NASA

Griffin, Constellation, and more

In yesterday’s issue of The Space Review, I write a more detailed article about Mike Griffin’s speech last week where he defended Constellation against the various alternatives proposed to replace it. A couple of items in the report that I didn’t mention in my previous post on the topic:

  • Grififn said he would not necessarily be opposed to extending the life of the shuttle beyond 2010 as one means of shortening or eliminating the gap in US government human spaceflight and any loss in international stature that may result from that gap. However, those in the “highest levels of government” who made the decision had to be aware of the risks associated with extending the shuttle, and the $3 billion a year needed to carry out two shuttle missions a year had to be new money added to NASA, not taken from other programs.
  • Congressman Ralph Hall (R-TX), the ranking Republican on the House Science and Technology Committee, said he endorsed keeping Griffin at NASA in remarks introducing the administrator. He hoped to communicate that desire in a phone call with President-elect Obama, but Hall was not available when Obama called his office, and later, his home, in response to a congratulatory note Hall sent Obama after the election.

A couple of related articles in Monday’s issue: Michael Huang tracks down some language in a CBO report that might have been the source for Obama’s original proposal to delay Constellation by five years, and Joan Vernikos and Kathleen M. Connell argue for the need for real, substantial change at NASA, including greater use of the ISS and more technology development and Earth sciences research.

9 comments to Griffin, Constellation, and more

  • yg1968

    Very good article. A good summary of the current situation at NASA.

  • Jim Muncy

    Michael —

    It may be that the Education advisers preparing the fall 2007 Education policy used the CBO report to find cuts that could offset their increase, and chose the delay of Constellation.

    However, you’re just wrong about CBO. If you read the 2007 options report’s section on energy, you’ll see that they look at cutting every different part of the Energy research budget, including fossil and nuclear and renewables.

    They are not saying that these SHOULD be cut. They are saying that they COULD be cut if the policymakers, i.e. Congress, want to cut spending to balance the budget. And they go thru each potential proposal’s pluses and minuses.

    It is true that CBO has been an independent watchdog on NASA’s overall financial/programmatic/budget performance — as distinct from GAO’s more focused investigations — but that’s a good thing for space, not bad.

    You shouldn’t blame Vehix.com for the drunken driver’s vehicular homicide, and you shouldn’t blame CBO because some Obama education wonk picked one NASA cut out of 100s of options in a book.

    And that’s assuming they did get it out of the book.

    – Jim

  • This should be of interest to everyone here,

    http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ssb/rationale_goals_civil_space.html

    My answers were:

    What should be the rationale and goals for the civil space program?

    To establish permanent scientific bases on other worlds, leading to eventual resource extraction, industrialization, colonization, and the development of trade. These are all critical developments of humanity is to have a long-term and interesting future.

    Can the civil space program address key national issues?

    Great aerospace projects employ large numbers on the ground, and not just the highly skilled. Giving young people constructive, hopeful jobs that lead to dramatic futures could ameliorate many social ills. The Apollo project was a catalyst for more and better education for all. Historically, culture, science, and the arts thrive in expansionist times. A fresh wind of discoveries and images blows away mental cobwebs and tired routines. No truly healthy society can long exist as a closed system.

  • Al Fansome

    There is an interesting piece of data in Griffin’s speech in Houston today.

    http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/6208583.html

    “Griffin said President-elect Obama faces four tough choices on the space program that must be made in the first months of the new administration.

    The immediate decisions included:


    Whether to speed delivery of the Constellation project by one year to 2015 at an estimated additional cost of nearly $4 billion.”

    Thus, Griffin confirms that Constellation has slipped to 2016. This is the first statement I recall seeing from a NASA official about the slip to 2016.

    And $4 Billion for shortening the gap by 1-year????? That is unsupportable, and unjustifiable.

    Griffin lists four options for the Obama administration. Please note that Griffin did not list COTS-D as even an option to consider.

    $4 Billion will buy us a LOT of COTS-D projects and work. The fact that Griffin does not even list COTS-D as an option tells you a lot about Mike Griffin.

    FWIW,

    – Al

    “Politics is not rocket science, which is why rocket scientists do not understand politics.”

  • The fact that Griffin does not even list COTS-D as an option tells you a lot about Mike Griffin.

    Nothing we (or at least I) didn’t already know. By the way, did you hear about the new potential pick for administrator? I find him a little scary.

  • Ben the Space Brit

    Originally posted by Al Fansome
    Thus, Griffin confirms that Constellation has slipped to 2016.

    Or, I strongly suspect, specifically Ares-1 has slipped to 2016. I don’t think that the Stick has very long left before it suffers the fate of X-33, OSP and numerous other NASA ‘next generation’ projects.

    After that? My money is on EELV as a launch vehicle for Orion to minimise the gap, with jobs retained by continuing work on Ares-V (in some form) with all effort possible being exerted to bring it into service earlier.

