of the VSE.

    “Also you need to do your homwork…”

    “So, Again,…”

    “In any case its not something…”

    “Only a mere four years passed betwenn…”

    “Indeed, we didn;t…”

    Look, Ace, your English is barely understandable now. I don’t mean to get high and mighty, but if you’re not going to bother to read and comprehend my earlier posts, if you’re going to insist on repeating the same erroneous arguments and falsehoods despite evidence to the contrary, if you’re not going to proofread your posts before you click “submit”, and if you’re not even going to follow the links that I’ve provided, then we’re just wasting each other’s time.

    Take your meds, graduate from middle school, or do whatever it is you need to do to put together a cogent, readable argument backed by truthful facts that is responsive to the other posts in the thread. Until then, it’s not worth my time or yours to engage in discussion.

    Ugh…

  • Someone

    anonymous.space

    You know I have avoided attacking you personally. Why do you feel you have to attack me? Is it because you are unable to support your position any other way?

    I have just tried to point out that the NAS is not the only source of recommendations for NASA’s program. Merely one among many. Yet you keep trying to elevate the NAS to some gold standard that NASA must obey above all other recommendations. And you are doing this using a seven year old report. If those issues were so important why weren’t they addressed with the Mars rovers or the Phoenix lander? Perhaps the MSL should be held back until it is capable of answering them. What is the point of sending mission after mission to Mars if they are unable to answer the questions that need to be answered before sending humans? You could make an argument the rovers were too far along, but the MSL and Phoenix were just in the early planning stages when the report came out.

    I also pointed out that there are inconsistencies, especially on the Mars timetable, with the President’s goals for VSE and NASA’s document on it. You don’t seem willing to accept that. And did you stop to consider that perhaps there was a reason the President did not give even a rough date for going to Mars in his speech? Also do we remember Kennedy’s speech on Apollo or the NASA planning document on it?

    I also pointed out 20 years wasn’t needed to go from Surveyor 1 to Apollo 11. Only four starting from a much lower knowledge base. We have been sending spacecraft to the surface of Mars since the 1970’s. Why do we need another 20 years of missions to Mars to learn how to land humans on there? Has our ability to tolerant risk declined since Apollo or just our engineering abilities? Seems at most one mission would be needed to scout a specific landing site. Or use the current rover landing sites as a target for a human mission. But instead you seem to insist we spend billions sending 20 years of missions to Mars before sending a human to just because the NAS recommends more study. Most scientists, left to themselves will study something to death before making a decision. I am sure if they were asked to determine how many robotic lunar missions were needed before astronauts were sent to the Moon we would still be trying to determine if it was safe.

    BTW if you can’t argue the issues you should not attack the person. Or is that how you were taught to win debates?

    Ugh yourself

  • Paul Dietz

    The business with solar storms affecting the ground is not due to radiation affecting computers, as it is in space, but geomagnetic effects on the power grid. This will not mean “by by” (sic) to computers, and need not affect their operation at all if they have UPSs. Moreover, it need not affect the power grid either if the grid is properly designed (with DC links, which experience only small and inconsequential shifts in voltage), or if the grid is not at high magnetic latitude.

  • Vladislaw

    “ah houston control, this is the mars lander eagle one on visual approach to mars landing, there are a few rocks down there, you said they were about 3-4 feet across but they are really 5-6 feet across and so we are aborting the mission and flying back to earth because we do not know how to mitagate a landing where there is a couple rocks laying on a football field sized landing area”

  • Vladislaw

    “NASA has to know the size distribution of boulders at landing sites so it can size the human landers and design their descent and landing systems in such a way as to stay upright if they land on a boulder or avoid landing on a boulder completely. This goes to all sorts of design decisions like how many lander legs, the size of those legs, the burn duration of the lander’s engine(s), the amount of propellant feeding those engine(s), etc. — all of which ricochets back through the mass fractions of the rest of the human Mars architecture.”

