Interest in space among Florida’s congressional delegation has traditionally been limited to primarily those representatives from the state’s Space Coast region, plus senators like Bill Nelson with an interest in the topic. For example, when over two dozen representatives signed a letter to NASA last month alleging the agency was breaking the law by starting efforts to wind down Constellation, only two Florida representatives signed on: Suzanne Kosmas and Bill Posey. By comparison, two Utah representatives also signed the letter, but Utah has only three congressional districts to Florida’s 25.
Now, though, Florida’s delegation is showing a united front. In a letter to President Obama signed by both senators and all 24 current representatives (one district is currently vacant because of the resignation of Robert Wexler in January), they express their “deep concerns” about the NASA FY2011 budget request. They are concerned in particular about the effect the budget, if approved, would have on the state: “the plan NASA has laid out fails to provide a manageable transition of the workforce and is likely to repeat the mistakes that plagued Florida at the end of the Apollo program.”
The letter is vague, though, on specifics they would like to see changed in the budget, beyond a request that “the U.S. retains a domestic capability to take our astronauts to the ISS and to deliver hardware that will ensure its utilization through at least 2020.” That raises the question of how united Florida’s representatives will be when it comes time to turn those requests into specifics, including changing or adding funding to NASA to accomplish those goals.
It’s shameless isn’t it?
“the plan NASA has laid out fails to provide a manageable transition of the workforce and is likely to repeat the mistakes that plagued Florida at the end of the Apollo program.”
Not sure why this is surprising to the Florida delegation. The best way to prove the mistakes of the past were wrong…..is to repeat them.
And per the CAIB, “NASA isn’t a learning organization”. I would expand that to say “the Congress/WH/NASA/OMB/OSTP” dysfunctional mess is not a learning organization.
In the end, we’ll get what we intend. Too bad much of what we intend is subconsciously self destructive and competes with our higher selves.
Humans. We are an amazing lot.
The orginal administration plan is DOA. I said so quite a while back. The issue is what will the compromise be? The are two major ideas: the extend the shuttle plus commercial HSF. The other is to downsize Constellation to a system to support LEO operations. There are cased to by made for both.
John wrote @ March 5th, 2010 at 9:27 am
The orginal administration plan is DOA.
;;
lol. really watch how wrong you are…
Robert G. Oler
Sigh. While watching this slow motion train wreck (that is the attempt to change our government/commercial space mix), the lesson we should take is: when you turn a giant ship – it takes time. Like steering a C-5; those beasts don’t do aileron rolls!! Many management people are certainly watching this, like watching the Hindenberg crash, and taking notes for their next publication – “How To Really Make A Fool Of Yourself In Government”.
What ninny could think that they could gather around a desk in the Oval Office, re-write an 18 billion dollar program, and then surprise everyone on Friday afternoon before a Monday announcement? The government budget is painstakingly “rolled up” from the bottom, and a change (if well managed) is slow. This is the “earthquake” form of management, where we throw the entire government/commercial enterprise into turmoil and chaos, and then hope that they can get everyone working on the “new” program in a month!!
The busiest office in various NASA centers is the contracting/procurement office, where they are simultaneously trying to get ready to close out giant contracts, while remaining ready to extend some, move more around, get new ideas ready for new contracts, etc. Right now no one has any idea what they will be working on when the new fiscal year money is finally approved. The only certain thing is that the current contracts will be extended under the normal continuing resolution – while the budget is fought over. So the direction is to terminate Orion, for instance, but the contracts which specify deliveries will be in effect into January or February or March of 2011.
If Charlie Bolden truely supported the new direction he would never permit senior people in various Centers to officially develop an alternative! They should be using their time to implement the new direction!!
And many of our regular “contradictory” people will insert their oft-repeated mantra “it HAD to be done this way” or “look at my really warped plan from 5 years ago” etc. Some of them are evidently still resentful about being ignored.
The people who are really capable will see this giant screw up and recognize that it did not have to be this way.
The result of this whole fiasco is going to be months of paralysis. No one is going to know what is the real direction until maybe next February!
Either way of buying launch services (commercial or government led) would work! Flying people on Atlas or Delta would take advantage of using a common set of hardware – the Ares would be a low-production-rate booster at best. But rolling out a change in such an amateur and wasteful manner!!
