The Space Studies Board of the National Research Council published today a long-awaited report on the US civil space program: “America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program with National Needs”. The report was prepared by a committee led by Lester Lyles, the former general and one-time candidate for the job of NASA administrator, with an A-level set of representatives from industry, academia, and other organizations. Their charter was to “to advise the nation on key goals and critical issues in 21st century U.S. civil space policy.” As such, the report is a relatively high-level overview of what the US civil space program (one that, in this report, includes not just NASA and other non-national security government agencies but also the commercial sector and academia) should be doing in space, without delving deeply into technical or programmatic specifics.
The best way to summarize this report is to first list the goals the committee identified for US civil space activities:
- To re-establish leadership for the protection of Earth and its inhabitants through the use of space research and technology;
- To sustain U.S. leadership in science by seeking knowledge of the universe and searching for life beyond Earth;
- To expand the frontiers of human activities in space;
- To provide technological, economic, and societal benefits that contribute solutions to the nation’s most pressing problems;
- To inspire current and future generations; and
- To enhance U.S. global strategic leadership through leadership in civil space activities.
The committee then identified seven recommendations for achieving those goals:
Recommendation 1. Emphasis should be placed on aligning space program capabilities with current high-priority national imperatives, including those where space is not traditionally considered. The U.S. civil space program has long demonstrated a capacity to effectively serve U.S. national interests.
Recommendation 2. NASA and NOAA should lead the formation of an international satellite-observing architecture capable of monitoring global climate change and its consequences and support the research needed to interpret and understand the data in time for meaningful policy decisions.
Recommendation 3. NASA, in cooperation with other agencies and international partners, should continue to lead a program of scientific exploration and discovery.
Recommendation 4. NASA should revitalize its advanced technology development program by establishing a DARPA-like organization within NASA as a priority mission area to support preeminent civil, national security (if dual-use), and commercial space programs.
Recommendation 5. The government, under White House leadership, should pursue international cooperation in space proactively as a means to advance U.S. strategic leadership and meet national and mutual international goals.
Recommendation 6. NASA should be on the leading edge of actively pursuing human spaceflight, to extend the human experience into new frontiers, challenge technology, bring global prestige, and excite the public’s imagination.
Recommendation 7. The President of the United States should task senior executive-branch officials to align agency and department strategies; identify gaps or shortfalls in policy coverage, policy implementation, and in resource allocation; and identify new opportunities for space-based endeavors that will help to address the goals of both the U.S. civil and national security space programs.
Some of these are pretty bland (“continue to lead a program of scientific exploration and discovery”), although the proposal for a DARPA-like advanced technology office with NASA is particularly specific and interesting, given the decline in advanced technology investment in NASA in recent years. The last recommendation would also appear to be an endorsement of a proposal made by President Obama during last year’s campaign to re-establish the National Space Council in some form.
The report, notably, does not pass judgement on the Vision for Space Exploration or NASA’s current technical implementation of that policy. The report does have this to say, however, about what the underlying purposes of a human spaceflight program should—and should not—be:
It is not sufficient for the United States simply to have a human spaceflight program, or to judge its success based on comparisons with the capabilities or aspirations of other nations. Rather, the priorities for U.S. human spaceflight should be determined by which efforts have the greatest potential for, and likelihood of, producing transformative cultural, scientific, commercial, or technical outcomes. Such results could include achievement of fundamentally new understanding or perspectives, or development of an essential new enabling capability that leads to an opportunity to visit and observe some new location. Meeting a high standard for performance can ensure that the United States’ human spaceflight program is able to be a leader among the nations with human spaceflight capability and that human spaceflight can serve the broad needs of the nation for technology development, economic growth, and inspiration—fundamental components of the nation’s strategic leadership.
How influential will this report be? Lyles is currently on the Review of US Human Space Flight Plans committee (aka the Augustine committee), as is another committee member, Wanda Austin. A third Augustine committee member, Charles Kennel, served as a reviewer of the report—as did NASA administrator nominee Charles Bolden. So, at the very least, it should have a little more weight than the average report tossed over the White House transom.
Its worth noting that Charles Bolden is acknowledged as a reviewer of the report.
If the only recommendation that’s accepted is #4, the creation of an independent DARPA-like organization reporting to NASA dedicated to advancing space and space flight technology, that would be a *huge* step forward. NASA has been trapped in its own program cycle and has not been innovating as it should be. Perhaps this could get innovation rolling again!
The biggest problem with #4 and the reason NASA shifted programs to DARPA was congress had no stomach for failure. R&D especially Advance R&D includes failure but as soon as Congress sensed failure they cut funding at least for NASA. One of many reason for so many different start-up spacecraft through the years. The NASA DARPA goes back to an early idea (not new) in the Constellation program to use a spiral up technology approach. At first utilizing proven technology while new technology were development than spiraled into the current technology to add capability. Anyway it comes down to consistent and reliable funding by Congress. It’s so depressing that Republicans, Democrats and Other Congressman can borrow 100s of billions of dollars for wars, banks and automakers and can’t find 5 billion for NASA, NASA/Commercial R&D and Commercial Technology Transfer and Commercial Services.
“The biggest problem with #4 and the reason NASA shifted programs to DARPA…”
Just to be clear, NASA hasn’t shifted any programs to DARPA. NASA is civilian and DARPA is military. The NRC recommendation is to create a DARPA-like organization within NASA for civilian space and aeronautics technology development.
“…congress had no stomach for failure. R&D especially Advance R&D includes failure but as soon as Congress sensed failure they cut funding at least for NASA.”