    Are you saying that NASA, with a freakin ARMY of engineers, would currently be stumped on how to land near or avoid a rock?

    How about we just design it to land REGARDLESS of boulder size and just design it robust enough to land on ground we already KNOW what the range of rock sizes are and mitagate them with HANDS on control by the astronauts doing the landing, I trust them to pick a landing site they feel they can land on.

    Nasa has a tendency to study problems to death, because of the simple fact it is easier to get a study funded then getting actual hardware funded. Granted, a lot of the basic questions are unanswered, but if EVERYTHING is so far off in the future as far as the possiblity of it actually happening, (meaning we need to do a million more studies and unmanned launches) why have NASA astronauts wanted to goto mars RIGHT AFTER the moon? Were the astronauts who ACTUALLY FLEW apollo missions some how deluded in thinking we could have went to mars with 1970’s technology?
    What DIDNT the astronauts of the apollo era know about a possible mars landing that would have stopped their 1970’s technology?

    Nasa astronauts and engineers have said for 30 years mars was doable and every landing SINCE has only confirmed it, mars is doable. So if astronauts who would actually have to fly the mission have said it is doable for 30 years, and the engineers have said it was doable for the last 30 years why do YOU say we need all this unmanned launches and studies done? What do YOU know that the ARMY of nasa astronauts and engineers dont know? It all boils down to money and political will, that is the ONLY thing holding America back from a mars landing.

    I say lets go.

  • I say lets go.

    Great. Go ahead. With your own money.

  • Okay, Rand, when you forgo all of the government subsidies you, personally, benefit from. . . . The highways and freeways you drive on, the airports you fly through, the trucking industry that delivers your goods and services, the military infrastructure and wars attributable to making sure we can continue to import oil cheaply, your grandmother’s medicare, etc., etc., etc. When what I call “free market radicals” voluntarily give up all of that, then and only then will I listen to arguments that government funding should have no place in human space exploration.

    — Donald

  • When what I call “free market radicals” voluntarily give up all of that, then and only then will I listen to arguments that government funding should have no place in human space exploration.

    Well, if and when I say that government subsidies should have no place in human space exploration, then perhaps I’ll care whether or not you will listen to arguments about it. (Though, as it happens, with the exception of the military, which is one of the few fundamental roles of a federal government, I would in fact be willing to give up all those “subsidies.”)

    All I said was that if he wanted to go to Mars, right now, he could do it with his own money. He’s not likely to find very many others willing to fund it.

  • Someone

    Vladislaw,

    There are two ways to easily avoid the rocks on landing problem from Apollo 11. First, just land at one of the sites the rovers are operating at now. Their ground level images should eliminate any surprises.

    Second, just include 2-3 small rovers that could be landed first at the short list of proposed sites. Unlike the Moon you are taking about a mission that will need to hang in Mars orbit for a year or more. And will need a lot of mass for fuel and supplies. A few rovers wouldn’t add much to mission complexity. A mini-rover, the size of Sojourner or smaller, could easily scout a site and even provide a beacon for a the human lander to home in on. Then the astronuats just pick the one that is least risky.

  • Dennis Wingo

    The business with solar storms affecting the ground is not due to radiation affecting computers, as it is in space, but geomagnetic effects on the power grid. This will not mean “by by” (sic) to computers, and need not affect their operation at all if they have UPSs. Moreover, it need not affect the power grid either if the grid is properly designed (with DC links, which experience only small and inconsequential shifts in voltage), or if the grid is not at high magnetic latitude.

    Paul

    In your eternal quest to be right, even when you are wrong, consider this.

    A voltage surge of the magnitude to actually catch buildings on fire, as was reported at multiple locations during the 1859 storm would result in the complete frying of the entire electrical grid across the planet. This would also effect wiring in houses, buildings, and even extension cords. Every single electrical power system on the planet is grounded, and the grounds would suddenly shift by as much as hundreds of volts which would completely reverse the polarity of every single power system on the Earth.

