Congress

Weldon to “pull every lever I have” to block INKSNA waiver extension

While one member of Florida’s congressional delegation, Sen. Bill Nelson, vowed several days ago to make “a full, true-blue push” to get legislation extending NASA’s INSKNA waiver through the Senate, another member has vowed to do everything in his power to stop it. In a statement released Friday, Rep. Dave Weldon (R-FL) “denounced” efforts by Nelson and others to extend the waiver, adding that discussion to extend the shuttle while also supporting the waiver extension amounted to “doublespeak”. “This is all very disturbing to me and NASA is acting very schizophrenic on this matter,” Weldon said in the statement.

While Weldon spent much of the statement criticizing Nelson’s seemingly contradictory statements about extending the shuttle while also buying Soyuz (which aren’t as “schizophrenic” as Weldon claims, since the shuttle, unlike Soyuz, cannot remain at the station for extended periods as a lifeboat for the station’s crew), he also took aim at the Bush administration for its perceived lack of support for NASA. “During its tenure, this administration has allowed community development spending to increase 91%, education to increase 57%, Medicare 51% and so on. NASA and the shuttle just wasn’t a priority for them and now we are seeing the consequences.”

In a follow-up article with the Orlando Sentinel, Weldon said he was “going to pull every lever I have” in his final months in office (he is not running for reelection) to try and block the extension. He added that Weldon plans to lobby Sen. John McCain to try and help: since Nelson is pushing to get the extension through the Senate by unanimous consent, it would take only one senator to block it.

The article adds, “McCain also opposes dealing with the Russians,” but to the best of my knowledge McCain, in his capacity as either senator or presidential candidate, has taken any position on this issue beyond the letter he and two other senators sent to the president last month calling for a halt on any plans to take steps that would prevent continued operation of the shuttle beyond 2010. In that letter McCain and Sens. Kay Bailey Hutchison and David Vitter state, “The Russian incursion into Georgia has raised new questions about the wisdom of providing that extension,” but they do not formally oppose the extension in the letter.

11 comments to Weldon to “pull every lever I have” to block INKSNA waiver extension

  • Engineering Lead

    In a nearly perfect world, we would have three flying shuttles with 14 of the most advanced and thoroughly tested reusable engines ever put into mass production, with a credible second generation reusable launch vehicle architecture, a space station, a cooperative international partner with Soyuz’ to spare, two flight ready EELVs, two commercial launch vehicles in development, and a whole spectrum of national an international space infrastructure assets to choose from, plus a high thrust, high energy upper stage engine nearly fully developed, and an advanced cycle engine development program in the works (the IPD, not the J2-X).

    Hey, guess what, we live in a nearly perfect world! Cancel Constellation, and I will welcome you back to that nearly perfect, reality based world with open arms. It’s really too bad that nearly perfect world is horribly marred by massive, irresponsible and unnecessary out of budget spending on seriously destructive national and international foreign policies, though.

    It’s always something.

  • anonymous.space

    Weldon is as technically off-base as ever. Blocking INKSNA and NASA Soyuz purchases doesn’t provide a rationale for extending Shuttle operations and jobs. Soyuz provides a unique capability (crew rescue) that Shuttle cannot provide. Taking NASA Soyuz purchases away only eliminates the permanent U.S. presence on the ISS. Shuttle can’t support a permanent U.S. presence on the ISS, and if NASA Soyuz purchases are blocked, that’s arguably a reason to shut down Shuttle sooner (not extend its operations) so that the Shuttle budget can be redirected to building something that can support a permanent U.S. presence on the ISS as soon as possible.

    Instead of whining about Soyuz purchases that we can’t do anything about at this point, it sure would be nice if Congress (and the White House) had focused a little more on Constellation oversight earlier in the game so we wouldn’t be in this mess now.

