A few thoughts about the Review of US Human Space Flight Plans (aka Augustine committee) and what they have discussed to date, including Ed Crawley’s presentation yesterday (and to add to the discussion already taking place):
- Last week there seemed to be a surge of interest in extending the life of the shuttle, including the proposals made by Sally Ride’s subcommittee that would extend the life of the shuttle though at least 2014 by stretching out the remaining flights and/or adding additional ones. However, in the scenarios Crawley presented, only one, the “Use Shuttle Systems” proposal, would extend the shuttle beyond 2011; that would also make use of shuttle-derived systems in lieu of Ares 5 for heavy lift.
- In a related note, for all the talk about reducing the gap, the scenarios presented yesterday do little to clearly address it. In addition to retiring the shuttle in 2011 in all but one case, all rely, to some degree or another, on international partners (read: Russia) for crew access to ISS. However, most also include a provision for commercial crew, which might be ready for service before the current Ares 1/Orion plans (particularly given the estimates of multi-year delays in that program made in hearings last week.) If these scenarios survive in some related form to the final report, it will be interesting to see how some members of Congress react.
- While some have noted that Ares 1 is identified in only two of the seven scenarios, both of those are ones that fit into the current projected budget profile. Given that OSTP’s original request to NASA when establishing the panel was to fit any scenarios “within the current budget profile for NASA exploration activities”, it would seem that the White House, at least, would be more responsive to scenarios that comply to that request than those that require additional funding.
“While some have noted that Ares 1 is identified in only two of the seven scenarios, both of those are ones that fit into the current projected budget profile. Given that OSTP’s original request to NASA when establishing the panel was to fit any scenarios “within the current budget profile for NASA exploration activitiesâ€, it would seem that the White House, at least, would be more responsive to scenarios that comply to that request than those that require additional funding.”
If you look more closely, all of the Ares options squeeze into the budget box only when ISS and Shuttle are canceled as quickly as possible (2011 and 2015 respectively). Yet even though they then manage to get inside the budget, all of their schedules are stretched-out across numerous additional Presidential/Congressional terms in order to do so, with first Lunar landings now no sooner than the mid- to late-2020’s, and no ISS destination in the interim. With no ISS, what missions will the agency be flying if the first Lunar missions aren’t for another 5 years?
All three Ares solutions clearly, obviously, fail to fit within both the budget and the schedule boxes at the same time even if they save money by choosing to abandon the ISS. This is a fatal flaw.
What is most interesting to me is that both of the SDLV solutions are only marginally above the budget level, yet their budget includes a full 5 years of additional Shuttle Program costs and also full ISS utilization thru at least 2020. If Shuttle were only extended 2 years, I would like to know if they then manage to fit within the budget box or not. I think they would and at that point there really is little else that appears to touch them.
J.S.
“While some have noted that Ares 1 is identified in only two of the seven scenarios, both of those are ones that fit into the current projected budget profile. Given that OSTP’s original request to NASA when establishing the panel was to fit any scenarios “within the current budget profile for NASA exploration activitiesâ€, it would seem that the White House, at least, would be more responsive to scenarios that comply to that request than those that require additional funding.”
If those scenarios offered an improvement over the current situation or something new, I’d agree.
But per Aerospace Corp., the first scenario is just the status quo with delays. Ares I/Orion is delivered late circa 2017-2019 and a lunar start comes two to three administrations later circa 2024. It may fit the budget, but it’s hard to see any White House endorsing a plan that’s just the current plan with a multi-year delay. If that was the only viable option on the table, the White House would be likely to say “why bother” and redirect the bulk of the funding to more pressing budget demands (or send the Augustine Committee back to the showers).
And the second scenario is longer stay in LEO, with exploration pushed even farther over the horizon. It may make greater use of the ISS and fit the budget, but it’s still hard to see any White House endorsing a plan that’s arguably a retreat from the previous Administration’s plan. Again, if that was the only viable option on the table, the White House would be likely to say “why bother” and redirect the bulk of the funding to more pressing budget demands (or send the Augustine Committee back to the showers).
In terms of Shuttle workforce retention, Option 4 is the most politically palatable, but it begs the question of “Why? Towards what end?”. Yet again, if that was the only viable option on the table, the White House would be likely to say “why bother” and redirect the bulk of the funding to other pressing budget demands (or send the Augustine Committee back to the showers). That said, the new NASA Administrator appears very concerned about the gap, and this is the only option that addresses it. If that consideration is a top priority, his argument could carry the day.
Options 6 and 7 are more aggressive than 3 or 5, but both suffer from “been there, tried that” experience given the unsustainability of the Apollo, SEI, and Constellation efforts. It’s hard to see a White House endorsing a strategy that would immediately be open to “deja vu all over again” criticism.
Administrations like to make their marks on the program, and only Options 3 and 5 offer something new in terms of destinations and approach. Option 3 is in the budget, and as some Augustine Committee members have noted, Option 5 (and maybe some of the other “above budget” options) can be tweaked and paced to be within budget. If I was a betting man, I’d wager that something in between Option 3 and 5 is where the White House will end up. A strategy to open up multiple destinations in the solar system (versus one destination) for future generations within the existing budget (or slightly more) probably offers the most compelling cost/benefit argument.
So, if Augustine limits the Committee to three options, I think we’ll see the following on the table:
Option 1: The “program of record” within budget but with multi-year delays.
Option 3/5: Possibly articulated as an in/near-budget strategy to open up the solar system to human space flight for future generations.
Option 6 or 7: A above-budget lunar- or Mars-centric program.
If those are the options, again, I think the White House will gravitate toward the cost/benefit “sweet spot” in Option 3/5.
If Augustine wants to add a fourth option, then maybe Option 4 will be added to ensure that Shuttle workforce interests are heard, but again, in the absence of a raison d’etre, it’s hard to see any Administration endorsing an $80 billion investment just to keep civil servants employed. That said, if the new NASA Administrator weighs in heavily on the gap, then it may come down to an argument between Option 3/5 and Option 4.
My two bit handicapping of the odds… YMMV.
FWIW…
“What is most interesting to me is that both of the SDLV solutions”
Depending on what you call “SDLV”, I think there’s either one or three SDLV options, not two.
Option 4 (Use Shuttle Systems) obviously employs a SDLV.
Option 5 (Deep Space) and Option 6 (Lunar Global) both use “NASA Heritage or EELV Super Heavy” to address heavy lift. If they go down the “NASA Heritage” route, then they would probably employ a SDLV.
And unless we count Ares I/V in Options 1-3 (and I wouldn’t given how far they’ve diverged from STS hardware), none of the other options appear to use a SDLV.
So I’d think there’s only one SDLV option (Option 4) or three SDLV options (Option 4 and Options 5 and 6 if they go down the “NASA Heritage” route), not two.
Of course, I may be missing something, so please clue-by-four me if so.
FWIW…
If the SD-HLV were chosen while ending both the Space Shuttle and ISS support by 2011, then full funding for the Altair lunar lander could begin in 2011. Since the Side-mount HLVs could be ready in 2015 or 2016, the Altair could also be ready to take men and lunar base components back to the Moon in 2015 or 2016.
While public is eager to return to the Moon as quickly as possible, NASA and the astronauts love the Shuttle and the ISS. Most people find the ISS program rather boring, IMO. At over $2 billion in annual US cost, the already expensive ISS is probably more politically valuable, as far as relations with Russia, than it is scientifically valuable.
