NASA

Griffin’s “exit interview”

While working on a recent article about Charles Bolden’s nomination to be NASA administrator, I checked out the latest report by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), the independent review panel that Bolden has been a member of the last few years. There wasn’t much in the panel’s findings that could be directly tied to Bolden, but there was something else interesting in the 2008 report, published a little over a month ago: a memo from then-administrator Mike Griffin. The memo, dated November 10, 2008, responded to a set of questions posed by ASAP on “agency transition issues prior to the presidential transition” and could be, in a sense, be considered something of an exit interview by Griffin (although at the time he was still hoping to be retained by the incoming administration.)

Perhaps the most interesting question posed by ASAP is their request for the top five goals for the next administrator, since, as it turns out, ASAP’s membership included the person picked to be the next administrator. Griffin’s response, summarized:

  1. Retain the current exploration strategy, the “matrix management” system reestablished by Griffin, and remove “excess process” from the agency. “If these things are not done, nothing else counts.”
  2. Seek additional funding for NASA, on the order of $3 billion a year “to repair and upgrade our institutional infrastructure, initiate sorely needed research and technology development efforts, and robustly execute those programs with which we are already charged.”
  3. Greater direct interaction between the president and the NASA administrator “to minimize and control attempts by, and the deleterious effects of, numerous White House EOP [Executive Office of the President] staff imposing their personal agendas on the conduct of NASA affairs.” He continues: “The president owes it to his NASA Administrator to ensure that other voices and other agendas are not prevailing over that of the president, merely because they can. The ‘mattress mice’ — many of them career civil servants, not political appointees — who serve on the EOP staff are always there.”
  4. The need for “top-level technical and program management talent”, with experience in the space business, in top management positions at NASA. “We spent almost 15 years conducting an experiment at NASA, an experiment whose purpose seemed to be to demonstrate that it was possible for people without relevant domain expertise to manage a highly technical agency. It did not work.”
  5. “Re-establish the freedom to fail, now and then, without requiring that heads roll.” He worries that without that freedom the agency will become too conservative in the programs it pursues. “In my opinion, it would be a good idea if every policymaker had to pass a regular test on the content of President Theodore Roosevelt’s famous ‘Man in the Arena’ speech.”

Some other highlights of the memo:

  • When asked what about the job was either harder or easier than expected, Griffin said nothing. “I’ve really had few surprises, if any, in this job.” By comparison, associate administrator (and current acting administrator) Chris Scolese, responding to the same questions in a separate memo also included in the ASAP report, provided a detailed list of items for both.
  • Asked what he would do differently if he could start over, Griffin indicated that he made a few picks for key management positions in NASA that he later regretted. “Two or three of those choices have been quite poor, and the responsibility for them lies absolutely with me. If I could ‘start over’, I would make better choices for those positions.” He added that he also would have “eschewed any commentary on global warming”.
  • Griffin said in another question that (not surprisingly) he thought NASA was on the right path with its exploration strategy. “It is imperative that progress continue on the exploration strategy without a new round of soul-searching debate or another extensive study. Any delay will only serve to increase the gap in U.S. human spaceflight capabilities, and further erode our leadership in human space exploration.”

10 comments to Griffin’s “exit interview”

  • si_atwork

    The ‘problem’ with Griffin was that often he says very true academic but practically doesn’t support such things, as he did for example back then at a a congressional committee when he spoke in doubt of the ‘Man Rating’ thingamajig (which was an extremely well articulated and well put argument!), but it gets laughed at often because they are often not applicable in the current regime for non technical reasons.

    The ex admin waxes poetic often… using big nebulous words such as ‘destiny’ and ‘colonization’, as space exploration enthusiasts do anyway. It’s like the ‘space cadets’ are thinking they can win on some superficial political grounds when the solution is in the ‘nuts&bolts’ such as currently flying atlas/delta EELV programs which employ hundreds of very skilled engineers (*and do LEO related things with payload integration as we speak*)

    Let’s cut to the chase, shall we? *Currently flying* is a HUGE advantage as the reliablility clock has started on them a while back. In fact the OSP was going to utilize them.

  • David Davenport

    5.“Re-establish the freedom to fail, now and then, without requiring that heads roll.”

    Griffin did have the freedom to fail — and his launch vehicle and spacecraft designs are failures.

    I agree with SI that peeple who spout words such as “destiny in space” and “vision” should be views with suspicion.

    (a) “I’ve really had few surprises, if any, in this job.”

    b) “Two or three of those choices have been quite poor, and the responsibility for them lies absolutely with me. If I could ’start over’, I would make better choices for those positions.”

    Aren’t points (a) and (b) somewhat contradictory?

  • A NASA Engineer

    Lets see …so we need an extra $3B a year quote re. Griffin – “Seek additional funding for NASA, on the order of $3 billion a year “to repair and upgrade our institutional infrastructure, initiate sorely needed research and technology development efforts, and robustly execute those programs with which we are already charged.”

    But if we don’t have that $3B we just gut current space systems R&D, and decimate future R&D and future systems development…by creating a Shuttle replacement system composed of two optimized vehicles that will consume every last human space flight dollar in recurring yearly production and operations?

    But wait…we can do plan B – complain we need the $3B?

    Does this make any sense?

    For the budgets we have we must start with wanting all these goals – balanced R&D, healthy future development AFTER Constellation, and a new Shuttle replacement. If only the budget was admitted to be a constraint, instead of R&D and future development as “Constellation reserve”, the right solutions would surely follow.

  • David Davenport

    NASA = GM?

  • richardb

    NASA=GM? Thats a good joke.

    But the counter point is NASA has built and operated two cars on Mars for over 5 without any road side service; without the need for a tow; without one turn of a wrench by a trained service technician. Can GM truthfully make the same claims?

    NASA>GM

  • pr

    Let’s see, Opportunity has ten miles on the odometer, Spirit five.

    If GM could spend 400 megabucks on each Chevy Malibu they might be able to go ten miles without service, too.

  • richardb

    Oh well, I tried to give NASA some props. Well I can’t resist.
    Ok the mileage is low but would a GM car operate at -130 F over 5 winters?

    Still NASA>GM.

  • Dave Huntsman

    I think Mike’s $3b/year to do the things that most of us would consider NASA’s primary jobs – like, technology development the private sector won’t do on its own – is disingenuous. He made the conscious decision to sacrifice everything – including R&D to enable the private sector to do things like increase flight rates, make RLV technology real, etc. etc. – for his own desire to bring back something better than the Saturn V. By putting it the way he does, he seeks to lay the blame on the politicos for not giving over more billions per year – instead of on himself, for making NASA his own Apollo redux at the extent of everything else, which was, simply put, the wrong priority.

  • Richardb:

    “Ok the mileage is low but would a GM car operate at -130 F over 5 winters?”

    You have a good point, but five Earth years do not contain five Martian winters.

  • BR549AMI

    That NASA is compared to General Motors is quite funny!

    Notice how they’re not compared to Ford, Mercedes or Toyota?

    The moniker “space cadet” is also cute!

    I’m not a Griffin fan. Short-sighted, over-educated idiot. Couldn’t manage his way out of a wet paper bag with a map, flashlight, rope tied to his hand, being given on-going instructions. Go back to the lab, Mike. Stay out of the people and management business.

    Bottom line for NASA?

    1. Piss Poor Public Relations & 2. Lack of Vision (which are crystal-clear, cohesive and unifying).

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