    Do you seriously think with that magnitude of power impulse in the lines that computers would survive? With that amount of radiation hitting a spacecraft do you thing for even one second that the computers or humans would survive?

    Now go do your research and come back with something that indicates that this would not be the case and so ad nauseum find a bit of light to show yourself right.

  • “How about we just design it to land REGARDLESS of boulder size and just design it robust enough to land on ground we already KNOW what the range of rock sizes are”

    For at least a couple reasons:

    1) Because those will likely not be the sites that we are interested in landing at a couple decades from now (whether for reasons of science, resources, other hazards, etc.).

    2) Because designing a human lander robust enough to handle any landing site is likely to be prohibitively expensive in terms of the human Mars architecture’s mass allocations.

    On Earth, there are terrains that even the best SUV or tank cannot navigate. Same goes for human landers, rovers, and EVA suits.

    But unlike on Earth, we don’t have detailed maps of those terrains on Mars. Before we spend billions sending a crew to Mars, it’s wise, even necessary, to spend some millions making sure that we’re not sending a crew to an area of Mars that they can’t land on or get around in. It’s frustrating, but it’s also common sense.

    “why have NASA astronauts wanted to goto mars RIGHT AFTER the moon?”

    They haven’t. Human Mars landings have consistently been planned 20 or so years after human lunar landings. NASA’s early planning for post-Apollo activities put the first human Mars landings in the 1980s, for example.

    “Were the astronauts who ACTUALLY FLEW apollo missions some how deluded in thinking we could have went to mars with 1970’s technology?
    What DIDNT the astronauts of the apollo era know about a possible mars landing that would have stopped their 1970’s technology?”

    It’s not a matter of technology. Unlike inflatable airbags for smaller, automated rovers, there’s no magical landing technology that can solve these problems for human-scale systems.

    It’s a matter of engineering and design. How many legs does the lander need and how big should the landing pads be to keep the lander stable in the terrain we’re interested in? How long will the landing rocket need to fire in order to find a safe landing spot? How much propellant does that involve? If autonomous systems are involved, how fast do they need to be to find a landing spot before the propellant runs out? If humans are in the loop, will they be fast enough to find a landing spot before the propellant runs out? How does the mass of all these landing systems, landing rockets, and propellant affect the mass of the transit and launch systems in the architecture?

    Anyone pretending that a human Mars mission can ignore these engineering realities is ignoring the lessons of Apollo 11. Neil Armstrong had to take manual control of the descent after the LM’s computer was guiding the LM towards a rock-strewn crater. With Buzz Aldrin’s help, they obviously found a safe landing spot, but with only 30 seconds of propellant left for the LM’s landing engine.

    “Nasa astronauts and engineers have said for 30 years mars was doable and every landing SINCE has only confirmed it, mars is doable. So if astronauts who would actually have to fly the mission have said it is doable for 30 years, and the engineers have said it was doable for the last 30 years”

    No one is saying that humans on Mars is not doable. But when NASA asks experts about what mission-ending risks need quantifying to give a human Mars mission a decent shot at success, there is a discrete list of unknowns that needs answering.

    Don’t confuse a need to quantify risks and inform design decisions with a refusal to pursue the mission.

    “why do YOU say we need all this unmanned launches and studies done?”

    I’m not saying that. An independent, expert panel of the nation’s best planetary scientists, aerospace engineers, and medical doctors — hired by NASA — wrote that. I’m just telling you that they wrote it. Don’t take my word for it. Read the report.

    “What do YOU know that the ARMY of nasa astronauts and engineers dont know?”

    Again, read the report. It’s not what I know or don’t know. It’s what a panel of the nation’s top planetary scientists, aerospace engineers, and medical doctors — hired by that same NASA army to address these uncertainties — know or don’t know. See for yourself — the link to the report is provided earlier in this thread.

    “It all boils down to money and political will, that is the ONLY thing holding America back from a mars landing.”

    Money and political will are obviously the only things holding any nation back from starting a human Mars effort.