The best domestic political move the Obama administration could make would be to extend the Shuttle until 2015 and the ISS until 2020 while increasing the NASA budget by about $4 billion a year for the next 7 years ($28 billion) so that the Altair can be ready at the same time as the SDHLVs are ready in 2015 or 2016. This would help to create and preserve jobs in Florida for the very popular US space program and would probably put Florida in Obama’s back pocket during the 2012 election. Florida has already been hit hard enough by the Great Recession. And $4 billion is about what the military spends in just 10 days in the publicly unpopular war in Iraq. And getting back to the Moon in 2016 instead of 2028 would be extremely exciting for NASA and for the general public.
MAJOR TOM: If that was the only viable option on the table, the White House would be likely to say “why bother†and redirect the bulk of the funding to more pressing budget demands (or send the Augustine Committee back to the showers).
I agree you that Scenarios 1 and 2 are non-starters. They have to list Scenario 1 — as it is the Program of Record (or baseline). But for the reasons you state I predict that Option 2, will not make the final list.
Option 4 will not make the final list either. Extending the Shuttle to 2015 is a non-starter.
Option 7 “Mars First” will also be eliminated from final list. It is not affordable or sustainable at this time.
Those are my predictions.
FWIW,
– Al
All Obama wants is something that boosts America’s science and technology leadership in the short term, and inspires kids into STEM so we’re all not spending chinese dollars in the long term.
The single 2015-shuttle option reflects Augustine’s steering of “Crawley’s” table. Augustine knows what the white house wants, and it isn’t more of the same.
Augustine also knows the gap isn’t a big problem. The causes of the gap are the real problems. Going nowhere (status quo) with a gap is a problem. Going somewhere (new plan) with a gap is a reasonable short term price to pay.
“Going nowhere (status quo) with a gap is a problem. Going somewhere (new plan) with a gap is a reasonable short term price to pay.”
Well put.
FWIW…
Since we are in the betting process I predict:
1 . Deep Space and Lunar Global first (tie)
3 . Marst First
First the other options:
I assume, possibly wrongly, that Ares I is now essentially dead: Baseline and ISS Focused won’t make it. The Dash Out of LEO seems to me a little expensive for any substantial return but keep the workforce alive. Also has the IP-only crew to LEO: Not sure the politicians will agree to anything like this. Shuttle Systems, to me anyway, are not the way to go: Sidemount will be a nightmare to make work for crew (as shown), Direct, I am afraid, is very optimistic in its ability to be any better (cost and schedule) than Ares I/V BUT I don’t know enough of Direct.
My choice:
They all use IPs, keep ISS till 2020, have commercial cargo and crew (possibly address the gap).
Workforce retention may dictate an Ares V option so Mars First probably has some appeal, in addition to the associated long term research/technologies required to make it really work (radiation, propulsion, etc). And ISS 2020. But probably the most expensive, long term, less politcally sustainable (?).
Lunar Global looks a lot like current VSE (?) with extended stay on the Moon and I think it stands a chance. At least we go there and possibly do something (ISRU) profitable (?). And ISS 2020.
Deep Space may have more of a scientific appeal than Lunar Global and ISS 2020.
If I decided I would do some sort of blend where one natuyrally leads to the other options, having the most difficult goal (Mars?) as the driver.
I think they’ll include at least one of the baseline scenarios, even if it’s a sucky option, just for sake of completeness.
~Jon
The options really boil down to three general categories, and these are summarized on Chart 5:
– Moon with surface exploration
– Deep space with no surface exploration immediately
– Mars first , with surface exploration
Of these, only the “Deep Space” strategy represents a significant departure from what we’ve looked at in the past, and it captures the intent of Options 3 and 5. It should be straightforward to craft a strategy that melds Options 3 and 5 into an evolutionary progression in capability, such as:
1) Start with Orion + man-rated Centaur/Upper Stage for lunar orbital missions. Multiple-day missions in polar orbit could be used to teleoperate rovers in polar craters and do extensive assays of these regions.
2) Incorporate an airlock onto the configuration and perform demonstrate deep-space servicing capability, perhaps on an existing asset in GEO. This could then lead to similar missions at Lagrange Points.
3) With the addition of another Upper Stage, missions to readily accessible NEOs become possible. Perhaps these will require the development of a new EDS-class stage.
4) With increasing durations, incorporation of TransHab should be considered. Ultimately, this would be the configuration used for the Phobos/Deimos, Mars Orbit and Venus Orbit missions.
There are probably many ways to slice and dice the evolution of this strategy. In the long run, it does not break the bank, and represents something different for human space flight beyond LEO.
The “only” problem I see with Deep Space and Lunar Global is related to the workforce (ATK). That is why I think that they may keep a version of Ares V going that might help with Mars and conversely.
I am not sure what will come first Deep Space or Lunar Global. It feels like Deep Space may be the most bang for the buck short term and Lunar Global longer term.
Also to hope in any way to capture the attention of the public the Mars option “alone” looks really good. Probably the most risky.
The “baseline” will serve as reference to their wheighing method, I think. But I hardly see how they would be able to justify its choice in the end considering its current cost and schedule issues.
sc220: “There are probably many ways to slice and dice the evolution of this strategy. In the long run, it does not break the bank, and represents something different for human space flight beyond LEO.”
It’s interesting that the “Integrated Options for Consideration Going Forward” slide classifies the “Deep Space” option as one of the “> FY10 Budget” ones. It strikes me as an option where you really could stretch out the more ambitious destinations (and thus stretch out the funding) because you’d have many useful things to do along the way. Thus it seems like you should be able to fit the FY10 budget. Also, it includes Heavy Lift, which doesn’t seem necessary, especially if affordable commercial launch and refueling options are available, which they should be according to the slide. I’d assume that the Heavy Lift funding contributes significantly towards the “> FY10 Budget” designation. Even if Heavy Lift is deemed to be needed for the more ambitious Deep Space missions, those would come later, so it should be possible to implement (and fund) Heavy Lift gradually and thus stay in the budget box.
The similar “Dash out of LEO” fits the FY10 budget according to the slide, but it has major poison pills in that ISS is retired in 2015, there is no new commercial engagement, and no U.S. crew to LEO capability. For some reason dual Ares V launches are needed, so it’s hard to imagine this one being a “dash” at all, or affordable, as envisioned on the slide.
I would imagine that some hybrid of these 2 options could be made that fits the budget and avoids the poison pills. With the 2020 ISS Life and commercial cargo and crew from the “Deep Space” option, a hybrid should also be able to do as good a job with space stations as the “ISS Focused” option, if not better. The TransHab sort of capability could be consistent with commercial space station capabilities, and thus the “Deep Space” TransHab and commercial cargo and crew capabilities could encourage that market. When we do eventually retire ISS, we should have several commercial stations operating.
@red
One reason for the high cost of the Flexible/Deep Space options was the assumed high flight rate. The presentation by ARC/Dave Korsmeyer to Ed Crawley’s subcommittee assumed one mission every year. Plus, almost all of the missions were different.
I think it would be much more realistic to assume lunar orbital missions for the first 5 years (2015-2020), followed by a phase-in of GEO/Lagrange Point demo missions for the balance of the remaining 10 years (2015-2025). The decade after that would concentrate on NEO missions (2025-2035), and a decade or two’s worth of Mars/Phobos/Deimos and Venus orbital missions (2025-2045).