“The orginal administration plan is DOA.”
If the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA is “DOA”, then why does the draft Senate FY 2011 authorization bill provide every dollar in every NASA account that the White House asked for?
If the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA is “DOA”, then why does the draft Senate FY 2011 authorization bill endorse commercial crew and cargo as the preferred means of ETO transport?
If the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA is “DOA”, then why does the draft Senate FY 2011 authorization bill extend ISS to 2020?
If the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA is “DOA”, then why does the draft Senate FY 2011 authorization bill seek HLV acceleration over Ares I/Orion?
If the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA is “DOA”, then why does the draft Senate FY 2011 authorization bill direct no funding to Constellation and reduces the program to a study about Ares I/Orion cost and operational effectiveness?
The draft Senate FY 2011 authorization bill for NASA has adopted every major human space flight element of the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA. Your DOA patient is alive and well with all major organs and functions intact.
“… I said so quite a while back.”
And that makes it true?
“extend the shuttle”
The Senate authorization bill adds this to the President’s budget request. It doesn’t substitute Shuttle extension for any of the other program content. The appropriators, who have to live within budget marks closer to the President’s budget, are unlikely to fund this add-on.
Moreover, it’s probably not doable on any realistic cost or useful schedule. The first-tier of Shuttle contractors have already let at least 2,000 workers go.
“The other is to downsize Constellation to a system to support LEO operations.”
There’s no funding for this in the Senate authorization bill.
FWIW…
“If Charlie Bolden truely supported the new direction he would never permit senior people in various Centers to officially develop an alternative!”
He didn’t. Per Bolden in Space News:
“… I did not ask anybody for an alternative to the President’s plan and budget. We have to be forward thinking and aggressive in our pursuit of new technologies to take us beyond low-Earth orbit, and the President’s plan does this. After years of underinvestment in new technology and unrealistic budgeting, we finally have an ambitious plan for NASA that sets the agency on a reinvigorated path of space exploration.â€
FWIW…
@Major Tom: how do we know that the President’s plan is DOA?
Because the NASA Administrator is permitting very senior people at the Centers to produce alternatives. If the Plan was going to go thru – those people would be busy implementing it. Right now all the middle level managers see one Plan from the President, and are being asked about alternatives by their immediate managers!
Any authorization bill is going to be endlessly debated – everyone in the government knows that the one we have today is very likely to be quite different when it is finally approved – next February? Next March?
Budget requests are not program direction, especially now. Between now and next Spring. we will not have a direction.
“Because the NASA Administrator is permitting very senior people at the Centers to produce alternatives.”
He’s not. Again, per Bolden in Space News:
“… I did not ask anybody for an alternative to the President’s plan and budget. We have to be forward thinking and aggressive in our pursuit of new technologies to take us beyond low-Earth orbit, and the President’s plan does this. After years of underinvestment in new technology and unrealistic budgeting, we finally have an ambitious plan for NASA that sets the agency on a reinvigorated path of space exploration.â€
Bolden very clearly wants his troops working on the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA, not on any alternative.
“Any authorization bill is going to be endlessly debated”
Well, duh…
Any position in Congress is endlessly debated. That doesn’t mean that every position is “DOA”.
“@Major Tom: how do we know that the President’s plan is DOA?”
The evidence shows that the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA is alive and well, not “DOA”. Congress is adopting it in legislation. The NASA Administrator is telling his troops to move out on it.
I don’t know if it stems from denial or just plain ignorance, but making “DOA” pronouncements when the patient is up and walking around is really goofy.
FWIW…
CharlesTheSpaceGuy wrote @ March 5th, 2010 at 10:46 am
not so much.
I see Major Tom has yet again addressed the issue of Bolden and Coats…most people commenting on the Coats thing simply seem to either 1) be in denial of what is happneing and what it means or 2) simply do not know.
this is how projects end in general and how they end in specific when the entire agency is wrapped up in that project(s). Particularly when the “buy in” has been for more then half a decade and the entire infrastructure of the agency is invested career wise etc in the entire affair.