    This past week, Constellation patted itself on the back for getting Ares I through its first preliminary design review (PDR) but glossed over the fact that Ares I still has to conduct a second PDR next summer to address the unresolved mitigation systems for the first stage thrust oscillation issue, with unknown consequences for the rest of the design. See the asterisk on the pre-board recommendation at the bottom of the last page of this presentation (add http://):

    images.spaceref.com/news/2008/ares.pdr.2.pdf

    The Constellation press release and briefing also made no mention of the recent year-long slip in the Orion PDR to next summer. See (add http://www.):

    nasawatch.com/archives/2008/09/orion_pdr_slips.html

    and (add http://www.):

    nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5487

    and (add http://www.):

    flightglobal.com/articles/2008/09/09/315769/nasa-to-confirm-orion-design-review-slip-to-summer-2009.html

    So neither the Ares I nor the Orion preliminary design is complete, and one could argue that the Constellation program has been held back a year more than it’s been allowed to pass to the next grade.

    More worrisome than the PDR slips are the grades that Ares I received in this partial PDR. The pre-board used a green, yellow/green, yellow, yellow/red, and red grading scheme, which can also be depicted as the more familiar A (4.0), B (3.0), C (2.0), D (1.0), and F (0.0) grading scheme. The pre-board provided ten grades against ten different success criteria from NASA’s program management handbook. The ten grades had the following distribution:

    One “Green” (A, 4.0) grade
    Two “Yellow/Green” (B, 3.0) grades
    Four “Yellow” (C, 2.0) grades
    Three “Yellow/Red” (D, 1.0) grades
    No “Red” (F, 0.0) grades

    So seven of Ares I’s ten grades were a C or a D. Ares I is NASA’s planned primary means of crew launch over the next couple of decades and should define technical excellence. But instead, the project earned a grade point average of 2.1, barely a “gentleman’s C” (or a “gentleman’s yellow”). See the pre-board grades on pages 3-7 of this presentation (add http://):

    images.spaceref.com/news/2008/ares.pdr.2.pdf

    And even more worrisome than the PDR slips and grades are the areas in which the project is earning its lowest grades. Among areas in which Ares I earned a yellow/red (or D) grade and the accompanying technical problems were:

    The preliminary design meets the requirements at an acceptable level of risk:
    — Induced environments are high and cause challenges, including pyro shock to avionics and acoustic environments on reaction and roll control systems.
    — No formal process for control of models and analysis.
    — Areas of known failure still need to be worked, including liftoff clearances.

    Definition of the technical interfaces is consistent with the overall level of technical maturity and provides an acceptable level of risk:
    — Process for producing and resolving issues between Level 2 and Level 3 interface requirement documents and interface control documents is unclear, including the roles and responsibilities of managers and integrators and the approval process for identifying the baseline and making changes to it.
    — Numerous known disconnects and “TBDs” in the interface requirement documents, including an eight inch difference between the first stage and ground system and assumption of extended nozzle performance not incorporated in actual first and ground system designs.

    See the pre-board grades on pages 4-5 of this presentation (add http://):

    images.spaceref.com/news/2008/ares.pdr.2.pdf

    So, in addition to the unknowns associated with the unresolved thrust oscillation system for Ares I:
    — the vehicle’s electronics can’t survive the shocks induced during stage separation;
    — the vehicle’s control systems will be shaken apart and unable to keep the rocket flying straight;
    — the vehicle is going to hit the ground support structure on liftoff;
    — the project is assuming performance from advanced rocket nozzles that don’t fit within the vehicle’s dimensions;
    — the project can’t even get the height of the rocket and its ground support to match; and
    — there’s no good modeling, analytical, or requirements control necessary to resolve any of these issues.

    And the real kicker from the press conference was the revelation that Constellation manager Jeff Hanley only has 2,000-3,000 pounds of performance reserve left at the program level and that Ares I manager Steve Cook has no margin left to contribute to unresolved future problems like thrust oscillation impacts to Orion. See (add http://www.):

    nasawatch.com/archives/2008/09/ares_pdr_teleco.html

    We know from prior presentations that Orion’s mass margin is down to practically zero (286 kilograms or 572 pounds) for ISS missions and is negative (-859 kilograms or -1,718 pounds) for lunar missions. See p. 25, 33, and 37 in this presentation(add http://www.):

    spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=28633

    When added to Hanley’s margins, that means that the entire Ares I/Orion system is down to ~2,500-3,500 pounds of mass margin for the ISS mission and ~300-1,300 pounds of mass margin for the lunar mission. That’s between seven and less than one percent mass margin against Orion’s 48,000 pound total mass. Typical mass margin at the PDR stage should be on the order of 20-25 percent, about triple the best-case assessment here. Ares I/Orion still has seven years of design and development to go and at best has only one-third of the mass margin it should have at this stage.