I suspect that some commercial or government entities may want to conduct a crewed landing on the Moon and Mars within this ~40 year timeframe. This could be done by deploying a lander/ascent system into orbit followed by rendezvous by the NASA provided in-space transportation vehicle. Perhaps some of the missions during this time could be dedicated to buildup of surface infrastructure and automated resource production plants.
I’m sure that many may see 40 years as too long of time for so little progress. However, you only have to look back over the last 40 years to see how realistic it may actually be. At least this plan sets the stage for much more ambitious activities in the latter half of this century.
I’m going to indulge in some wild speculating. Which of the seven options so far identified by the Augustine committee will Obama finally choose?
I like the term “poison pill” mentioned earlier, it’s a good shorthand way of identifying the least likely options. Which is why I think options 1-4 will not make the final cut, because they have poison pills.
Options 1 (Baseline) and 3 (Dash out of LEO) are out, because the ISS only lasts until 2015. Any option which does not include ISS extension to 2020 will not survive, IMHO. The perceived investment in ISS to too great to tolerate throwing it away so early.
Option 4 (Use Shuttle) is out, because of STS extension to 2015. The political risk is too great of another Shuttle accident killing another crew during that extension. What president would want that blood on his hands? Something so foreseeable and avoidable?
Option 2 (ISS focused) is out, because it gives up on manned exploration for the foreseeable future. No president is going to want the reputation as the man who killed the great dream of space, remembered as the anti-JFK.
That leaves the last three options as the most likely to survive: Deep Space, Lunar Global and Mars First. I expect two of these to be among the final three options presented by the Augustine Committee to Obama, and one of them to be the final pick by Obama. If I have to guess right now, Obama will choose the Deep Space option as the winner.
I’ll try a round at the guessing game, too. All guesses would be retracted if the committee adjusts scenarios, which I think they should in some cases. My guesses are based on the charter of the committee, which asks them to get ISS support capabilties online sooner, support missions to the Moon and generally beyond LEO, fitting the budget, stimulating commercial spaceflight, and possibly extending the ISS beyond 2016. It also asks them to look into international participation, robotics, and R&D, but per the slides it seems those details will come later. I’d give some consideration to what I think Obama, Bolden, Garver, Whitesides, Ladwig would favor, since I imagine the committee will have that in mind too.
1. Baseline Derived from Program of Record – I think we can discard this one out of hand. It has all of the problems that caused the committee to be formed in the first place – too little commercial space, not fitting in the budget, shutting down the ISS too soon, no international participation, too little R&D and enabling robotics, large HSF gap, etc. If all of that wasn’t enough, we have the recent assessment that Ares 1 won’t be ready for ISS support until 2017-2019, and lunar missions won’t be ready until 2028, with all of the opportunity costs that implies.
2. ISS Focused – This features commercial participation and long ISS support. It also fits the budget. Therefore I don’t think it can be ruled out. However, it is weak/delayed in the exploration area, and the results need to “inspire the next generation”, not the generation of 2040. Personally, I’d be ok scrapping the human exploration part of this option (including Ares 1/V) if it were replaced with strong support for commercial stations (eg: NASA use of Bigelow stations, Dragonlabs, and the like, commercial micro reentry systems, commercial point-to-point/station-to-station transport, etc), since I think those offer a better foundation for later exploration than Ares 1/V anyway. However, that’s not what the option states. So … because of weak exploration/inspiration, I’d class this as a “possible”.
3. Dash Out of LEO – This option doesn’t feature commercial participation beyond the existing COTS cargo effort. It doesn’t expedite ISS support. It also ends the ISS in 2015. Those characteristics would probably cause this option to be removed from consideration based on the HSF charter and political reality. The “Deep Space” option might pick up pieces of this one, though.
4. Use Shuttle Systems – One interesting thing about this option is that it relies on the Shuttle/International Partners, and then on commercial transport. One capability that could fit well with an extended Shuttle lifespan is commercial crew rescue. This commercial capability could be designed to be a stepping stone towards full commercial crew transportation support. In combination with the Shuttle, it could reduce reliance on Soyuz. However, the combined cost of supporting the Shuttle and International Partners, developing a Shuttle-derived Heavy Lift vehicle, encouraging commercial crew capabilities, developing a lunar capability, and possibly developing or encouraging a refueling capability strike me as being either unrealistically expensive, or as postponing exploration progress so long that exploration plans are in reality postponed to some future President. Thus I’d class this as a “possible”. The key point is that use of Shuttle does little to address the HSF committee goals. There is no “reduce the gap” goal, and extending Shuttle does nothing to expedite new U.S. ISS support capabilities. I think the committee has done its job in the Shuttle area by putting the “2011 probable reality” on the table, and that’s enough.
5. Deep Space – This option is strong in exploration content, ISS support, ISS lifespan, and commercial support. It offers something to lots of factions: Moon, Mars, asteroids, science, satellite servicing, commercial, etc. The only problem is the budget, and as we’ve discussed above, there are ways to adjust this one to fit the budget with over-budget features treated as options.
6. Lunar Global – This option is also strong in exploration content, ISS support, ISS lifespan, and commercial support. Again, the only problem is the budget. Perhaps the budget problem can be solved by taking out the government backup to commercial crew to LEO capability, and focusing enough funding on multiple commercial capabilities to ensure success that way. Perhaps the refueling option can be considered enabling, and the HLV option can be considered enhancing, and thus HLV would be an over-budget option to consider.
7. Mars First – Developing Ares V, developing Mars systems, and running Mars missions that require many Ares V launches (6 or 7 if my memory serves) seems to be completely unrealistic from a budgetary standpoint. This is unfortunate, since this option strongly supports commercial and international participation (eg: it is the only one where a refueling option is considered enabling).
So, my wild guesses are:
1 and 2: Deep Space and Lunar Global – both with internal options to fit the budget and to go somewhat over the budget
3: ISS Focused (with a strong robotic precursor component and more exploration-focused ISS science/engineering)
distant 4: Use Shuttle Systems (but scaled back to 2013 or so to fit the budget, with 2015 as an over-budget option)
Here is what I’ve gather from the hearings to date.
The ISSP must be extended until at least 2020 because
1) Congress has mandated it.
2) The International Partners “demand” it.
3) NASA Human Space Flight will lose creditability with the American people if it is not.
The SSP must be extended until commercial, international partners, and/or NASA can provide replacement capabilities because
1) A viable ISSP extension requires logistics support that only the SSP can provide.
2) An extended SSP provides realistic gap reduction.
3) An extended SSP provides synergy with some form of SDLV should SDLV be selected.
4) An extended SSP provides honest utilization of the ISS.
5) NASA Human Space Flight will lose creditability with the American people if it is not.
The commission has stated that no matter which option is selected;
1) International participation in exploration is highly desirable (mandatory)
2) Commercial participation is exploration is highly desirable (mandatory)
3) Use of Propellant Transfer/Depot technology is highly desirable (mandatory)
4) Any mission beyond LEO can not last longer than 200 days with our current technology due to health effects.
@ Norm Hartnett .Excellent analysis! This (British) Space Cadet concurs.
Further hand-waving, hyperbole and hypothesis to be found at my link. However the real dilemma remains: “Not Shuttle-C” vs “Not Direct – Really!”
“Now IANARS but given the choice between the side-mount [NS-C] and in-line design [ND-R]: which looks more elegant? (Sod the engineering!) ”
We already know that political considerations ‘trump’ engineering realities. But what about aesthetics? In the final analysis your President will be selecting what NASA TV broadcasts for the next 40 odd years and the icon used to inspire the next generation of Space Cadets!