    But any number of things can go wrong technically between starting the effort and completing a successful mission. It would be the height of technical arrogance to ignore those risks and not attempt to quantify and design around them.

    Faith is not a substitute for good planning and engineering. (Just ask most folks working Ares I these days.)

    “I say lets go.”

    Me too. But let’s not be stupid with our taxpayer dollars.

    “Second, just include 2-3 small rovers that could be landed first at the short list of proposed sites.”

    Robotic precursor missions must be sent years ahead of the human mission so they can inform the design decisions about the human mission hardware (see examples above).

    Robotic precursor missions cannot be sent simultaneous with the human mission. The human landing systems, landing engines, propellant tanks, etc. obviously cannot be redesigned while en route to or in orbit around Mars. It’s silly to suggest so.

    “A mini-rover, the size of Sojourner or smaller, could easily scout a site and even provide a beacon for a the human lander to home in on.”

    Mars Pathfinder only had a half-kilometer range. Even with advanced precision landing technology (which would need to be tested at Mars), the landing ellipse for a human mission will be measured in kilometers to tens of kilometers. If we go with an all-rover route for landing site characterization (not a wise choice, but it’s what’s assumed here), more capable MERS-class rovers will probably be required.

    FWIW…

  • Someone

    anonymous.space

    First, are you saying that given what we know of the surface conditions where the current Mars rovers are operating, given their images of the surface, NASA would not be able to build a craft capable of landing humans at those sites? One without air bags using a system similar to that used on the Vikings?

    Second. You seem to misunderstand the role of the mini-rovers. The purpose would only be to make sure that a landing site is clear of boulders before the human landers go in. The would be NO need to redesign the human lander. Your are just selecting the location within that rovers radius that was the most level and free of boulders. In short the location the human lander would be capable of landing at given its existing specs. I.E. if the human lander needs a site with a 1 degree slope max. and rocks 6 inches in diameter max. you are merely confirming that is the condition that exists. And no, you don’t need a huge rover. Just one big enough to carry a camera and to test the strength of the surface..

    As for pin-point landings. Only Apollo 11 had to over shoot its landing site because of boulders. And it had the fuel to do so as a safety measure. Yep, they cut it close, but not as much as you think. As for Apollo 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17. They all landed on target. In fact the Apollo 12 mission used the Surveyor pictures and orbital pictures from Apollo 11 to pick its landing site and landed with yards of where it was suppose to land. Are you seriously claiming that using technology that is 60 years more advanced then the Apollo era astronauts on Mars would not be able to even approach the accurate landings of Apollo? Even with the aid of a rover scouting the site and providing a fix point for the system to home in on?

    BTW don’t forget the same Apollo era technology got BOTH Viking landers safely to the Mars surface with only pictures from their orbiters to use in selecting a landing site. In short a similar strategy to the one I am advocating, only with oribital images replacing the surface ones. Note also that the original Viking I site was discarded AFTER the Vikings reached Mars orbit and photos showed a boulder field. If NASA could do that with a robotic system over 30 years ago why couldn’t it be done with a human one 20 years in the future?

    Sorry, but the challenge of landing humans on Mars does not require 20 more years of robot missions.

  • anonymous.space

    “First, are you saying that given what we know of the surface conditions where the current Mars rovers are operating, given their images of the surface, NASA would not be able to build a craft capable of landing humans at those sites? One without air bags using a system similar to that used on the Vikings?”

    No, I’m saying we will likely not be interested in landing humans at the MERS sites a couple decades from now, for reasons of science, resources, etc. We may be that lucky, but it’s unlikely.

    “Second. You seem to misunderstand the role of the mini-rovers… And no, you don’t need a huge rover. Just one big enough to carry a camera and to test the strength of the surface.”

    Again, the issue is not size, but range. Even with advanced precision landing technology, the landing ellipse for the human lander is going to be on the order of kilometers to tens of kilometers. Mars Pathfinder only had a range of a half-kilometer. So the robotic precursors will probably have to be MERS-class rovers in order to have the required range.

