Earlier today, a day before the full House is scheduled to take up HR 6063, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008, the Office of Management and Budget released a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on the bill. And the White House is not too happy with the bill in its current form:
The Administration supports maintaining a strong national civil space science and aeronautics enterprise and is committed to advancing the quest for new knowledge, discovery, and exploration that is embodied in NASA programs and activities. However, the Administration strongly opposes H.R. 6063 because it mandates specific Space Shuttle flights that greatly threaten NASA’s ability to retire the Shuttle in 2010, an action that is critical to implementing the President’s Vision for Space Exploration. In addition, the Administration has other serious objections to several provisions of H.R. 6063 that must be satisfactorily addressed prior to final congressional action on reauthorization legislation.
As the excerpt suggests, the administration’s biggest concern with the bill is the provision that mandates that NASA carry out the two “contingency” shuttle flights currently on the manifest as well as add one for carrying the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer to the ISS. “The direction in this section would almost certainly result in several serious impacts and risks to NASA’s exploration programs and other activities, including: (1) significantly increasing costs of the Shuttle program, not including potential recertification activities; (2) delaying the operational capability of the Orion CEV well beyond its current projected dates; (3) exacerbating transition challenges, including facilities and workforce; and (4) exposing astronaut crews to increased risks. In addition, statutorily mandating additional flights regardless of safety assessments and costs sets a dangerous and unwise precedent.”
The administration has several other problems with the bill, including a provision that mandates COTS awards for crew capabilities, several technology development requirements, and a requirement for continued operation of the ISS beyond 2016. The administration is also opposed to the topline authorization of $20.2 billion, compared to the administration’s proposed FY2009 budget of $17.6 billion.
While the White House states that it is “strongly opposed” to the bill, nowhere in the SAP does the administration make any threat to veto the bill if approved in its current form, something it has not hesitated to so in the past, particularly with appropriations bills. It is, though, clearly a warning shot across the bow of the bill’s supporters in Congress.
Update: Wednesday morning’s Houston Chronicle reports that Houston-area members of Congress, Democratic and Republican, continue to support the bill despite the SAP. (The article oversimplifies the NASA authorization bill, claiming it would “hand NASA $2.9 billion for three additional shuttle flights to the international space station before retirement of the shuttle fleet in 2010″; the additional money is for more than just the shuttle flights.)
Have any other administrations ever issued such strongly worded responses (SAP or otherwise) to NASA-related legislation?
“Have any other administrations ever issued such strongly worded responses (SAP or otherwise) to NASA-related legislation?”
Sure, when the House tried to boost ISS funding in NASA’s FY 2002 appropriations bill, this was the White House response:
“The Administration appreciates the Committee’s efforts to fully fund the President’s request in many priority areas within NASA. Funding in the Committee bill currently exceeds the requested level for the International Space Station (ISS), and is contingent on providing a comprehensive plan to the Appropriations Committee. The Administration does not believe that additional funding is necessary based on the current management plan. Should the House pursue this course, the Administration will make any additional funding contingent on certification by the Office of Management and Budget that cost growth in the ISS has been contained based on the assessment of an external review team. The required comprehensive plan will include measures that will contain future cost growth in this program. We look forward to working with the House to address mutual concerns, including improving management of the Station, and ensuring better cost controls and quality research.”
See (add http://www):
.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/107-1/HR2620-r.html
Just peruse the webite and you’ll find more.
The White House is justifiably worried about the Shuttle extension, which would be a trainwreck budgetarily. But it’s sad that the White House is not taking the budget- and schedule-saving measure that the House legislation introduces of trading the crippled Ares I/Orion for COTS D. Instead of pushing NASA back into exploration and opening Earth orbit to commerce, the White House is now on the record that NASA’s top priority is to stay in the trucking business by contining to build and operate duplicative ETO launch systems. Really shows how bankrupt Griffin’s strategy has become, especially within the limited resources that this and future White Houses will allocate to the NASA budget.
FWIW…
Fellow Space Policy Aficionados –
Many of you know that I have supported additional Shuttle flights so this will not come as a surprise…
But some comments are in order. The Administration said:
“The direction in this section would almost certainly result in several serious impacts and risks to NASA’s exploration programs this is bad, considering that the programs already have more risks than they appear to be able to handle! and other activities, including: (1) significantly increasing costs of the Shuttle program, not including potential recertification activities; probably meaning that the available money would be moved from other NASA programs over to Shuttle – probably little additional money would be spent? (2) delaying the operational capability of the Orion CEV well beyond its current projected dates; well not that big a deal since the current projected dates appear to be unrealistic. I wonder if we might actually delay past realistically projected dates? (3) exacerbating transition challenges, including facilities and workforce; we would actually improve workforce retention since there would be more need for the workforce, and much of the facilities are just being transferred, some would be retained longer. and (4) exposing astronaut crews to increased risks.correct, since they are more at risk driving in traffic than they are in flying. They would not fly for years and so would be more exposed to traffic driving on Interstate 45 In addition, statutorily mandating additional flights regardless of safety assessments and costs sets a dangerous and unwise precedent.â€Hmmm. How about arbitrarily selecting a retirement date, isn’t that a dangerous precedent?