    I’d like to see NASA adopt a ‘whole cloth’ idea like DIRECT 2.0. However, given the mess that they have made of Ares, it is quite possible that the politicians may have finally run out of confidence that NASA can actually run a LV development program and actually produce something in the end other than cool-looking CGI simulations. Why risk the money if, no matter how good the idea, the agency won’t be able to deliver?

  • Al Fansome

    Rand,

    I doubt that General Gration’s views have been influenced much by spending 1-year as a White House fellow under Hans Mark.

    I have to wonder why Gen. Gration would want the NASA job. Based on his background, I would have guessed he would want a senior DoD or State Department position to go with his deep expertise in international affairs. Gration has to know that he has a huge deficit in space policy experience.

    Something tells me that he might be a closet space buff, and asked to be considered for this position.

    – Al

  • I doubt that General Gration’s views have been influenced much by spending 1-year as a White House fellow under Hans Mark.

    I agree. If there has been no interaction between them since then. My concern is that there has, or if there hasn’t, that there will be. Mark has, after all, stayed involved in space policy (he recommended Mike Griffin to the White House). It wouldn’t be unnatural for the general to turn to his former boss for advice on space matters.

  • red

    From Jeff’s Space Review article:

    “And for those who argue that a switch to an EELV-based system would give the struggling US launch industry some much-needed support, Griffin effectively said he had no reason to favor the EELV part of the industry over the shuttle part. “Exactly what is it that makes the EELV industrial base more important to support than the shuttle industrial base?” he asked. “Why is it, exactly, that in this time of transition in NASA, in our spaceflight systems, we ought to be making decisions to augment the existing Atlas and Delta workforce, while completely decimating the shuttle workforce? Why is that?”

    There actually is a good reason to favor EELVs. The Shuttle and the need to maintain its infrastructure is going away. We do need to maintain the EELVs, though, because they’re used for all sorts of national security and other government launches. They happen to be seriously underutilized, thus raising their average cost. Using EELVs for human spaceflight (launching astronauts, launching propellants for depots, or whatever) would help reduce this problem. This is one way the human spaceflight program could contribute to national security, science, and economics.

    Anyway, a COTS-D competition would be open to all players, be they EELVs, COTS cargo derivatives, Shuttle-derived, mixes with foreign systems (if allowed) … whatever works.

    “Another alternative being floated is that NASA not design Ares 1 and Orion for LEO operations, allowing them to be optimized for lunar missions while turning over human access to LEO to the commercial sector. While Griffin has been a strong supporter of efforts like COTS and the recently-awarded commercial cargo resupply contracts, he sounded skeptical about depending on the commercial sector to have a crew transportation system ready in the foreseeable future. “All I can say about this is, if you like the present gap in US government access to LEO, you’ll love this one.”

    I agree that waiting for the commercial sector would be risky for NASA. That’s why NASA should have a well-funded, carefully managed COTS-D competition, and actually should have started it years ago. COTS-D could replace Ares 1, but it could also complement it. I’d suggest that encouraging commercial space to deploy redundant, safe crew transportation systems for ISS use, space tourism, commercial space station use, and other purposes is a much higher priority than getting Ares 1 online. We could do both, but if we have to choose 1, we should do COTS-D.

    “Besides providing a backup for the uncertain development schedules of commercial vehicles, Griffin said that a government system that can access the ISS can also act “as a control on the price” the government is willing to pay for commercial systems as well as alternatives offered by international partners. He also suggested that a government system might be more flexible and robust for LEO operations than a commercial system optimized for ISS transportation. “Do you want to do another Hubble servicing mission, or something else like it? Do you want to do something else in the future that you haven’t thought of today?” he asked. “If so, you’re going to need something more than basic commercial transportation.”

    Control the price? With Ares 1? The way for NASA to have price leverage is to encourage multiple suppliers, and if it wants to be extra pro-active open doors to allow those multiple suppliers to do non-NASA business (eg: encourage space tourism at ISS, encourage commercial space stations). This is true for crew transport, cargo transport, cars, etc. Griffin has stated that Ares 1 will be way too expensive for ISS transport. Wouldn’t he rather have U.S. commercial suppliers to give him leverage over foreign suppliers, rather than expensive Ares 1 to give him leverage over U.S. suppliers?

    As for missions like Hubble-style servicing, I don’t see why Ares 1 would be more cost-effective than commercial alternatives that include commercial “skin in the game”, the potential for non-NASA business, and no need to maintain particular workforce requirements. If NASA needs such capabilities, they should be built into the COTS-D competition as requirements or options, a COTS-S (S for servicing) competition should be run, or some similar commercially-oriented procurement should be done. At any rate, even if a basic COTS-D competition is funded for ISS access only, there is no natural law that insists that Ares 1 can’t also be built.

    There are plenty of cutting-edge human spaceflight jobs for NASA and traditional cost-plus contracts. Let’s get commercial space firmly into the LEO transportation role so NASA can afford to do those cutting-edge jobs.

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