    “Only Apollo 11 had to over shoot its landing site because of boulders. And it had the fuel to do so as a safety measure. Yep, they cut it close, but not as much as you think.”

    Do you have any evidence for that assertion or is it your opinion? 30 seconds of propellant is only 30 seconds of propellant. Having heard Armstrong and Aldrin talk about that landing, I don’t think that they share your view.

    “Are you seriously claiming that using technology that is 60 years more advanced then the Apollo era astronauts on Mars would not be able to even approach the accurate landings of Apollo?”

    No, I’m saying that there are error ellipses that must be taken into account, just like there were in Apollo. We may be lucky enough to hit the bull’s-eye, but statistically, we can’t rely on luck.

    “BTW don’t forget the same Apollo era technology got BOTH Viking landers safely to the Mars surface with only pictures from their orbiters to use in selecting a landing site.”

    We don’t take the same risks with $1 billion-class robotic missions as we do with $100 billion-class human missions. Unfortunate, but true.

    “Sorry, but the challenge of landing humans on Mars does not require 20 more years of robot missions.”

    Where did I say 20 years of robotic missions? Based on the “Safe on Mars” report, I estimated and wrote 10-15 years of robotic precursor missions (including sample returns and data analysis), followed by 10-15 years of designing and developing the human Mars architecture, vehicles and systems.

    FWIW…

  • Vladislaw

    I believe you are incorrect in saying going to mars in the 80’s

    In 1961 the Nuclear Engines for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA) program took the research done by the ROVER program and began building working rockets from it. NASA issued a request for proposals and established the Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (SNPO) to drive NERVA. The rocket was envisioned for use in a human mission to Mars and, eventually, the outer solar system.

    NERVA was organized as a joint effort between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and NASA, with much inspiration and technology taken from the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program. The idea was to re-create the success story of the AEC-Navy arrangement that had developed and built small power plants for the nuclear submarine and surface ship program. The AEC had the expertise and the sole authority in the U.S. to oversee nuclear reactors for civilian use, and NASA would develop the rockets or ships that would use the engines.

    http://www.aboutnuclear.org/view.cgi?fC=Space,History
    President Kennedy leaving the Rocket Development Station at the Nevada Test Site after viewing a full-scale mock-up of a NERVA engine on December 8, 1962.

    [121] By early 1964, it was widely recognized within NASA that Mars was the next likely major target for exploration following Apollo’s expeditions to the moon. Leonard Roberts, head of the Mathematical Physics Branch in the Dynamics Load Division at the Langley Research Center, became interested in the technological problems associated with vehicles passing through the Martian atmosphere. Langley, by virtue of its extended research into the behavior of airplanes arid spacecraft operating in Earth’s atmosphere, was generally recognized as the leading NASA center for the study of the aerodynamic and heat-load aspects of the entry design of such vehicles. Pursuing the Langley tradition of researcher-generated study projects, Roberts brought together an informal group of center personnel to [122] examine the possible application of its expertise to the problems associated with landing vehicles on Mars. From that group, he selected William D. Mace, Flight Instrumentation Division; Roger A. Anderson, Structures Research Division: and Edwin C. Kilgore, chief of the Flight Vehicle Systems Division, for a team * that would determine how Langley personnel could best contribute their talents to the investigations of the Red Planet.
    http://www.solarviews.com/history/SP-4212/ch5-2.html

    If you look at old documents on what some in government THOUGHT America’s path to mars was it was clearly going to be in the 70’s, Astronauts OF THE DAY (1961-67) assumed America would go forward on nerva AND ‘in space’ ships. Politians of the day had already been watching science fiction movies and television where nuclear powered rocket ships were zipping around the planets and when they were voting on the appropriations for nuclear propulsion and space they saw it happening in THEIR lifetimes. That is a matter of historical FACT! Congress OF THE DAY who were voting for the money being spent saw it happening in THEIR lifetimes.

