Late Friday NASA released the 2009 report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. What attention the report has received has largely focused on its findings, including that no commercial vehicle developers are certified to meet NASA human safety standards (“despite some claims and beliefs to the contrary”), that it is “unwise and probably not cost-effective” to replace Ares 1 with any alternative vehicle “without demonstrated capability nor proven superiority (or even equivalence)”, and that extending the shuttle “significantly” is unwise without a thorough recertification of the vehicle.
These findings, though, are unsurprising, since they are similar to its 2008 report, which found that commercial vehicles “are not proven to be appropriate to transport NASA personnel” and that extending the shuttle not only posed an increased risk to crews, it “could jeopardize the future U.S. Exploration program by squeezing available resources (and, in the worst case, support) for the Constellation program.” If anything, ASAP’s criticism of commercial crew is a bit milder in the 2009 report, which is focused more on NASA for not moving fast enough to “develop and communicate the standards necessary for any COTS manufacturer if astronauts are to be transported on non-NASA vehicles.” On the other hand, ASAP’s support for Ares 1 is stronger in the 2009 report than in the 2008 one, which cautioned that Ares 1/Orion could not be accelerated significantly with additional funding because the agency needs “sufficient time to identify and resolve problems” during development.
There are a couple of interesting aspects of the ASAP report that have been less widely discussed. One is the timing of the report’s release. While the 2009 report came out Friday, the 2008 report was not published until mid-April of 2008; the 2007 report wasn’t released until August 2008. The acceleration from the 2007 to 2008 report can be explained by a switch in formats to a “brief, to-the-point letter report” ASAP said was warranted because the agency was at a “critical crossroads”. The further acceleration of report production between 2008 and 2009 isn’t explained in the report or accompanying media release, and it could be the result of further streamlined production processes. However, given the report’s effective endorsement of the so-called “program of record”, it’s likely supporters of that architecture will use this report to defend it should the White House and NASA decide to go in a different direction in the coming weeks.
The other interesting aspect of the report is that ASAP’s membership included, for half of 2009, Charles Bolden, who left ASAP after becoming NASA administrator. Bolden only attended the first of ASAP’s quarterly meetings; he apparently did not attend the second quarter meeting in April, and he left ASAP before the other two. The report includes the minutes from the four quarterly meetings, including this interesting passage from the first quarter meeting where then-ASAP-member Bolden is talking about risk, safety, and communicating those issues to the public:
General Bolden digressed to talk briefly about four overriding themes, specifically (1) foremost, a determination of how safe is safe enough; (2) the timing of NASA involvement in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program and in specification of human-rating requirements for COTS vendors, which has not yet been answered (good people are agreeing to disagree); (3) the level of ambiguity in the Constellation risk matrix and the granting of approval authority for hazard reports and risk acceptance to the project level rather than the program level (see recommendation ASAP-2009-01-03a) for one of the largest programs that NASA has ever developed and the first one that the Agency is integrating in decades, an approach that makes the Panel uncomfortable because reason demands that a higher level of approval in the design phase of an integrated project is essential for program oversight and accountability; and (4) the central issue of transparency and clarity when sharing information with the public, particularly the capability to comprehensibly describe the significant risk associated with space exploration.
Acknowledging that General Bolden raised an important point, [ASAP chairman] Admiral [Joseph] Dyer commented that the ASAP would recommend almost a new communications genesis. The ASAP suggested that the new Administration and the in-bound Administrator take time to consider a new approach that would explain not only the level and range of risk associated with space exploration, but also the importance of the work, the reward that justifies the risk, and the acceptance of that risk by willing and knowledgeable astronauts. The public discourse thus would be more direct and clearer, with less interpretation required. General Bolden agreed, contending that American citizens can handle difficult issues, so NASA should quit treating them as if they are children who do not understand, instead bringing them in as partners.
Will whatever new exploration policy chosen by the White House and NASA take that advice to better explain the risks and rewards of human spaceflight and bring in the public as “partners”?
The ASAP suggested that the new Administration and the in-bound Administrator take time to consider a new approach that would explain not only the level and range of risk associated with space exploration, but also the importance of the work, the reward that justifies the risk, and the acceptance of that risk by willing and knowledgeable astronauts. The public discourse thus would be more direct and clearer, with less interpretation required. General Bolden agreed, contending that American citizens can handle difficult issues, so NASA should quit treating them as if they are children who do not understand, instead bringing them in as partners.