I think it’s time to think boldly!
I’ve tried to come up with a chart to rate the 7 mission scenarios, plus sub-options within those scenarios involving presence or absense of refueling capability, using the scope and objectives of the Human Space Flight Plans Committee. I only used those objectives that appear to be most relevant to the mission scenarios as they have been defined so far.
Mission Scenarios
1. Baseline Derived From Program of Record
2. ISS Focused
3. Dash Out of LEO
4N. Use Shuttle Systems – No Refueling
4F. Use Shuttle Systems – Refueling
5N. Deep Space – No Refueling
5F. Deep Space – Refueling
6N. Lunar Global – No Refueling
6F. Lunar Global – Refueling
7. Mars First
Human Space Flight Plans Committee Charter Scope and Objectives Items
a) expediting a new U.S. capability to support utilization of the International Space Station (ISS)
b) supporting missions to the Moon and other destinations beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO)
c) stimulating commercial space flight capability
d) fitting within the current budget profile for NASA exploration activities
e) extending ISS operations beyond 2016
Human Space Flight Plans Committee Scope and Objective Items not included (most to be addressed after basic scenarios are chosen):
– the appropriate amount of research and development and complementary robotic activities needed to make human space flight activities most productive and affordable over the long term
– appropriate opportunities for international collaboration
To do this, I assigned a weight to each of the HSF objectives used. This weight is 1.0. The evaluation could change if different weights are used, but I have no way of objectively assigning such weights. (I was tempted to give “e” a lower weight since it was not one of the “main” objectives, but I didn’t do that).
Then I attempted to rank each scenario against each objective on a scale of 1-5 (5 being “best meets objective). The actual numbers I used were subjective, but you could do a similar evaluation using your own numbers. I attempted to give some qualitative background on why I chose the numbers I chose to make it easier to validate or correct these numbers.
1. Baseline Derived From Program of Record
a) ISS Support – 1 – only COTS cargo from U.S., Ares I only available after ISS retired
b) Beyond LEO – 2 – attempts beyond LEO, but new 2028 schedule shows this to be a weak plan for beyond LEO
c) Commercial – 1 – only COTS cargo (baseline for all options)
d) Budget – 4 – fits budget (I’m skeptical about giving it more than 4 because of Ares V use)
e) Extend ISS – 1 – ISS retired in 2015
2. ISS Focused
a) ISS Support – 4 – commercial cargo; commercial crew gives substantial chance crew transport would be expedited; opportunity for other expedited ISS support (eg: early crew rescue support, micro rentry vehicle, point-to-point craft)
b) Beyond LEO – 3 – lunar sortie/outpost included, but likely much delayed, ISS science can support exploration
c) Commercial – 3 – commercial cargo and crew; possibly other commercial ISS transport services; potential use of other commercial stations/labs; availability of ISS labs for commercial use
d) Budget – 4 – fits budget (I’m skeptical about giving it more than 4 because of Ares V use)
e) Extend ISS – 3 – ISS retired in 2020, commercial support
3. Dash Out of LEO
a) ISS Support – 1 – only COTS cargo from U.S., Ares V only available after ISS retired
b) Beyond LEO – 3 – achievable destinations, dash
c) Commercial – 1 – only COTS cargo (baseline for all options)
d) Budget – 4 – fits budget (I’m skeptical about giving it more than 4 because of dual Ares V use)
e) Extend ISS – 1 – ISS retired in 2015
4N. Use Shuttle Systems – No Refueling
a) ISS Support – 3 – commercial cargo; commercial crew gives substantial chance crew transport would be expedited – extending Shuttle does not add value to this objective since it does not expedite new ISS support
b) Beyond LEO – 2 – lunar sortie/outpost included, but likely much delayed
c) Commercial – 2 – commercial cargo and crew, possible ISS advantages cancelled by possible Shuttle competition against commercial
d) Budget – 3 – Shuttle, long ISS life, commercial, HLV, lunar work together unlikely to be affordable
e) Extend ISS – 4 – ISS retired in 2020, commercial support, additional Shuttle helps with spares
4F. Use Shuttle Systems – Refueling
a) ISS Support – 3 – commercial cargo; commercial crew gives substantial chance crew transport would be expedited – extending Shuttle does not add value to this objective since it does not expedite new ISS support
b) Beyond LEO – 3 – lunar sortie/outpost included, but likely much delayed – refueling allows more capability
c) Commercial – 4 – commercial cargo and crew, possible ISS advantages cancelled by possible Shuttle competition against commercial; refueling strong here because of potential for commercial depots, commercial launch market to supply depots, and commercial applications of refueling (eg: satellites)
d) Budget – 2 – Shuttle, long ISS life, commercial, HLV, lunar work, refueling together unlikely to be affordable
e) Extend ISS – 4 – ISS retired in 2020, commercial support, additional Shuttle helps with spares
5N. Deep Space – No Refueling
a) ISS Support – 3 – commercial cargo; commercial crew gives substantial chance crew transport would be expedited
b) Beyond LEO – 4 – multiple useful destinations, achievable intermediate results, early results possible, sets stage for achievable surface missions
c) Commercial – 3 – commercial cargo and crew, potential for commercial habs in transport plan, potential teleoperation of commercial robotics, potential commercial spin-offs of teleoperations, potential spin-offs of satellite servicing techniques to commercial space
d) Budget – 3 – HLV, deep space transport, long ISS life, commercial, robotic elements combined are costly
e) Extend ISS – 4 – ISS retired in 2020, commercial support, deep space missions fit well with ISS science, assembly, microgravity
5F. Deep Space – Refueling
a) ISS Support – 3 – commercial cargo; commercial crew gives substantial chance crew transport would be expedited
b) Beyond LEO – 5 – multiple useful destinations, achievable intermediate results, early results possible, sets stage for achievable surface missions; refueling allows more capability
c) Commercial – 5 – commercial cargo and crew, potential for commercial habs in transport plan, potential teleoperation of commercial robotics, potential commercial spin-offs of teleoperations, potential spin-offs of satellite servicing techniques to commercial space; refueling strong here because of potential for commercial depots, commercial launch market to supply depots, and commercial applications of refueling (eg: satellites)
d) Budget – 2 – HLV, deep space transport, long ISS life, commercial, robotic elements, refueling combined are costly
e) Extend ISS – 4 – ISS retired in 2020, commercial support, deep space missions fit well with ISS science, assembly, microgravity
6N. Lunar Global – No Refueling
a) ISS Support – 3 – commercial cargo; commercial crew gives substantial chance crew transport would be expedited
b) Beyond LEO – 3 – lunar surface is a solid exploration plan
c) Commercial – 3 – commercial cargo and crew; potential use of commercial surface robotics, commercial satellites
d) Budget – 3 – HLV, commercial, long ISS life, lunar elements combined are costly
e) Extend ISS – 3 – ISS retired in 2020, commercial support
6F. Lunar Global – Refueling
a) ISS Support – 3 – commercial cargo; commercial crew gives substantial chance crew transport would be expedited
b) Beyond LEO – 4 – lunar surface is a solid exploration plan; refueling allows more capability
c) Commercial – 5 – commercial cargo and crew; potential use of commercial surface robotics, commercial satellites; refueling strong here because of potential for commercial depots, commercial launch market to supply depots, and commercial applications of refueling (eg: satellites)
d) Budget – 2 – HLV, commercial, long ISS life, lunar elements, refueling combined are costly
e) Extend ISS – 3 – ISS retired in 2020, commercial support
7. Mars First
a) ISS Support – 3 – commercial cargo; commercial crew gives substantial chance crew transport would be expedited
b) Beyond LEO – 3 excellent capability if achieved, but high risk it would be canceled because of few intermediate goals and expense
c) Commercial – 3 – commercial cargo and crew, refueling strong here because of potential for commercial depots, commercial launch market to supply depots, and commercial applications of refueling (eg: satellites)
d) Budget – 1 – many (6? 7?) Ares Vs per mission unlikely to be affordable. Add Ares V development, commercial crew, Mars hardware, technology development, lunar test flight and budget isn’t there.