    If are serious about going to mars we have to be serious about using nuclear power, I have written literally hundreds of letters to representatives urging us forward in this field. If we use nuclear, travel time is reduced to 3-4 months, hang time around the planet would give the astronauts all the time they need to do detailed analysis of potential landing sites.

    As the ANTI NUKE sentiment started taking hold in love generation of the 60’s we see Nerva started getting defunded in 1967 and IF you use 1967 as the starting point you now see nasa coming to understand we were PROBABLY not going to mars in the 70’s and by 1972 and the end of apollo we see Nasa now extend to the 80’s, and that has remained the status quo “mars is doable” but only in a 20-30 year FUTURE time frame BECAUSE of a lack of political will and money. This means stretching it out as long as possible to try and make the yearly bite in funding easier to swallow and an endless stream of paper studies.

  • Vladislaw

    “Where did I say 20 years of robotic missions? Based on the “Safe on Mars” report, I estimated and wrote 10-15 years of robotic precursor missions (including sample returns and data analysis), followed by 10-15 years of designing and developing the human Mars architecture, vehicles and systems.”

    so lets say in year 1 of your 15 year robotic precursor mission you obtain data about some aspect of mars…. 14 more years go by and that first 15 year period of robotic precursor missions ends and you now start the second phase of your plan and start the designing and building phase. So in year 15 of the building phase, you are going to design systems around 30 year old data and technology.

    Under my plan, we FULLY FUND nuclear space propulsion as a manhatten project, build a 150 ton BDB ( big dumb booster) under the KISS principle ( Keep it simple stupid) and launch 150 ton soup cans, string them together add the engines and do a precusor MANNNED ORBITAL mission and do EXTENSIVE mapping of protential landing sites with balloons and unmanned UAVs, drop a nano sat GPS system in orbit and come home. Second mission, we land. Total time 9 years.

  • anonymous.space

    “In 1961 the Nuclear Engines for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA)…”

    As you described, NERVA was a technology development program for space nuclear power and propulsion. It was not a human Mars program. Although important, NERVA’s technologies would have been only one of many pacing items for a human Mars mission.

    “If you look at old documents on what some in government THOUGHT America’s path to mars was it was clearly going to be in the 70’s”

    Some individuals certainly did think that. But the first NASA testimony to Congress on human Mars missions in 1964 recommended a human Mars flyby to launch in 1973 followed by the first human Mars landings to launch in the early 1980s.

    “As the ANTI NUKE sentiment started taking hold in love generation of the 60’s we see Nerva started getting defunded in 1967…”

    Maybe someone will correct me, but I don’t think the drawdown of the NERVA program had much to do with any anti-nuclear sentiment. (Three-Mile Island was still 12 years into the future.)

    IIRC, with no Johnson Administration commitment to a post-Apollo human Mars program, NERVA simply had no customers for its technologies, making it a budget target as NASA’s funding was drawn down for other national needs after Apollo development peaked.

    FWIW…

  • anonymous.space

    “So in year 15 of the building phase, you are going to design systems around 30 year old data and technology.”

    That’s a rather silly statement. To build human Mars systems, we’re going to leverage the current technology base at that time the development of those systems is started (and we’ll probably have to develop some new technologies as well). We’re not going to use an outdated technology base from when the first robotic precursor missions launched a decade or more prior. When the first human Mars mission launches, the human Mars technology base on average will be somewhere between zero (new technologies) and 10-15 years old (when the development effort started), not 30 years old.

    “Under my plan… Total time 9 years.”

    I’m not trying to be snotty, but your plan has been vetted by who?

    Just the trip time for your two human missions (the orbital mission and the landing mission) will be on the order of four or more years. Even setting aside all the robotic precursor missions, it’s just not a credible statement, under even the strictest KISS principles, that the architecture, vehicles, and systems for human planetary landing effort greater than Apollo could be developed in half the time that it took to develop the Apollo architecture, vehicles, and systems.