Medocrity has been the rule at NASA human spaceflight; the folks at JSC and KSC and MSFC have skated from one debacle to another and aside from the Congressional reaction to the effort (which is nothing more then “save our jobs”) and the hangers on for the bush agenda…the effort is encountering stiff resistance in the management of NASA because to some extent people like Coats and Hanely and all the other gang of second raters recognize that their time is up in the new world.
Yes it was sprung out..but there really is no other way to do it. The trick in something like this is to move as fast as possible before the opposition “cements” support.. in other words the congressional folks who are at the various districts in spaceflight have to be overwhelmed before they can start gaining support in the non space groups…and the trick to do that is to kill off the programs before giving them something new to compare the programs to.
Problem is that most of the save ares people are either so partisan or politically unsophisticated (or both) that they cannot judge accurately the difference from simple ‘noise” and reality…and hence they try and make the noise seem like reality…this explains for instance why Whittington exaggerates every little scrap he can find of opposition.
Problem for the Ares huggers is that the alternate program is gaining traction because “the adults” in the House and Senate understand a few key points…the POR is simply non viable for the amount of money that anyone of importance wants to spend…and the shuttle is so far down the path of shutting down that there is a reasonable argument to keep going.
You can see how weak the “keep our program” people are by their personal attacks on Garver…that is all they have.
In the end this is how sausage is made; and Charlie Bolden has a reasonable amount of experience making it (although on a smaller scale) and is very competent.
That he is helped by political inepts like Coats…is useful…but Charlie is doing the lifting quite nicely.
Robert G. Oler
Last entry on this, don’t want to turn Jeff’s site into a one-on-one debate! Sorry, Jeff, for monopolizing the conversation.
Anyway, Major Tom shows that he very selectively chooses his evidence. He surely gets all his news from a web page or two, if he had read Andy Pasztor’s story in the Wall Street Journal on March 4th, the Major would have seen Mike Coats (Major Tom – Mike is JSC Center Director by the way) being quoted as saying that Charlie Bolden is permitting him to divert many senior managers to develop a Plan B.
A required quote: “In an email, Mr. Coats told senior managers at other centers and program offices that Mr. Bolden “agreed to let us set up a ‘Plan B’ team” to come up with alternate budget and program priorities.” So people at other Centers also must be helping. When we have people from multiple Centers working on alternatives to the Presidents proposal, instead of enthusiastically implementing it – we call the proposal Road Kill.
Those of us at the various Centers have “The Plan” and also layers of management directing people to go off and develop alternatives.
The result? Paralysis. Do we pay attention to an early version of a proposal, when we are months away from ever seeing that in an authorization bill? Or do we continue with the contracts in place – that will certainly be in place for almost a year?
Charlie Bolden may say that he did not ask for alternatives, but if his senior people work on those alternatives (while taking time away from implementing the official plan) – Charlie Bolden will not object.
That is the definition of a DOA plan – look it up in your “How To Not Run A Big Program” book.
“The orginal administration plan is DOA. I said so quite a while back. The issue is what will the compromise be? The are two major ideas: the extend the shuttle plus commercial HSF. The other is to downsize Constellation to a system to support LEO operations. There are cased to by made for both.”
No, not really. Cx wasn’t a home run for beyond LEO operations, but had some promise. For LEO, Cx was awful. Ares I has made a series of downgrades to capabilties and has been repeatedly restructured resulting in successive and unnecessary downgrades to Orion’s capability. In addition, it’s prohibitively expensive, even for beyond LEO operations.
There is another option to the current plan, though. I usually rail against Cx because that was the only on-record, NASA-owned alternative to the current plan. But if we get a serious in-house alternative to Ares I that didn’t require us to obliterate all other exploration programs and wait almost a decade to develop and operate it, I can see a NASA-developed and owned alternative working. As it is, no one is suggesting we find an affordable alternative for Ares I, it has been “keep it or toss it.”
So where’s the Jupiter or SDLC folks working on the LEO level? All the alternative proposals I’ve seen have focused on the HLV, which would be equally cost-prohibitive for LEO no matter what system was picked.
There’s justification for keeping Orion, and I feel strongly that we should. There can also be a case made for Ares V, though I think building the heaviest lift spacecraft ever by 25% is total overkill. But I don’t see any justification for keeping Ares I. It has been the #1 failing point for Cx for a very long time, and no matter what path we choose, it should be without Ares I.