e) Extend ISS – 3 – ISS retired in 2020, commercial support
Full Chart (see above for meanings):
—-a b c d e total
1 . 1 2 1 4 1 9
2 . 4 3 3 4 3 17
3 . 1 3 1 4 1 10
4N. 3 2 2 3 4 14
4F. 3 3 4 2 4 16
5N. 3 4 3 3 4 17
5F. 3 5 5 2 4 19
6N. 3 3 3 3 3 15
6F. 3 4 5 2 3 17
7 . 3 3 3 1 3 13
Top (19): Deep Space – Refueling
2nd-4th (17): ISS Focused, Deep Space – No Refueling, Lunar Global – Refueling
So, the presented options could be:
1. Deep Space with refueling (with an option of no refueling and possibly other measures to fit the budget)
2. ISS Focused
3. Lunar Global with refueling
The following is a general conceptual statement against which it could be useful to measure the final recommendations of the NASA_HSF study group.
A Space-faring PEP Talk (Posted as blog to SpaceTweepSociety on 8/8/09)
By Waddell Robey (XiNeutrino)
Sorry, but this blog is not about intergalactic sports. PEP for this discussion is an acronym representing: Preservation, Exploration, and Pioneering. This Talk seeks to address the logical and essential steps that, in my opinion, must occur if future generations are to successfully venture into deep space.
Preservation: Our home, planet Earth is vital to many thousands of years of both human and robotic explorations of our solar system and our galaxy. It is vital because it remains the best equipped with science, technology, human-power, financing and natural resources than any other accessible place in the entire Universe. In fact, at the moment, as far as we know it is the only place with all these assets. As a wannabe, space-faring nation we need all of these resources, therefore, we must carefully protect and preserve them.
Preservation includes the standard ecological measures, but it also must attend to the care and nurturing of us. We need to grow even stronger and healthier. Most importantly we need to grow much smarter, especially in science and technology. Lastly we must become increasingly space aware. This goes beyond amateur astronomy to include a sound understanding of both astrophysics and astrobiology and how these sciences relate to our very existence.
Finally, we must actively protect our planet from potential terrestrial and celestial damage. Monitoring and reporting is not enough. This is particularly important in the case of Near Earth Objects. In these cases, we must perfect and put into effect interdictory mechanisms that will, in a timely manner, divert deadly impacts from either asteroids or comets. If we do not do this then all of our space faring efforts stand to be for naught as we are demolished by a near earth object.
Exploration: Exploration of our solar system and beyond is already in process, but for it to be sustained and expanded we must first have in place an active preservation program as described above. If we fail to do this then our exploratory efforts are, at best, feeble. Earth First is not a fringe group-motto; it is a mandate for successful and sustained space exploration
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Within the context of this blog discussion, exploration does not imply colonization. The exception, of course, would be the construction of base sites in support of our exploratory efforts. Plans to terra-form vast areas of another planetary site followed by colonization should not, in my view, be a part of any exploration program. To do so would be both a distraction and a misdirection of our space exploration goals.
Exploration goals, as mentioned above should concentrate on exploring. Those programs involving human spaceflight are essentially focused on our solar system. Programs that seek to explore our galaxy, the Milky Way, and beyond must use, for now, robotic spacecraft that include space telescopes and associated sensors.
There is much to learn, especially within our own solar system. Human exploration of the planets, especially Mars, will enable us to determine if any of them could artificially support future colonization. Artificial support implies terra-forming, and we may find from our explorations that Mars may not support a vast terra-forming program. We need to know this in detail and is thus a key objective or our human exploration of Mars. This same kind of assessment could be conducted on other planets within our solar system, but it is unlikely that we will find other good candidates. This is the exact exploratory feedback that we need. This feedback will directly impact our future space program goals. Earth First could easily become an even more critical mandate.
In addition to assessing Mars and the other planets, we need to fully explore the asteroid belt both from a defensive standpoint, and as a potential source of a variety of natural resources. Again, exploratory efforts simply assess and report, but those reports could stimulate future efforts to extract vital resources from asteroids. This same research will reveal vital information that enables us to better defend Earth from wayward asteroids and other Near Earth Objects
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Future deep space explorations are going to be directly affected by what our current Kepler, Corot, WISE and many other spacecraft research programs produce in their search for Earth-like planetary bodies. In all cases the distances are immense and so we must rely on a variety of innovative space astrometry techniques to enrich our growing database. Of course, new developments in spacecraft design; robotics and propulsion systems will directly affect future travel by both robots and humans.
All of the above requires considerable commitment of funds, science and technology to successfully explore our celestial neighborhoods. Exploration therefore demands an equally considerable human leadership commitment to make it all happen.
Pioneering: Whenever I come across this word, my mind is filled with visions of tough, courageous, imaginative and innovative humans striking out across wilderness regions in search of the promise of opportunity and a better life
In almost all cases these pioneers follow the pathways established by equally brave, curious and resourceful explorers. This will certainly be the eventual course for our space-faring society.
Throughout human history, pioneers have not only broken and settled upon new ground, but have brought with them elements of their past localities and cultures which are important structural elements in the colonization of a new world. The heritage from Earth, once we colonize another planetary body, is vital, especially since our migration is due in large part to our successful application of the Earth First protocol. Those perseveration and conservation activities must be a part of our behaviors in our new world. In doing so, we have not abandoned our lovely blue planet; we are now implanting its goodness in our new home. So love, without sad longing, goes on as humankind boldly steps forward into an entirely new evolutionary era.
Lastly, as pioneers we may, just like our ancestors, meet other life forms and cultures. Hopefully, if we have really followed our Earth First practices we will avoid cultural clashes and instead rejoice with the knowledge that we are not alone in this vast, glorious, and mystifying Universe.
Some of the above analysis has much merit, from an engineering perspective.
But this isn’t what defines national space policy. Politics has ALWAYS been the primary driver (to the tune of 90% or so) and it will always be so, because the people in charge of making the policy ARE political.
Given this over-riding truth, the specific options defined by Augustine et al are only a mish-mosh of hi-tech-sounding pieces-parts—a menu to choose from, and to mix and match from—of what will ultimately be the path that the administration will define.
So, there are really only two avenues open to the current administration in the current fiscal/political environment, if history is any guide:
A) The cheapest option that still looks visionary on paper: maintain ISS and develop the least expensive possible crew ferry that will maintain a modicum of US govt spaceflight capability while retaining the “option” of heading out beyond LEO…for which advanced studies, but not hard design nor metal-cutting, will continue. This is the fiscally responsible choice even as it preserves the appearance of keeping open the door to a visionary tomorrow (a la Nixon re: the shuttle decision, and Clinton re: Freedom => Alpha => ISS).