Evidence?
It’s true that NASA lives in a fishbowl, and its failures are more widely publicized than, say, DARPA.
That said, I don’t know of any high visible failure at NASA that has led to reduced funding. In fact, flight, mission, and program failures tend to lead to more funding. Off the top of my head, Challenger led to increased funding for the Shuttle program, Columbia led to the Vision for Space Exploration and an extra $1 billion, and Mars mission losses back in the faster-better-cheaper days led to a doubling down on the twin Mars Exploration Rovers (Spirit and Opportunity). Heck, even the programmatic failure of the X-33 program led to the bigger Space Launch Initiative.
One might argue that the lack of negative feedback (at least in terms of budgets) for NASA failures is a factor contributing to their recurrence.
“The NASA DARPA goes back to an early idea (not new) in the Constellation program to use a spiral up technology approach. At first utilizing proven technology while new technology were development than spiraled into the current technology to add capability.”
Again, for clarity’s sake, spiral development and DARPA-like organizations are not really the same thing. Organizations like DARPA exist to mature high-risk/high-payoff technologies to the point that operational organizations (like the military services or most of NASA) can adopt them. Spiral development is the development of successive iterations of an operational system, and is generally incorporating lower-risk/lower-payoff and more mature technologies than what a DARPA-like organization goes after. A DARPA-like organization could feed one or more spiral development programs, but again, they’re not the same thing.
“Anyway it comes down to consistent and reliable funding by Congress.”
Not really. It may not grow as fast as some would like, but the White House and Congress provide a very consistent $18+ billion budget for NASA. The problem in recent years has been the costs of the Constellation Program. Just to get Ares I/Orion started, Griffin sacrificed most of the agency’s space technology development programs — things like Project Prometheus (nuclear fission power and propulsion) — as well as most life and microgravity sciences research. Successive Constellation cost increases have forced cancellations in the lunar robotic program, the advanced in-space propulsion technology development program, etc.
“It’s so depressing that Republicans, Democrats and Other Congressman can borrow 100s of billions of dollars for wars, banks and automakers and can’t find 5 billion for NASA, NASA/Commercial R&D and Commercial Technology Transfer and Commercial Services.”
It may be depressing, but these are things over which the civil space program has no control and which are much higher priorities for the nation. Rather than bemoan reality, it would be better if NASA took more control over its own fate, formulated programs that fit within their resources to start with, and proactively pursued alternatives when programs do go off the tracks — instead of wasting years and gazillions of taxpayer dollars limping along, hoping that the White House and Congress will bail out major program overruns only to have those overrunning programs reformulated into something that’s executable within the existing budget resources by blue-panel commissions like the ongoing Augustine review committee.
FWIW…
One thing that DARPA has managed to accomplish, which has huge import for NASA activities, is successful technology demonstration for on-orbit robotic spacecraft servicing in the Orbital Express program. There are other such programs in the DARPA pipeline. NASA is way, way behind DOD on this kind of technology, which could be of enormous value for future space efforts. In principle, NASA could try some teaming with DARPA to gain value from their efforts, or at least use those DARPA programs as templates for NASA-specific servicing efforts. In principle, this technology would apply to on-orbit fabrication, assembly, and deployment as well.
If everything we put together in space has to be done with astronauts bearing wrenches and crowbars, we’re screwed.
@ Major Tom
Didn’t NASA transfer the X-37 to DARPA? I think Robonaut too.
One might argue that the lack of negative feedback (at least in terms of budgets) for NASA failures is a factor contributing to their recurrence.
Yes, NASA got punished for success after Apollo with shrinking budgets, and they’ve been getting rewarded for failure ever since.
“@ Major Tom
Didn’t NASA transfer the X-37 to DARPA?”
Yes, that’s right. I should have qualified my statement by saying that NASA has not transferred any recent or ESMD projects to DARPA.
Thanks for the correction.
I want to see a Vision for Space Utilization as well as Exploration… so far I haven’t seen much of anything that speaks to those ideals… just a lot of politicing (ie hot air)
it is possible for the Aerospace Industry of this Planet, to do the job, but only collectively, and with disregard to National sensitivities over Not Build by Us, so we won’t use it…
1) a fleet of Launch Vehicles to meet the challenges of LEO, LLO, NEO, and the infrastructure to support said LV’s and Space Vehicles
2) Space Vehicles that are capable of interplanetary flight, with 20+ persons, with no intention of landing on said planetary destinations; or ever returning through Earth Atmosphere, but live out their lives in space
3)with shuttle capabilities to move people and goods from orbit to planetary surfaces.
4) assembly & maintenance depots and fuel depots for interplanetary flight vehicles (human and robotic), and orbital space station destinations in LEO, LLO, and at L1/L2, by 2030, with potential for later Space Stations at the Martian Moons, around Venus and in Solar Orbit, by 2050…
5) robotic flights to the Outer Planets, with potential to land on their moons and return with samples… Exploration of the Astroid belt, with mapping and resource estimations… again post 2030…
6) and true commercial utilization of space, where space becomes commonplace: ie Sports, Tourisim, and Industrial Complexes ie Factories… where it costs no more than the present fares to cross the Atlantic to go to L1 or L2, maybe double to visit the Moon… and no requirement to become working Astronauts…
ok, is that clear enough… I am talking VISION here, not vision… lets get the Thumbs Out, give our kids the chance to dream BIG, and go places where once we had the promise of, but lost the way…
DARPA/BMDO also did proof of concept on SSTO technologies, which prompted NASA to power-grab it, and it died. What a waste…
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