Regarding the above excerpt, I”m going to guess that the new approach to communicating ‘safety’ to the private sector hasn’t happened yet, as Bolden is suggesting in the report. Meanwhile Space X is stating they can get to ISS with humans no problem. Seems they’ve figured this out all on thier own, w/o NASA ‘bringing them along’. Now, if Bolden does not create this new ‘way of communicating’ to the commercial sector the import and criteria for success of ‘safety’ and just goes ahead and turns over ISS re-supply to COTS, is he being duplicitous?
We seem to be making the assumption that NASA, or the Aerospace Safety Advisorty Panel, has a more effective approach to safety than SpaceX. Has anyone who believed that actually sat through the months of meetings where managers who never put hands on the hardware present reams of powerpoints and vote on whether a system is safe.
Risks in NASA documents are often calculated to two or three decimal places, but if you trace them all the way back to the origin they are just rough order-of-magnitute guesses, figures from specifications, or historical records of dissimilar designs.
Real reliability data comes from design and testing multiple times at the component and system level, and from hours o operation and number of launches. SpaceX will have a substantial number of cargo launches, probably at least ten, before any manned launch, and the additinal cargo launches it will get will allow it to maintain a launch rate at least twice that of the Ares. Moreover, SpaceX Falcon has a simple, clean sheet design with a very limited number of components, as does the Delta IV heavy.
Since when does Ares I satisfy the NASA human rating requirements? Ah yeah we can change the requirements until both converge. But then do we have to change them for Orion?
Both NASA and SpaceX are concerned about safety.
But anyone who’s been through a real NASA safety review or actually traced the origins of the scads of probabilities knows that NASA often has figures given to three decimal places that are based on 1) order of magnitude estimates with no supporting data, 2) arbitrary figures drawn from specifications rather than testing or analysis, or 3) historical records from highly dissimilar designs. The safety estimate for the Delta IV-H, which has no SRBs, was based on that of the Titan III, which has SRBs, while the Challenger was “not counted” in calculating the safety of the Ares SRB based on the historical record.
For example, in calculating the relative safety of the Delta IV-H and Arers, the LSAS used the safety record of the totally dissimilar Titan as an estimate for the Delta IV-H. Failures due tro the Titan SRBs were counted against the Delta, which does not even have SRBs. However to estimate Ares safety the Shuttle SRB was used, but 51-L was “not included”, so the safety record was 100%. One would have to be fairly naive to imagine that the authors of the report were not under pressure to find the Ares superior.
Real safety comes from extensive testing at the component and system level, and from experience in actual flight, because the failure modes that will kill you are the ones you didn’t predict. NASA safety assurance is unfortunately largely paperwork and organizational based on applying rather simplistic rules that make sense at the management level but not at the hardware level, and do not make it intrinsically safer than any commercial system. Additional flights for unmanned cargo, on the other hand, add to flight experience and make the Falcon and Delta safer.
One safety disadvantage that the Ares I configuration has relative to a DIRECT Jupiter vehicle is that its long term reliability has to be tested over the years strictly through manned launches– since there are no plans to use the Ares I as an unmanned cargo vehicle. The basic Jupiter configuration, on the other hand, would probably have more unmanned cargo or EDS launches than manned launches. So the long term reliability of the Jupiter would be tested by both manned and unmanned launches.
Also, the Jupiter would be using 4-segment SRBs that have not had any new fatal malfunctions in nearly a quarter of a century.
I read the HRR section of the report and found it so biased as to rank somewhere between political spin and fraud. What business does ASAP have commenting on the cost effectiveness of alternative architectures that it never had a chance to evaluate? The evaluated effect of NASA’s program of record is to prevent any American space exploration until at least 2030, probably killing the program at some point. (Ares I might launch before 2030, but it would have nowhere to go and nothing to do. All it would take to kill the entire program is for one Congress in 20 years to get sick of the obvious make work.)