B) The big distracting feel-good patriotic splash: Go full bore with as grandiose a plan as possible so as to distract the public, the media, and one’s political enemies from the administration’s other difficulties and political failings (a la JFK and Apollo whilst in the unflattering light of the Bay of Pigs, Gagarin, Southeast Asia, etc). The President can play up his being a visionary who intends to inspire our youth while advancing our nation toward grander horizons of exploration and economic opportunity; no investment is too large a price to pay as a down payment on America’s future…blah blah blah.
Yes, of course, there were other circumstances and issues surrounding and influencing these historical examples, but at their core they boil down politically to the two options I’ve described: cheap and fiscally responsible while leaving a door open (on paper) OR grandiose, visionary, and a big distraction.
Besides, in the current political circumstances and climate, I suspect anything in-between will come off as appearing wishy-washy and un-focused, something ANY administration would want to avoid.
I’ve already noted, in other places, which choice I think is forthcoming…and I think this choice was pre-ordained long before the election took place last year (unless more recent polling dramatically points in another direction…). All that’s left is the spin…of which I believe the evaluating panel is merely a component.
But time will tell. I really, really hope I’m wrong.
[…] Augustine observations – Space Politics […]
@Bob Mahoney:
I am trying to understand your point of view here because none of the options you describe seem to satisfy you nor do they me.
Yes I do agree these are all political decisons. But what do you think they should be? What is the problem with that? Are you saying that politicians should base their decision on… on what? Of course it is about elections and power and cash, whether “visionary” or “responsible”, even though I am not sure why these are mutually exclusive. Do you think we will get someone in power ever that will look past this (never mind the political party)?
I am interpreting now but it feels like you long for the grandiose scheme while ignoring the financial crisis we’re in. And it also feels like whatever the choice “fiscal responsibility” OR “grandiose” there is NO good choice. So what do we do? Carry on the current fiscally irresponsible, technically flawed program? Whatever the mess, space and otherwise, we’re in, maybe, just maybe, we ought to take it to those who put us in it, should we not? Now and again, WHO will do anything like that since it is all political?
In the end, some people will be unhappy whatever we end up doing, some will be happy and some, probably most, will not care one bit. So? The art here is to navigate the muddy waters of politics in order to reach our common goal. But hold on! Do we, the space community, have a common goal? Do we? I fear not. Until then it’ll be like it is, most likely a form of status quo that neither satisfies anyone nor really bothers anyone since it’ll still give them a job.
And that sir is the reality of it all as I see it. Not human space exploration of the Moon, Mars or anything. Only politics.
@common sense: “Only politics.”
Yep. That was pretty much my point. The final path chosen will serve the administration’s political interests regardless of how good or bad the engineering behind the options offered up by the Augustine panel. So many are putting so much energy into evaluating the converging “options” based on rational, technical engineering principles, but the technical merits of this or that choice are barely blips on the admin’s radar, especially compared to budget (or, truly, perceived impact to the budget) and other political circumstances. It’s hard to talk about Buck Rogers (which is how I suspect many in ANY administration view spaceflight) when the daily headlines are all about job losses, healthcare (excuse me, health INSURANCE) reform, and our gradual losing of the war in Afghanistan.
But your point is taken. If we can not align “proper” goals in space with the current political sensibilities and desirements of the present administration and congress, we will achieve nothing. As you say, the true art lies in mastering that challenge. How? I do not know, especially since the “science image” of the current admin points inward more than outward.
As to what I would like to see? The VSE (including the points articulated by Marburger later) was strongly in tune with what I would like to see: the entire solar system explored in a coherent fashion that ultimately folds its resources and opportunities into our economic and social sphere. Sadly, CxP’s response (ESAS) to the VSE challenge fell far short of that intent and promise, in many respects because the admin, after articulating the necessary vision, walked away from it both in terms of oversight and budget.
That the previous admin did actually come through with formulating a good, solid policy seemingly for the right reasons (the country needed its space program focused, and they delivered) was remarkable in and by itself, certainly from a political perspective. Some might argue that VSE was meant to serve as a distraction from Iraq, but given how little the administration “exploited” it in that regard, that suggestion doesn’t seem to pan out. They seemingly offered up what was needed (yes, Columbia forced it to happen, but kudos to any admin that sees a problem and addresses it) and they then trusted NASA (in Griffin’s hands), in a typically delegatory fashion, to implement it. He then ran the vision aground (both in terms of budget and technical mapping) by turning NASA into a rocket factory instead of keeping them out front in the role of advanced planning architect and advanced hardware trailblazer. [To show you my mind, I found the elimination of the Jupiter Icy Moons Mission to be one of the most short-sighted decisions ever executed; I’d list the heavy-handed imposition of ESAS sensibilities atop the CEV bidding process as right behind it.]
As for common goal, I think that a very, very large majority of those who advocate “space” would agree on the “big” one, and that is where the VSE was pointing: expand human civilization out into the solar system. I think most of the petty arguments that we flame over in these blogs involve closer-in objectives, that is, the stepping-stones that will ultimately bring about that grander accomplishment of a spacefaring humanity.
Me, well, I suppose I AM yearning for the grandiose: I’m all for establishing the transportation infrastructure that will conquer cislunar space and the inner solar system out to and including asteroid exploitation (to start, at least): reusable OTVs, fuel depots, aerobraking, tethers, ISRU, surface bases, nuclear low & high-thrust interplanetary tugs, etc. I personally think the Moon, including lunar surface base establishment, is a vital stepping stone. Apollo succeeded because of Gemini; I feel that the lunar base’s Gemini is the ISS, and the lunar base will be the Gemini for bases (and operations strategies) farther afield.
Big price tag, ultimately, but also, theoretically, an immensely big payoff, ultimately. But I never expected any admin to stand up and triple NASA’s budget; as long as the vision remained paramount, the pieces could be tackled individually, especially if the entire architecture was designed to backfill capability with private industry providers once the trailblazing technologies were mastered. (Shuttle, remember, was originally the first piece of a larger architecture. Too many folks lost sight of that along a very arduous road.)
But back to your ultimate question: how do we wed such a grand vision that holds so much long-term promise (economic and otherwise) to the immediate preoccupations of the current administration?
I don’t know. But that’s REALLY what’s been missing in all this discussion of the merits of this or that “option”. As others have articulated in a number of places, the underlying WHY of space exploration has not been satifactorily explained to either this admin or to the American people.
I am of a mind that it can’t be done so much as a table of logical points or justifications but must be conveyed in other ways. Facts and figures don’t win over hearts, and space exploration, as I’ve indicated elsewhere, is primarily an emotional pursuit regardless of what economic benefits it provides. If you can get the emotional connection to happen with more people (see my Space Review essay “Space for Improvement” for my detailed thoughts on this), then we may have a chance.
But it ain’t gonna happen overnight. And, sadly, not many folks in the OMB, regardless of who’s in the WH, seem to have hearts to begin with…
@Bob Mahoney:
Yes I agree the WHY is paramount and sorely missing. I already communicated what I thought it should entail (briefly: national interests).
But here is what is really missing in any of the options: THE PUBLIC.
BTW, I understand and fell your pain and frustration but I would avoid direct attacks, e.g. OMB, as some of these people may be friendly to us but may get frustrated to be finger pointed as the ennemy. OMB is not all mighty. The President is. Somewhat…
OMB: My comments were not intended to antagonize, merely force a smile. Lest we forget, it was Casper Wienberger, OMB director under Nixon and later Dfen Sec under Reagan, who ended up convincing both presidents to go ahead with the approval of the shuttle and space station, respectively. And James Webb, everyone’s favorite example of an effective NASA administrator, came from the Bureau of the Budget (OMB’s predecessor org).