    Even worse, those Orion mass margins don’t account for the mass threats still to be allocated in next year’s Orion PDR. In the presentation above, the 90th percentile mass threats for the ISS and lunar missions are separately about 900 kilograms or 2,000 pounds. That reduces the total Ares I/Orion mass margin to between -1,700 and 1,500 pounds. That’s a negative (negative!) three percent mass margin on the lunar mission and only a positive three percent mass margin on the ISS mission, at least seven times less margin than what the program needs at this point in time.

    Instead of worrying about $60 million Soyuz purchases and extending existing Shuttle jobs, Weldon and his staff need to be worrying about the $20 billion Ares I/Orion program and whether it can ever technically close and replace some of those Shuttle jobs.

    Sheesh…

  • Al Fansome

    I thought that Griffin might be able squeek through something this year on INSNA, but Weldon is going to be a party pooper.

    Not sure why. It is completely idiotic to shoot ourselves in the foot.

    The most likely scenario is that INSNA will be revised next year, which means — under a standard schedule — that NASA will need to abandon ISS in the Fall of 2011 (as they can’t fly to ISS in October 2011 and still be at ISS on January 1, 2012 when INSNA authority to purchase expires.)

    The Russians can build Soyuzes faster. It just costs more money. But Griffin recently stated he is not willing to ask the Russians to work faster on something that is safety critical.

    Beyond this option, four more option come to mind in this scenario that could eliminate the ISS gap.

    1) Griffin could change his mind (or maybe he was bluffing that he is not willing to rush a Soyuz), based on certifications from the Russians that it was still safe.

    2) Griffin could be gone on January 20, or very soon thereafter, and the Acting Administrator could change the policy.

    3) The Russians could start the long-lead items for the additional Soyuz this Fall with their own money, as an act of good faith and partnership, based on the commitments from Griffin to get INSNA amended next year. The Russians do have more money these days — and they could decide to do this. (NOTE: It does not help the Russians for the U.S., Europe, Japan and Canada to abandon ISS. They can survive without us, so we can’t force them to do this. But this is another opportunity to make diplomatic points — at least with NASA.)

    4) Canada, Japan, and/or Europe could pay the Russians for the advance lead-items for another Soyuz this Fall. If NASA does not come through next year — then they may well follow through and pay for the entire Soyuz. If so, then “cosmonauts” from the paying countries will travel to ISS in the Fall of 2011.

    This is completely rational, as Canada, Europe and Japan want to get the return on their investment in the ISS. If so, then ultimately the U.S. will be the only ones not at the ISS.

    Now this would be diplomatic mud on the face for the U.S. The U.S. would look petty, vindictive and idiotic sitting on the ground — while the rest of the western world was in orbit using the space station that we mostly paid for and assembled.

    – Al

  • Eric Sterner

    Interesting points, Al.

    Personally, I’d like to see the Russians step up and offer some Soyuz services on their own nickel. We spent the 90s bailing out their civil space program when it was flat on it’s back. Yes, some of that was out of self-interest, but NASA went well beyond the bounds of meeting U.S. needs. We changed the inclination of the space station, requiring additional upgrades to shuttle; took over a significant portion of the crew and cargo resupply to Mir, enabling it to live well beyond its useful lifespan; and, wrote them several checks for services that they should have rendered to us out of their own self interest if they truly valued a strategic partnership in space. (Toss in the suspect practice of continuing to fly to Mir long after it wouldn’t have met even basic NASA standards for safe flight–all in the name of helping Moscow save face.)

    In any event, turnabout is fair play. Sadly, I know it’s not the way the world works and the Russians aren’t about to engage in the same kind of behavior. They simply don’t vew the world as a positive-sum game. Everything is zero-sum. So, it’s too much to expect. (IMHO, that’s sufficient reason to end this marriage as quickly as possible.) They could, of course, change my mind by doing something substantive that led me to question my assumptions and conclusions about their interests, intentions, and likely behavior. Putin is an unlikely candidate.