CharlesTheSpaceGuy wrote @ March 5th, 2010 at 11:39 am
not so much again
There was little or nothing that was going to be done this year.
A standard Marine leadership “problem” is when “change” is occurring…announced change is to let “department heads” come up with their own version of the stated change…
how to implement, use resources etc…
why?
Because this lets the leadership and the leader then shift through the various plans and 1) you might find some good ideas there, 2) you defiantly find who doesnt have ideas that mesh with the proposed doctrine/concepts and 3) you figure out who is worth keeping and who is worth sending somewhere else to cause trouble.
This concept has been drummed into Bolden’s head since his Canoe U days…and he has executed it quite well in all the “cleaner” groups he has been a part of (including Cleaning up Canoe U) but particularly in his time at a MAW.
What amazes me really is that this is not obvious to most…it is textbook USMC leadership 101.
Robert G. Oler
“Anyway, Major Tom shows that he very selectively chooses his evidence.”
I didn’t choose anything selectively.
I went with the latest, direct quote from Bolden about what direction he wants the agency to go in. Here it is again:
“… I did not ask anybody for an alternative to the President’s plan and budget. We have to be forward thinking and aggressive in our pursuit of new technologies to take us beyond low-Earth orbit, and the President’s plan does this. After years of underinvestment in new technology and unrealistic budgeting, we finally have an ambitious plan for NASA that sets the agency on a reinvigorated path of space exploration.â€
Bolden very clearly states that Coats’ email is in error and that he wants his troops working to the President’s FY 2011 budget request.
You’re going with an email from a center director who, on hearsay, makes claims about what Bolden said that Bolden has since stated were wrong.
Don’t accuse other posters of being selective about evidence when you’re the one ignoring a direct quote from the Administrator and going with hearsay in an email from a center director.
“So people at other Centers also must be helping.”
But they aren’t. Bolden told them he wants them working to the President’s FY 2011 budget request. What part of “I did not ask anybody for an alternative to the President’s plan and budget” and “We have to be forward thinking and aggressive in our pursuit of new technologies to take us beyond low-Earth orbit, and the President’s plan does this” don’t you understand?
“Do we pay attention to an early version of a proposal, when we are months away from ever seeing that in an authorization bill?”
The President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA is in the Senate FY 2011 authorization bill already.
The Senate FY 2011 authorization bill provides every dollar in every NASA account that the White House asked for.
The Senate FY 2011 authorization bill endorses commercial crew and cargo as the preferred means of ETO transport.
The Senate FY 2011 authorization bill extends ISS to 2020.
The Senate FY 2011 authorization bill seeks HLV acceleration over Ares I/Orion.
The Senate FY 2011 authorization bill directs no funding to Constellation and reduces the program to a study about Ares I/Orion cost and operational effectiveness.
The draft Senate FY 2011 authorization bill for NASA has adopted every major human space flight element of the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA.
What part of this don’t you understand?
“Or do we continue with the contracts in place – that will certainly be in place for almost a year?”
You do what the NASA Administrator told you to do. He’s your ultimate boss.
Duh…
And if you can’t in all good conscience do that — if you’re going to drag your feet over hearsay in an email when the NASA Administrator has told you to move out — then resign you position and work someplace else.
Why is this so hard to understand?
“if his senior people work on those alternatives (while taking time away from implementing the official plan) – Charlie Bolden will not object.”
Bolden did object. He told his troops that he wants them working to the President’s FY 2011 budget request. Again, what part of “I did not ask anybody for an alternative to the President’s plan and budget” and “We have to be forward thinking and aggressive in our pursuit of new technologies to take us beyond low-Earth orbit, and the President’s plan does this” don’t you understand?
“That is the definition of a DOA plan – look it up in your ‘How To Not Run A Big Program’ book.”
I have never authored such a book.
Lawdy…
“If Charlie Bolden truely supported the new direction he would never permit senior people in various Centers to officially develop an alternative!â€
Ah! And I am sure they are ready to pack. I believe more and more that this was started without his knowledge and he is doing damage control. Considering what the constellation huggers have been up to recently I don’t think it is that far fetched. If those people think they will be saved by Congress just watch. Sad sad sad.