I find it difficult to imagine how public participation can be folded directly into any of the proposed options in a first-tier sense, and even whether doing so would necessarily accomplish much.
As previously noted, my Space Review article conveys my thoughts on how to better engage the public with spaceflight; ultimately, I see the necessary task as raising it higher in their consciousness by various means. I believe that if it were to occupy a larger (any?) portion of their daily musings (in-between buying their cosmetics, iPods, and tuning in to American Idol), support for more space investment will come of its own accord because they’ll want more stuff happening, in the sense that it will seem to them to be the right thing to do.
Why do the likes of us find it (i.e., the ideas and vicarious experience of space exploration, development, and settlement) to be so cool? Can we really explain that? I’ve been pondering this question for decades and have yet to come up with a satisfactory answer, except that it doesn’t seem to be a superficial affinity. Something about it appeals to things down deep that I believe nearly all humans share: the fun of learning, the adventure of exploring, the sense of accomplishment that stems from achieving difficult goals…even the sense of community (both the supportive and antagonistic interactions) inherent in a team effort. [Really, can anyone truly explain why people enjoy watching football? Sagan tried in an article ages ago in Parade magazine, but I don’t think he dug deep enough…]
As such, I think we can (re)awaken that same fascination in a much larger percentage of the public if only we exposed them to (and emotionally engaged them with) more of the drama inherent in the endeavor…regardless of any specific near-term destination, because, in the end, I think we ALL want it all.
“OMB: My comments were not intended to antagonize, merely force a smile. Lest we forget, it was Casper Wienberger, OMB director under Nixon and later Dfen Sec under Reagan, who ended up convincing both presidents to go ahead with the approval of the shuttle and space station, respectively. And James Webb, everyone’s favorite example of an effective NASA administrator, came from the Bureau of the Budget (OMB’s predecessor org).”
Despite Griffin’s protests to the contrary, OMB isn’t the problem in the current era, either. This is a repeat from earlier posts, but over the past six years, FY 2004 – FY 2009, OMB, the White House, and Congress have provided $2.5 billion more for NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) — the division within NASA responsible for building Constellation — than what the Bush II Administration promised in the FY 2004 budget.
Here’s what was promised in the FY 2004 budget:
FY 2004 $1,646.0M
FY 2005 $1,782.0M
FY 2006 $2,579.0M
FY 2007 $2,941.0M
FY 2008 $2,809.0M
FY 2009 $3,313.0M
Total $15,070.0M
And here’s what ESMD actually received in each fiscal year:
FY 2004 $2684.5M
FY 2005 $2209.3M
FY 2006 $3050.1M
FY 2007 $2869.8M
FY 2008 $3299.4M
FY 2009 $3505.5M
Total $17,618.6M
The total difference is $2,458.6 million. So OMB during the Bush II Administration and prior Congresses provided almost $2.5 billion more for ESMD than what the Bush II Administration promised to develop systems and technologies to return to the Moon. This doesn’t include the $400 million that ESMD received in the Recovery Act (passed after the Bush II Administration), which would increase the total difference to $3 billion.
The fault for the current situation with Ares I/Orion/Constellation does not lie at the feet of OMB underfunding of these projects/programs, because there has been none. On the contrary, the problem is that ESMD continued in the long tradition of NASA human space flight programs that can’t formulate and execute programs to anything resembling the original budget. That might be acceptable during the Apollo era, when many of these systems were first-of-a-kind. It’s not acceptable in the modern era, after decades of learning and with the ready availability of many of the necessary systems.
FWIW…
@Bob Mahoney:
“I find it difficult to imagine how public participation can be folded directly into any of the proposed options in a first-tier sense, and even whether doing so would necessarily accomplish much.”
Well, I never said it was going to be easy to include the public. BUT isn’t there someone somewhere who has an idea? Even a simple idea? Look, you want to get public support, you get the public to fly. Far-fetched? Ask Virgin Galactic. Is this a government’s job? Heck I don’t know but what I know is that without the public you and/or I will keep whining about underwhelming budgets/goals.
“I believe that if it were to occupy a larger (any?) portion of their daily musings (in-between buying their cosmetics, iPods, and tuning in to American Idol), support for more space investment will come of its own accord because they’ll want more stuff happening, in the sense that it will seem to them to be the right thing to do.”
Here again, I understand the frustration but this language is way too demeaning of the public. You turn the public into a somewhat ignorant mass hooked to whatever is fashionable. Who is to say that the public does not see space exploration as useless. I think their day-to-day concern has grown as of late, don’t you think? And remember they have a direct application/enjoyment of their iPods and such. Nothing comes even close with human space exploration.
As to explaining what is what to whom, I don’t think anyone can with words. After those many years of space flight it still is very difficult for any astronaut to really explain the experience to those who stay on the ground. The only experience that I believe can approach it may be flying an airplane, not as a passenger but as a pilot. And probably aerobatics and probably somewhere in a vast, remote and uninhabitated place. Or maybe ocean diving… In any case those experiences can hardly be communicated via a set of rules. Rather someone with great (TBD) communication skills can only do that. It cannot be packaged or quantified. It is the human experience.
“Something about it appeals to things down deep that I believe nearly all humans share: the fun of learning, the adventure of exploring, the sense of accomplishment that stems from achieving difficult goals…even the sense of community (both the supportive and antagonistic interactions) inherent in a team effort.”
Yes to that we agree. But one must be included or at least has the vague feeling that one may be included – again see Virgin Galactic. Today the public at large is all but included in the space program. It looks like the unachievable goal. It looks so difficult that it feels, right or wrong, you may become a millionaire more easily than you can be part of this adventure.
The public must be in the equation. The public is the support. No-one in politics will go against the electoral public. No-one. Not for long anyway.
So here goes for an example: Start a Space Academy.
We have all sorts of military academies we can use as examples. Make a Space one, a CIVILIAN academy. Define a curriculum that if you can make it through you will be assured to be part of the space program. And as with any such academies there would be astronauts, engineers and whatever you like.
Is it that difficult?
Thank you, Major Tom, for your OMB info. I am now deeply mortified that I played on such a tired old cliche in my bad attempt at humor.
@common sense
“But one must be included or at least has the vague feeling that one may be included – again see Virgin Galactic.”
To counter this (or at least to reinforce my position….”vague feeling” can be open to interpretation…) I would cite something from my personal experience:
Quite a number of years ago, as I was pondering out loud these questions (why folks enjoy this but not that, in particular spectator sports vs space coverage) with my brother-in-law, he indicated that the only reason he enjoyed watching football so much and not spaceflight was that he related to football since he himself had played it back in high school.
So I countered with the question: Do you enjoy the Star Wars movies? Of course he did. So I asked him how many times he had actually fought a duel with a real light saber.
And thus my point was made: one need not participate directly and really in something to have it become one’s own. Every time a person reads a novel (or any compelling story) or watches a movie or documentary that grabs them, they become emotionally linked to the people in that story and through that link the material in the story becomes their own—they care about it.
I would LOVE to see a national lottery for a trip into space, at govt expense even, and I agree that your space academy idea has much merit (I’ve yet to hear of ANYONE who didn’t enjoy space camp), but I just don’t see such things entering at the level of the Augustine panel’s list of options.