    That said, it wouldn’t surprise me if the Russians built a few Soyuz “on spec” and kept quiet about, just in case the Americans some day show up at their doorstep with a load of cash. Of course, it doesn’t serve their interest to let us know that now. Doing so would take the heat of an INKSNA waiver, increasing their risk. Besides, they can always charge more if the customer shows up with a last minute.

  • […] Weldon to “pull every lever I have” to block INKSNA waiver extension – Space Politics […]

  • typo

    We spent the 90s bailing out their civil space program when it was flat on it’s back. Yes, some of that was out of self-interest, but NASA went well beyond the bounds of meeting U.S. needs. We changed the inclination of the space station, requiring additional upgrades to shuttle; took over a significant portion of the crew and cargo resupply to Mir, enabling it to live well beyond its useful lifespan; and, wrote them several checks for services that they should have rendered to us out of their own self interest if they truly valued a strategic partnership in space. (Toss in the suspect practice of continuing to fly to Mir long after it wouldn’t have met even basic NASA standards for safe flight–all in the name of helping Moscow save face.)

    This is all very true.

    And then we spent the late 90s and 2000s slapping them in the face. Setting up ABM bases in their former satellite states, Poland and Czech republic. Going to war against Serbia (a country with strong ties historically, culturally, and economically with Russia) without their voice being heard. Threatening war on their trading partner Iran without consulting Russia. Forming alliances all along their southern border with the Stans — setting up numerous military bases and partnerships in these states. Occupying Afghanistan for going on 7 years now, a nation which Russia itself had an interest, without seeking Russia’s help. Launching preemptive wars in the name of fighting terrorism while denouncing Russian actions against Chechnyan insurgents. And painting the Georgia-Russia conflict in an overly one-sided, anti-Russian soundbyte.

    Since the end of the Cold War, the US has acted as the unconstrained superpower which primarily views from the perspective of how we can advance US interests and prosperity. Indeed, the US has a very zero-sum perspective on the world as well. And the fact that we haven’t retreated from our global engagements and overseas basing following the end of the Cold War (but in many ways, expanded upon them), has certainly made Moscow (perhaps rightfully) uneasy and defensive. Yet we seemingly refuse to consider the world from anybody’s perspective but our own. Case in point, look at the hullabaloo regarding a few Russian bombers in Venezuela or the resumption of Russian bomber patrols, all while the US has troops and military equipment in hundreds of nations with a defense budget equal to the rest of the world combined.

  • Al Fansome

    Eric,

    With Putin in charge, my best guess is that Russia is going to try to use this issue to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe/Japan/Canada.

    Therefore, my best guess is that Russia will purchase the long-lead items for the Soyuz needed in Fall 2011, but their real plan is to sell the Soyuz rides to Europe/Japan/Canada. Considering that the European and Japanese modules are in orbit, and that their multi-billion-dollar investment is depreciating every day, those nations will have little choice but to accept the Russian offer of crew transport/rescue services.

    If & when there are Europeans, Japanese and Russians at ISS in 2012 — but no Americans — it will be quite politically embarrassing.

    Here in the U.S. that is. Neither Europe nor Japan will be embarrassed. And Russia will be chortling.

    – Al

  • Eric,

    FWIW Russia did provide crew transfer services from 2003’s Columbia tragedy thru late 2005 and limited cargo delivery on their own nickel, without cash compensation… because the original INA exemption had not been enacted yet. Starting in 2006 or 7, their obligation to provide crew rescue went away.

    While the current INSKNA would prevent NASA actually paying for any good service to be delivered after Dec 31, 2011, that doesn’t mean NASA couldn’t negotiate an option to buy something at a later date at a given price, once Congress has acted (assuming it does act). Options are regularly used in the real world to ensure a long-term deal remains possible even though you can’t fully commit yourself today.

    What is so sad about Dr. Weldon’s latest thinking is that he must know that flying the Shuttle doesn’t solve the crew rescue problem, but since INKSNA renewal’s political difficulty (and the general anti-Russian mood in Congress today) is a desperately needed talking point for the Shuttle huggers, he wants to keep that issue (and the talking point) alive.

    Which will only prolong and worsen the pain for employees already confused by the transition going on at KSC and Michoud.

    – Jim

  • Eric Sterner

    Typo:

    …where to start? A few quick points.