I can see a NASA-developed and owned alternative working.
I can see it working rather like the last two, Shuttle and Ares.
“But if we get a serious in-house alternative to Ares I”
Unlikely in the extreme.
Atlas Exists.
Delta exists.
Falcon 9 in on the pad.
Taurus II is 18 months away.
That’s 4 US LV’s that can carry cargo or crew to LEO.
So NASA should develop a fifth?
Why?
Likewise crew vehicles.
Dragon exists. Just needs LAS.
Boeing/Bigelow are already working on a commercial vehicle under CCdev as are other groups including Dreamchaser.
Is there any need for a NASA built crew vehicle?
No.
Of course if anyone wanted to develop Orion as a commercial vehicle…
“So NASA should develop a fifth?
Why?”
I agree with you, Fred. But there are those on here and out there that feel that private industry is somehow entirely incapable of making it happen. So if they’re really going to raise an issue over it, all I’m saying is let’s see the alternative. I’m up for a better gov’t run option for LEO access if there’s one to be had. But so far none is in the offing. At least none that won’t underperform while at the same time completely devouring our exploration budget.
aremisasling,
There is no “private industry” as related to HSF. No private market.
Kiss the whole notion off.
It’s a bunch of contractors like SpaceX fighting for NASA’s funds.
“There is no “private industry†as related to HSF. No private market.”
Simply not true. Using private funds, eight individuals have purchased Soyuz rides through Space Adventures at prices of $20-35 million each. That’s a market with about $240 million in revenue to date.
Space Adventures also has an Orbital Mission Explorers Circle where an unknown (at least to me) number of individuals have made $5 million reservations to have priority on future flights. This indicates that the market has some amount of unmet demand.
No doubt, the future size and sustainability of private human space flight markets are TBD. But it’s false to claim that there is no market today.
FWIW…
“There is no ‘private industry’ related to HSF. No private market.”
So you say.
Yet Virgin Galactic has hundreds of paid deposits for flight slots on their SpaceShip 2. They also have built White Knight 2 and SpaceShip 2 and are ready to start flight testing.
Bigelow has already orbited two prototype modules for his private space station.
Boeing is developing a manned capsule to support the Bigelow space station.
ULA is man-rating the Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicles.
Manned spaceflight is attracting millions of dollars of private money. I wonder why that unsettles so many people.
Mike
SpaceShip 1 or 2 have nothing to do with human Space flight. I.e. orbital. Virgin Galactic or its ‘orders’ has nothing to do with Human Space Flight.
What Bigelow station? Where is it and when was it launched?
“Man-rating” is a silly notion. If a rocket/launcher is good enough for highly expensive unmanned payloads it’s good enough for a manned one.
If they “attract millions of dollars”, why do they need NASA to hold their hand?
“SpaceShip 1 or 2 have nothing to do with human Space flight. I.e. orbital. Virgin Galactic or its ‘orders’ has nothing to do with Human Space Flight.”
This is actually totally false. Space is defined by altitude or height not velocity. You could orbit at 50 km yet not be in Space, or you could go suborbital at 110 km and be in Space. Get your facts straight it’ll help make your case.
Oh well…
Maybe you should check your facts but Space is not defined as orbital vs. suborbital. “The Fédération Aéronautique Internationale has established the Kármán line at an altitude of 100 kilometres (62 mi) as a working definition for the boundary between aeronautics and astronautics. This is used because above an altitude of roughly 100 km, as Theodore von Kármán calculated, a vehicle would have to travel faster than orbital velocity in order to derive sufficient aerodynamic lift from the atmosphere to support itself.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outer_space)
“What Bigelow station? Where is it and when was it launched?”
Genesis I was launched on 12 Jul 06…
http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/genesis_I/
…and Genesis II was launched 28 Jun 07…
http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/genesis_II/
Bigelow’s full-up space station is on-hold waiting for a crew vehicle to service it. Hence their interest in the Boeing capsule:
http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/news/
The ARRA CCDev contract mentioned there requires at least a match of funds from non-NASA sources, so Boeing / Bigelow are putting at least $18 million of their own money into it.
Mike