    I’m all for accelerating the pace of activity and innovation in human space flight, but there are some realities we still have to acknowledge.

    FWIW…

  • Vladislaw

    There were those in congress in 1964 who thought that the more expensive something relative to space cost the more it was NOT really needed. ANYTHING mentioned to those elements relative to the drive in space with apollo was a no go, ESPECIALLY if nasa was even HINTING at another manned landing somewhere like mars.

    True Nerva was not started as a “MARS ENGINE” but it was clear to kennedy that it was in Dec 12th 1962 when he said “the nuclear rocket would be useful for further trips to the moon or trips to mars.” The PSAC and the white house budget bureau teamed up to stop nuclear engine funding in 1962 because they saw the RIFT test as a foot in the door to an early and COSTLY mars launch. By 1967 those groups capitalized and promoted an anti nuke sentiment among liberal groups.

    So in even in 1964 when NASA had stated the 73 fly by and a landing in early 1982 NASA administrators were ALREADY having to factor in funding and how REGARDLESS of how the TECHNOLOGY and ability america had in GOING to mars in the 70’s the only way it could happen is if the number of flights and time in between could be stretched out it still could be doable. Here we see again, it is not about technology or ability, it is political will and money.

  • Vladislaw

    Congressman Karth, told one reporter that he was “absolutely astounded,” especially in view of repeated congressional warnings against “new starts. Very bluntly he said, “a manned mission to Mars or Venus by 1975 or 1977 is now and always has been out of the question-and anyone who persists in this kind of misallocation of resources at this time is going to be stopped.”

    This was after he read about proposals being circulated inside NASA about a manned mars landing in 75 AFTER the 73 flyby. It was then extended to the 82 landing date in the hopes of still saving it. But with budget manuvering they got a clause in about phased development that effectively allowed for the killing of manned mars flights altogether and the voyager mission.

  • Vladislaw

    Your 10-15 years of precursor mission and the 10-15 years of design and build time was 20-30 years, not counting the first orbital or landing mission. My nine years was based on just what scientists in the field have stated on nuclear propulsion. My flight times are based on what Dr. Franklin Chang-Díaz said projected flight times would be.

  • Vladislaw

    As we can plainly see here when Karth in 63 says he is ““absolutely astounded,” to hear that there is STILL proposals floating around NASA suggesting manned missions to mars AT ALL! because NASA had been given, BY 1963, REPEATED warnings about PLANNING manned missions to mars BEFORE the 1980’s.
    So you see, NASA clearly was planning on mars in the 70’s REGARDLESS of what they said PUBLICALLY to congress when elements in congress was REPEATEDLY telling them NO MARS in the 70’s.

  • Someone

    anonymous.space

    No, I’m saying that there are error ellipses that must be taken into account, just like there were in Apollo. We may be lucky enough to hit the bull’s-eye, but statistically, we can’t rely on luck.

    So you are on record as claiming that the accurate landings of the last 5 Lunar Modules (5 out of 5) was pure luck? I think the Apollo astronauts would disagree with you. The late Pete Conrad was especially quite proud of his pinpoint landing on Apollo 12. I expect future Mars astronauts, with technology 60 years more advance will do as well.

    Also the error ellipses are as large as they are for Mars because the landers are not going into low orbit first and don’t have humans at the controls. Both make a huge difference as the Apollo Astronauts showed.

    As for the range of the Mars Pathfinder, it was limited because it was using the lander as a radio relay to Earth. It won’t need the same size relay if it only has to send signals to Mars orbit.

  • Vladislaw

    “As for the range of the Mars Pathfinder, it was limited because it was using the lander as a radio relay to Earth. It won’t need the same size relay if it only has to send signals to Mars orbito .”