The worst bias shows in the patently false claim that the safety of Ares I alternatives is based on “nothing more than unsubstantiated claims.” Some of the alternatives to Ares I have exemplary records of actual launches, while Ares I is mostly a bunch of computer files. So which is “unsubstantiated”? ASAP apparently believes that their familiar process applied to a nonexistent rocket is superior to actual launch histories supported by well-validated processes that were “not invented here.” If that is where ASAP stands, then it is time to disband it, or at least replace the current members.
Quoting Bolden: “so NASA should quit treating them as if they are children who do not understand, instead bringing them in as partners. ”
Okay, so Bolden wants NASA to stop treating the public like children and instead bring them in as partners.
In many businesses, the business partner usually has something at stake in the enterprise, brings money to the table, and has equal voice in the decision.
Hmm. So I guess that means at the next Agency Program Management Council (PMC) meeting (a.k.a. NASA’s top brass board of directors type meeting); that Admiral Bolden should have a few John. Q. Public’s in attendance, and like any business partner, they would have a say, a voice, a vote, influence,over decisions that Admiral Boldens PMC would make.
Right?
And I can see a Program or a Project having John. Q. Public sit on say, it’s Risk Management Board Meeting, it’s Configuration Control Board meeting, it’s Safety Board Meetings, etc. And in true partner fashion be an equal voice in decisions. Because, after all, they aren’t children.
Right?
NASA Fan wrote @ January 17th, 2010 at 6:43 am
in my view the people have sort of a voice at the safety table…and the Rasmussen poll (which leans right) more or less stated what they think…a majority feel that nothing much is worth the risk of human space exploration.
Americans dont flinch at death. We have sent over 4000 to their deaths in various wars since 9/11 and Americans only get upset when 1) the deaths are due to incompetence or 2) what they were told was the reason for them turns out to be false. They take that wrath out on their politicians.
For the life of me I cannot imagine what one would say people died for if it were in terms of returning to the Moon, going to Mars or a NEO…
The real exploration in This Republic right now is being done by people like Musk…people who are trying to find ways (explore) to create new jobs that can save The Republic.
Robert G. Oler
Not pointed out anywhere above, but I found the words on potential of robotics for support of human exploration in this annual report of some interest. This was identified as one of several “other critical issues”. It would seem that the panel was not completely satisfied with the response they got back from the agency when this was brought up before. NASA’s claim that telerobotics didn’t offer the necessary dexterity was not reflexively accepted by the panel. The theme was recultivated during a panel visit to JPL, where they were very impressed at what they saw. In summary
“The Panel continues to urge NASA to take a more open-minded and aggressive view towards using robots to reduce human risk whenever possible, consistent with mission accomplishment. This means using robots to replace humans on some missions and to support astronauts on others.”
“For robotics in support of human spaceflight, there are three basic areas: stand-alone, precursor for human activities, and systems embedded in the human infrastructure. This categorization of functions makes sense to the Panel.
and it sounds like we’ll be hearing more about this
“During 2010, the Panel will undertake a more in-depth assessment of NASA’s investment in and planning for using robots in place of and in support of human astronauts.”
So the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is going to start weighing in more strongly on what humans are actually needed for, and what they aren’t needed for. It’ll be interesting to see if the bottom line turns out to be that humans are needed because humans are wanted. I’m not sure they are chartered to go beyond that, really.
At least NASA is finaally seeing the light about their sidemount monstrosity… Took a little while but better safe than sorry so to speak.
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/01/bolden-review-hlv-friday-sidemount-doubt-in-linessme-boost/
“HLV study summary from (Mr) Hanley – Sidemount doesn’t buy anything and takes hit on safety. A couple of versions of In-line going to Bolden on Friday,†noted the memo (L2), which was part of a MOD managerial overview of recent activity.
Consider that one of those Ares alternatives, the Delta 4, will have 30 launches total between now and 2015, with 10 of those being “heavy lift” versions. That will be a total of 50 common booster cores and 30 upper stages before ever putting a manned capsule on top of one. Compare that with Ares 1 which will fly at the rate of 2 per year for ~20 years for a total of 40 vehicles, all of which will be manned. Basically, the delta will have a pretty good baseline of real reliability and safety data available before ever risking an astronaut’s life, while the Ares 1 will only have (heavily flawed) projections to fall back on.
I think it’s pretty obvious that the ASAP has their heads firmly planted in their rectums.
Musk’s response to ASAP, FWIW:
http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1001/19safety/