    We spent the 90s and last few years: inviting them to join the G-7, even though their economy didn’t warrant it; bringing them into the halls of NATO through the NATO-Russia council; providing economic development assistance (yes, AID was in Moscow); withdrawing our tactical nuclear weapons from around their periphery; halting our strategic nuclear modernization activities while they continued theirs; limiting our missile defense capabilities such that they cannot deal with Russia’s arsenal; assisting them in cleaning up the environmental and security damage by the USSR’s lax treatment of its weapons of mass destruction; generally bringing our conventional military ground forces home from Europe; and, cutting our conventional military force structure by almost 50%. Putin knows all this.

    Last I checked, the Poles, Czechs, and “stans” were all independent countries capable of making their own decisions and entering into whatever relationship with the United States that they’d like. Could the fact that Russia invaded those countries and imposed alien political and economic systems on them before launching a general pattern of repression perhaps have something to do with the desire of some of those countries to build closer relations with the U.S.? I doubt Putin is so out-of-touch as to think that these guys were all willing victims and happy communist colleagues. He was a spook, after all. (I realize that cuts both ways…)

    FWIW, we don’t have “alliances” with the stans, either, and Afghanistan isn’t “occupied.” Bush and Putin did talk extensively about Afghanistan after 9/11, but it’s not clear to me that any significant Russian “help” in Afghanistan would have actually helped. The Afghans weren’t real fond of the Russians at that point and probably won’t be for another century. The U.S. footprint in the stans is pretty modest and seems to be a function of the relative needs of the rather dictatorial leaders of those countries anyway. Karimov cut us way back at K2 after we criticized some human rights abuses and then sidled right up to Putin like they were old friends. They’re playing us in their own self interest, either because they want more leverage in their relationship with Russia and/or they’re interested in finding out what we’re willing to pay them in exchange for a presence. Putin’s no dummy. He knows he’s being played the same way we are.

    Viewing the world through Putin’s eyes, he knows the score. He plays raw power politics and knows full well that our behavior has been radically different from what he would’ve done if the roles had been reversed. He’s no dummy. If anything, he’s rubbing his hands together in glee that the sole superpower is the United States and doesn’t play the game of international relations by his rules.

    ’nuff said.

    Al:

    Seems like a very feasible scenario to me. Wouldn’t find it surprising in the least. If you see signs that Russia is willing to subsidize those European/Japanese seats (seeing as how they don’t have a lot of cash either) then I think you’ll have your proof.

    Jim:
    I’d forgotten about their role right after Columbia. My mistake. I’m not sure what to think about Weldon’s approach unless he’s assuming you could live with either: a) periodic visits to ISS by Americans and/or b) you could work a deal with the Russians in which we got 1 seat on the lifeboat in exchange for……something….? Up-mass is out since they’ve got Progress. Downmass? Not something they’ve historically had a lot of interest in. Maybe he simply forgot the whole lifeboat question or decided that it was more important to put more pressure on the next administration to keep the shuttle by nixing their easy out.

    Eric

  • Al Fansome

    STERNER: Seems like a very feasible scenario to me. Wouldn’t find it surprising in the least. If you see signs that Russia is willing to subsidize those European/Japanese seats (seeing as how they don’t have a lot of cash either) then I think you’ll have your proof.

    Eric,

    If my conjecture is correct, I think the first sign will be phone calls from Europe and Japan to NASA HQ reporting that somebody from the Russian FSA is offering seats to them in Fall 2011 on the Soyuz, if/when the U.S. fails to extend INSNA.

    For all I know, the first feelers are already taking place.

    The Russians who think about space are capitalists. As a capitalist, that is what I would be doing.

    (NOTE: It is also very low risk for the Russians to commit to long-lead items this Fall for an additional Soyuz. It will not go to waste. Worst case, they just built these long lead items six months earlier than usual.)

    – Al

    PS — Thank you for the additional facts on how we have retrenched our military around Russia since the wall came down.

    PPS — I may be wrong, but I believe that the INKNSA prohibits barter deals like the one you suggest to Mr. Muncy. They tightened up the legislative language in 2005.

  • […] Friday’s Orlando Sentinel. There’s not much there that he hasn’t said previously, particularly when he vowed to “pull every lever I have” to block the extension. Weldon rejects the idea that the US has no choice but to extend the waiver […]

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