    This is exactly why I suggested if we are going to mars, and we are serious about going to mars, and we are serious about staying at mars, then drop off a nano sat GPS system for robot precursor missions operated by astronauts in orbit around mars rather then worrying about having to send the signals back to earth and deal with the lag time. Astronauts orbiting mars on the first orbital mission could operate a small fleet of cheap, single use, ground robots, UAV’s and balloons in real time and gather all the data needed for future landings and spare the expensive earth to mars robotic precursor missions. A lot can happen to a 200kg probe traveling for hundreds of millions to mars, just keep it close and haul it there and astronauts can give it a routine prelaunch check and drop it MORE accurately then trying to fly 400,000,000 miles FIRST, and try to hit an orbit.

  • […] is an interesting discussion going on about all this over at Jeff Foust’s Space Politics […]

  • D. Messier

    I thought the more interesting response from Griffin was him urging scientists not to specialize in one area (specialization is apparently just for bugs). Is this even practical given how specialized science has become? The sheer amount of data that need to be analyzed, and the number of co-authors required to get a paper published by a reputable scientific journal, would tend people toward specialization. Not even counting the unique nature of Mars compared to say Ganymede or Titan. Is it really that easy to shift fields like that?

  • Z-Bob

    No human being is going to go to Mars at government expense in this century unless life is found there by our probes. If life is found, then the check will be blank, and the drive to get there will be urgently felt by scientists all around the world..
    Otherwise, only some wealthy group interested in colonizing and terraforming Mars will ever go, maybe Scientologists fleeing religious persecution.
    The country needs to focus gov’t money for manned flight on the moon and asteroids.
    Since there seems to be no life on Mars, robotic money would be better spent on a Europa mission. A warm ocean has got to be a better gamble where life is concerned.

  • anonymous.space

    “No human being is going to go to Mars at government expense in this century unless life is found there by our probes.”

    Actually, if life is found on Mars, the likelihood that astronauts will walk on the planet’s surface in the foreseeable future goes way down. With humans in the surface loop, the back- and forward-contamination issues become very complex.

    “If life is found, then the check will be blank, and the drive to get there will be urgently felt by scientists all around the world.”

    Agreed, but if I had to bet, I’d bet that those checks will go to expansive robotic exploration, possibly augmented by human operators in orbit around Mars (or on Phobos/Deimos), at least for the foreseeable future.

    “Since there seems to be no life on Mars,”

    No current life on the surface Mars, but evidence continues to build for habitable environments and bodies of water on the past surface of Mars that may have supported ancient lifeforms now fossilized. For example, just last week, there was an announcement about salt deposits on the Martian surface consistent with ancient lakes/oceans (add http://www.):

    sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/03/080320150042.htm

    Ambitious robotic missions have also been planned to seek evidence of life under the surface of Mars, where conditions should be habitable for extant lifeforms, if they exist (add http://www.):

    space.com/scienceastronomy/mars_life_040323.html

    “The country needs to focus gov’t money for manned flight on the moon and asteroids.”

    I’m all for human exploration of the Moon and asteroids. For now, they’re certainly the closest and most realistic targets for human space exploration, their resources may be leveraging or enabling for more expansive exploration or space development efforts, and some of them certainly pose a quantifiable and avoidable risk to life on Earth.

    That said, the most compelling and interesting space exploration targets appear to lie elsewhere. Just last week, in addition to the Mars salt deposit announcement, there were announcements about potential new habitable environments on Titan and the discovery of simple organic molecules in the atmosphere of an extrasolar planet (add http://www.):

    saturndaily.com/reports/Ocean_May_Exist_Beneath_Titan_Crust_999.html

    astronomy.com/asy/default.aspx?c=a&id=6743

    That’s not to say that the Moon and asteroids can’t be exciting (and useful), too. But the really, really exciting developments are happening farther out.

    It’s an unfortunate accident of nature that a larger, more complex, more diverse, and living body like Mars isn’t a satellite of the Earth, instead of the smaller, simpler, relatively uniform, and relatively dead Moon.

    Of course, we probably wouldn’t be here if it weren’t for the Moon, but it’s nice to dream…

    FWIW…

Leave a Reply to Dennis Wingo Cancel reply

  

  

  

You can use these HTML tags

<a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>