In the meantime, those of us who are already caught up in the excitement of space travel all need to become better storytellers (libraries have been written about effective storytelling techniques across all media) for the sake of our fellow citizens whose exposure to spaceflight is currently through a very narrow, distorted filter, a filter which has deprived them of the opportunity to participate in it as we do…even when that participation may be as mere audience members.
And what’s really so wrong with that, to start with? When I leave the theater after seeing a great movie, I don’t feel excluded since I wasn’t the hero on the screen; on the contrary, I come away with the distinct impression that I WAS the hero on the screen…or at the very least, I shared in his or her adventure and celebrate their triumph because the storytelling skills of the writers, directors, and actors made that adventure my own through the emotional links they forged between me (an ordinary but fellow human) with the character(s).
Perhaps I’m too cynical, but I strongly suspect that in the current “space coverage” media environment, even a national lottery to fly someone to the space station for a week, open to anyone, wouldn’t make much inroads into the public’s consciousness. [And it ain’t the ISS as a destination that’s the problem here; if we had an established lunar base and it was to there, same difference].
Even the space tourists that pay their tens of millions barely get any coverage—just the usual 30-second mention on the news here and there. Do you really think that the mere chance of flying one or two “average” folks a year would seriously change that dynamic? Maybe, just maybe, if it became a weekly TV show a la Survivor, along with a matching promotional budget.
But in that circumstance, the fact that the folks getting to go had won a lottery to gain their seat into space becomes incidental to the drama of the mission preparation & execution itself…and right now, there already are “average folks” who ARE training for going into space, average folks who, like you and me, have families and insecurities and personality quirks and histories. They just happen to have higher degrees and/or military and/or technical backgrounds that they helped shape to put them into that seat into space.
If we can’t engage the public by drawing them into THEIR just-as-real drama (and I think we can), I don’t think the “average joe” angle will make a bit of difference…because most folks, once the lottery is over, would become mere spectators or audience members…just like they are today. Only today, we’re not engaging them with the story like we should.
@common sense (again):
“The public must be in the equation. The public is the support. No-one in politics will go against the electoral public. No-one. Not for long anyway.”
I agree with you wholeheartedly.
So let’s start with what we already have available, and draw the audience in more effectively. If we can get them to “leave the theater” feeling satisfied, I think we will move a long way toward winning them over and having them ask for more.
My point about a space academy is that it would kill several birds with one not so big stone: Education, inspiration, national pride, opportunities. Of course in order to have an effective academy we must have a correspondingly ambitious space program. But no I don’t think that the way we hire astronauts is any inspiring to anyone. No one today really question the existence of West Point but if my memory serves it was far from a done deal at least initially.
So imagine someone today in high school trying to work for the space program, let alone becoming an astronaut. How do they go about it? Well you must be the best. The best what? Engineer? And say you become the best engineer, is NASA really the place to work today? So basically you must become the best engineer (or whatever) to work at NASA to do… To do what? I mean related to human space exploration of course. Work your bottom off for a program that has good chance of being killed? Anyway, there is no glamour in working at NASA for the average public. Sure they (usually) respect you if you do but so what? And the same goes for the usual Defense contractors that work for NASA.
Unlike a movie, NASA is really real. Nobody dreams when they see a Shuttle launch for the 100 time. Nobody even understands what it takes to launch a Shuttle. According to NASA it is/was routine. Who cares about routine? Routine is when you commute to work. That is routine. How inspiring?
So there ought to be a grand scheme. Not Mars, not the Moon, not ISRU, not a new shuttle. Nobody cares. The grand scheme however will have to start small and grow. An academy might just well be the first stepping stone in that direction. Otherwise there will always only be the select few, and that is not inspiring any more, and that is that.
MAHONEY: If we can’t engage the public by drawing them into THEIR just-as-real drama (and I think we can), I don’t think the “average joe†angle will make a bit of difference…because most folks, once the lottery is over, would become mere spectators or audience members…just like they are today. Only today, we’re not engaging them with the story like we should.
This completely misses the point.
You are treating space as a “show” or “movie” in which the vast majority of the people are watching a few (one in a million) people get to go. It does not matter whether the lottery is by ticket, or by astronaut application. The result will be the same.
But if we begin treating space as a “frontier” that with smart and effective action could become open and available to the vast majority of the American people — who might earn enough during their lives to pay to go — or who could earn one of many jobs working on that frontier … then it will TOTALLY change how everybody thinks about space.
It stops being about the few — the one-in-a-million — getting to go on the backs of the millions, and becomes personal.
This is not a movie.
This is reality, and the American people deserve the opportunity to go. To quote Lincoln, we need a national space agenda that is “of the people, by the people, and FOR the people”.
I think the Augustine committee has gotten it exactly right — it is about expanding human civilization across the solar system.
FWIW,
– Al
@ Al:
“This is not a movie.”
For most people today, space IS essentially a movie, i.e., a spectator sport, and barely one at that: a 30-second “muted wow” that they occasionally see on the news or hear about from others.
MY point is not missing your point, it’s that I believe bringing about your scenario (which is my desired one, too) would be helped along immensely by making the spectator-sport opportunity that IS available today more engaging for more folks by putting it in front of them in smarter ways.
Launching hundreds or thousands of people into space isn’t feasible in the next two or three years, but inserting inspiring, well-crafted “NASA shorts” with spectacular space imagery into movie trailer line-ups is. If you can get enough people exposed to space material in ways that entertain them (and I use the term “entertain” in its broadest possible sense), then the larger the groundswell will become that demands more of the “real”.
Space exploration advocates need to create a better sales pitch if we are ever going to realize our dreams; I’m merely offering some thoughts on how to accomplish a portion of that task.
For most people today, space IS essentially a movie, i.e., a spectator sport, and barely one at that: a 30-second “muted wow†that they occasionally see on the news or hear about from others.
If that is the case (and I think it is for most of advocates in the human space flight community) then it would be far more cost effective for the government to make inspiring sci-fi films with the best special effects money can buy. Although I don’t have numbers to back it up, I’d bet that more people in the world are emotionally affected by the movies than with NASA. The fact that people voluntarily pay money to see movies, and must be coerced to do so for space probably means something.
I know that this line of reasoning is a stretch, but to justify a government investment because it is “inspiring,” touches on our visceral urges to explore…yatta….yatta…yatta just doesn’t sound right. It smacks of bread and circuses, and may actually indicate that we’ve passed our zenith and have begun our inexorable decline as a civilization.
@Bob Mahoney:
“Launching hundreds or thousands of people into space isn’t feasible in the next two or three years”.
I, for one, am not talking about even hundreds of people. You gotta start somewhere. Aviation did not fly hundreds of people initially, nor did the cruiseship industry. BUT you can get people to fly parabolic flights, high speed jets and suborbital flights as a first step. See Space Adventures or again Virgin Galactic. This does not necesarily come at great expense.
“Space exploration advocates need to create a better sales pitch if we are ever going to realize our dreams;”
This to me is a (slightly) separate issue but I do absolutely agree with you.
@sc220:
“If that is the case (and I think it is for most of advocates in the human space flight community) then it would be far more cost effective for the government to make inspiring sci-fi films with the best special effects money can buy. ”
No! No! No! This will keep space in the realm of fantasy for ever! It MUST become REAL for the average citizen!
As to associating “human space exploration” and “decline of civilization” I think that is a (little bit of a) stretch. There are other factors that should send red-flags WAY before the termination of HSF, like hunger in the country or lack of health care or greedy financial system ready to blow out the world to make a buck or two or… But HSF? Nah, that is a stretch.
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