To summarize, it is not too bad that the Congress is trying to establish their own space agenda since the Administration has given us one that appears to be unrealistic.
What I was hoping for was comparison with other, previous administrations. One criticism of this WH is that, after coming forward with the VSE, they (POTUS, in particular) offered little public comment on it going on four+ years now.
And yet, when Congress tries to counter a vital portion of the original underlying foundation of the entire policy (retire shuttle by 2010 to free up the money so we can get going on exploration hardware), out comes a rather forceful statement. [The “other” example that anon.space offered is along the same lines as this one, from the same admin.]
Is this indicative of this admin’s style in how they manage programs (my take: don’t make big media waves but instead stay low-key and focused on core issues)? What is the relative merit (or detriment) of such an approach compared, with, say, making big splashy statements and lots of flowery speeches in the media that might put Congress in a corner?
While we can all offer up invective about the “horrors” of this or that administration and whether Republicans or Democrats are “better” for space exploration, which political approach makes better progress when dealing with the legislative branch? How is the current political situation (including the fact that we’re at war) affecting this admin’s approach? Does the WH fear that having the president speak of space exploration will somehow undermine his stance on bigger issues such as the economy or the war? (I can remember Karen Hughes’s comment about a State of the Union speech and a Mars mission mention not passing “the giggle test” or some such thing).
One could argue that, while the ESAS execution’s having been problematic has helped bring the Congress to this foray into the executive’s domain (dictating actual individual rocket launches???), the formulation of the original VSE (as a policy roadmap) was well handled and was well-received by Congress. Why did one (VSE) go so smoothly while the other (ESAS) is hitting the rocks?
Ultimately, I’m after the best political approach as a recommendation for adoption by those in the next administration involved in space policy formulation & execution.
To summarize, it is not too bad that the Congress is trying to establish their own space agenda since the Administration has given us one that appears to be unrealistic.
Strongly concur. The Democratic Congress (like the Republican one) has done a poor job of, well, doing its job as the decider of where the money goes in this government. This Authorization is more strategically relevant to America’s needs (such as expanded concern with detecting Near-Earth Objects, something also in the bill); it helps salvage our reputation as an Agency and a country that will not reneg on its commitments (AMS); and throws more weight behind commercial space development, which is another way of saying, sustainable space development.
Hopefully they will stand firm, for the country’s, and for Earth’s, sake.
Why did one (VSE) go so smoothly while the other (ESAS) is hitting the rocks?
VSE was a White House initiative. ESAS was a NASA HQ initiative, in which the WH had little interest.
Another example of the Bush administration proposing a program, then undercutting it by not having the guts to find the money to make their proposals reality. All words, not enough money. This is why I am no longer a member of the Republican Party, they having left me sometime in 2002-3, and having disappointed me repeatedly since, by not closing the borders after 9/11, by not rounding up all the illegals in the country and deporting them ASAP, by not reigning in government spending, by starting a war meant to further the aims of turning this Constitutional Republic into a demi-empire, by making it easy to spy on people and find or create reasons to turn them into criminals for doing nothing else but being free people, which is what I used to think Americans, myself included, were. But no more.
As for Congress, Diana De Gette from the 1st Congressional district here in Colorado once told me, and I paraphrase her conversation, not repeat it verbatim ” I don’t care about space – no one else here cares about space, and it’s a waste of money when we have other concerns more important than sending people into space or to other planets, so don’t bother me with space issues again!”.
Tom Tancredo also told a local conservative talk show host’s guest who brought up the issue of VSE, and the failure of the Bush Administration to back up their proposal with sufficient real money to make it happen (and again I paraphrase, not parrot his response): “I think there are more important things for the Administration to be spending money on than sending it into space, or to Mars” “We need to spend that money right here on Earth”.
Interesting that (I believe)Tancredo’s district includes the Lockheed Martin facility in Waterton Canyon, and he apparently does not care about space issues one jot, and dismissed the good work and the many space workers there as apparently extraneous and their work as unnecessary frivolity given the current state of the “War on Terror, the economy, and his pet cause, “Illegal Immigration”.
Mark Udall is doing actual useful work in his position in the House of Representatives, but his is running for the Senate, and space will likely take a back seat to other, (seemingly) larger issues outside the hardcorps of space interested people in Boulder and his district.
I wish the Administration, (any Administration) Congress, (regardless of what session or which political party is in power) the space community, and the American people as a whole could see fit to craft space policy with sufficient funding and political will to actually make it happen, on time and on or close to budget projection, but with Continuing Resolutions being the only way NASA funding is provided, I don’t expect it to change anytime soon. Then again, I could be surprised, because space has a way of surprising me and everyone else involved with it. Maybe everyone involved will get their act together, and pull together for common goals, but with this atomized culture and divided electorate focused on crisis management, and immediate gratification, I’m not holding my breath, but am hoping for the best from the sorry bunch of people the Administration, The Senate, the House of Representatives, and much of the Space Community have proven themselves to be, I’m very sorry to say. I thought space deserved better than this.
I wish I personally knew what to do to fix this mess, but I am only one man, and very worried about the state of the nation, and the state of our civil/commercial/military space programs too.
It’s strange that one of the complaints in the SAP is that the House bill exceeds the Administration budget, but the SAP is worded against COTS D which is a lot cheaper than Ares 1/Orion:
… worry about potential unfunded mandates … “For this reason and in view of associated problematic policy implications, the following requirements should either be removed from the bill or appropriately modified: (1) carrying out an additional procurement for Commercial Orbital Transfer Services (COTS) crew capabilities” …
NASA is supposedly reviewing the COTS D option right now (search for “COTS Review in Final Stages” – from Aviation Week June 6 2008). I wonder what the implications of the SAP statement are for this review.
With today’s Space Adventures announcement of a Soyuz ISS flight dedicated to Personal Spaceflight, and apparently getting more customers for these flights, there’s more and more evidence for a commercial market for crew space transportation. Add to this NASA’s ISS needs and the potential for Bigelow to add a new dimension to the market and contribute to transportation development, and it’s hard to understand why NASA wouldn’t want to encourage a U.S. presence in this market for its own needs.
anonymous.space: “But it’s sad that the White House is not taking the budget- and schedule-saving measure that the House legislation introduces of trading the crippled Ares I/Orion for COTS D. Instead of pushing NASA back into exploration and opening Earth orbit to commerce, the White House is now on the record that NASA’s top priority is to stay in the trucking business by contining to build and operate duplicative ETO launch systems”
This is an important point that I want to expand on. The House bill doesn’t trade COTS D for Ares 1/Orion in the sense of cancelling Areas 1/Orion – it (as anonymous.space implies) limits
“to the maximum extent practicable, the use of the Crew Exploration Vehicle to missions carrying astronauts beyond low Earth orbit once commercial crew transfer and crew rescue services that meet safety requirements become operational”.
A big part of why the total for the bill is so high is that it actually introduces COTS D (a small amount of money) *and* increases Ares 1/Orion funding (a huge amount of money, especially considering unlike COTS D that program already exists):
“$1,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2009, to be used to accelerate the initial operational capability of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and associated ground support systems, to remain available until expended.”
and
“COTS CREWED VEHICLE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to NASA for the program described in subsection (a)(4) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2009, to remain available until expended.”
plus
“There are authorized to be appropriated to NASA for the provision of International Space Station-compatible docking adaptors and other relevant technologies to be made available to the commercial crew providers selected to service the International Space Station $50,000,000, to remain available until expended”
[…] White House “strongly opposes†NASA authorization bill […]
“What I was hoping for was comparison with other, previous administrations.”
Unfortunately (and not surprisingly), SAPs from prior administrations no longer appear on the White House website. But this kind of strong language is not unusual for a SAP, NASA or otherwise.
FWIW…
Something very interesting about the SAP.
It specifically mentions the “Crew Exploration Vehicle” or “Orion CEV” three separate times.
It does not mention the Ares 1 even once.
The SAP does not use the term “Ares” in any form, whatsoever.
FWIW,
– Al
“Politics is not rocket science, which is why rocket scientists do not understand politics.”
Well, Ares is not part of the VSE. CEV is.
I wonder if Congress is telling NASA something.
Politics is the antithesis of science. It is bad enough when internal politics within the science community hold back cutting edge ideas and innovation. Bureaucrats know little if anything about real science. The current occupier of the White house is only interested in salvaging his image in an attempt to leave behind a “legacy.” The system needs to be fixed before we can expect real progress. They say one must be in the loop to get anything done. I think we need a new loop.
“Politics is the antithesis of science.”
Even if this statement were true (I believe it to be false, or inaccurate at best), it would remain irrelevant. Spaceflight, a cultural & engineering endeavor that includes elements of scientific discovery) has been intertwined with politics from its inception because it has taken public monies and organization to afford it. Even now as some tentatively step into the realm of privately funded spaceflight and space development, politics remains a factor.
Success in space initiatives—all space initiatives—has always, and likely will always, demand a mastery of politics. It may not be to our liking, but “the system” is what we have to work with and proper manipulation of that system is what brings ideas to fruition and allows us to muddle our way to accomplishment…sometimes of great things.
If the “current occupier of the White House” was truly only interested in salvaging his image, his support of the VSE (a practical and far-thinking policy statement, not to be confused with NASA’s current implementation scheme) would have been much louder and more frequently offered. That it was not was a sign that he has been trying to let “the system” work without trying to over-politicize the process or the issues involved.