Other, White House

Space transportation policy review underway

Nearly a year after the release of an overall national space policy, the Obama Administration is starting a review of “sectoral” policies, starting with the national space transportation policy. In his remarks opening the meeting of the FAA’s Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) in Washington yesterday, FAA associate administrator for commercial space transportation George Nield stated that the first interagency policy committee meeting regarding updating the policy took place on Tuesday. The policy was last updated by the George W. Bush Administration in December 2004 in a document officially designated NSPD-40. “It’s been several years since that was put out, and things have changed, so we want to look through what we have and see if the existing environment warrants some modifications to the policy,” Nield said.

In a presentation later in the meeting, representatives of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council, who are jointly running the policy review, provided some more details. The review of the policy is just getting started, they noted, with a target of completing the review in four to five months, although they cautioned that timeline is subject to delays. “Issues come up, there are challenges that you have to work through,” Damon Wells of OSTP said. That work would be followed later by reviews of other sectorial policies covering commercial remote sensing and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT).

Because the review is in its earliest stages, officials said they weren’t sure yet if the review would result in just tweaks to the 2004 policy or a wholesale rewriting. “It’s useful to look at that document for tone and for the level of detail,” Wells said, but added it was too soon to say what level of changes would be made to the policy. “We’ve got to go through the conversation first.”

One thing the administration is doing upfront is to solicit input from industry. As part of the interagency review, the FAA asked COMSTAC to provide a 10-page paper later this month; they are also accepting two-page addenda from companies that want to address specific topics. Some of the items that COMSTAC considered in a working group meeting Tuesday that may work their way into that final paper include support for NASA’s commercial crew development effort and the FAA licensing of launches of missions carried out under that program, adding a section of the policy to specifically address suborbital spaceflight activities, and support for technology development and improvement of ground systems, range infrastructure, and in-space propulsion technologies.

26 comments to Space transportation policy review underway

  • Vladislaw

    From NSPD-40:

    “To exploit space to the fullest extent, however, requires a fundamental transformation in U.S. space transportation capabilities and infrastructure. In that regard, the United States Government must capitalize on the entrepreneurial spirit of the U.S. private sector, which offers new approaches and technology innovation in U.S. space transportation, options for enhancing space exploration activities, and opportunities to open new commercial markets, including public space travel. Further, dramatic improvements in the reliability, responsiveness, and cost of space transportation would have a profound impact on the ability to protect the Nation, explore the solar system, improve lives, and use space for commercial purposes. While there are both technical and budgetary obstacles to achieving such capabilities in the near term, a sustained national commitment to developing the necessary technologies can enable a decision in the future to develop such capabilities.”

    [ It looks to me like President Obama is only trying to fulfill the NSPD that was presented by President Bush in 2004. I hope this section gets strengthed under this Administration. ]

    Under the section below it states that the policy of the United States should be FOCUSED on technology, something President Obama tried to do in the 2010 budget request, again simply trying to follow established policy.

    “III. Transformation of Space Transportation Capabilities
    1) The United States shall sustain a focused technology development program for next-generation space transportation capabilities to transform U.S. access to and use of space. In that regard, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in cooperation with industry as appropriate, shall:
    a) Within two years of the date of this policy, develop the requirements, concept of operations, technology roadmaps, and investment strategy for next-generation space transportation capabilities with the objective of dramatically improving the reliability, responsiveness, and cost of Earth-to-orbit space transportation for deployment of spacecraft and other payloads in Earth orbit, exclusive of human space flight; and
    b) Pursue research and development of in-space transportation capabilities to enable responsive space transportation capabilities and the transformation of the Nation’s ability to navigate in space. These efforts shall include, but not be limited to: automated rendezvous and docking, and the ability to deploy, service, and retrieve payloads or spacecraft in Earth orbit. The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in cooperation with the Secretary of Energy and other departments and agencies as appropriate, shall pursue research and development of space nuclear power and advanced propulsion technologies to more quickly, affordably, and safely expand the reach of exploration into the solar system and beyond.”

    { I believe building Nautalus would be the ticket for establishing in-space capability, along with fuel depots/stations. ]

    “IV. Commercial Space Transportation
    1) The United States Government is committed to encouraging and facilitating a viable U.S. commercial space transportation industry that supports U.S. space transportation goals, benefits the U.S. economy, and is internationally competitive. Toward that end, United States Government departments and agencies shall:
    a) Purchase commercially available U.S. space transportation products and services to the maximum extent possible, consistent with mission requirements and applicable law;
    b) Provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment for licensing commercial space launch and reentry activities;
    c) Maintain, subject to periodic review and the competitiveness of U.S. industry, the liability risk-sharing regime for U.S. commercial space transportation activities set forth in the Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended (49 USC, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701), including provisions for indemnification by the United States Government;
    d) Refrain from conducting activities with commercial applications that preclude, deter, or compete with U.S. commercial space transportation activities, unless required by national security;
    e) Involve the U.S. private sector in the design and development of space transportation capabilities to meet United States Government needs;
    f) Provide stable and predictable access to the Federal space launch bases and ranges, and other government facilities and services, as appropriate, for commercial purposes on a direct-cost basis, as defined in the Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended (49 USC, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701). The United States Government reserves the right to use such facilities and services on a priority basis to meet national security and critical civil mission requirements;
    g) Encourage private sector and state and local government investment and participation in the development and improvement of space infrastructure, including non-Federal launch and reentry sites; and
    h) Provide for the private sector retention of technical data rights in acquiring space transportation capabilities, limited only to the extent necessary to meet United States Government needs.

    2) The Secretary of Transportation shall license and have safety oversight responsibility for commercial launch and reentry operations and for operation of non-Federal launch and reentry sites, as set forth in the Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended (49 USC, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701), and Executive Order 12465. The Secretary of Transportation shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other United States Government departments and agencies, as appropriate.
    a) The Secretaries of Transportation and Defense shall establish common public safety requirements and other common standards, as appropriate, taking into account launch vehicle type and concept of operation, for launches from Federal and non-Federal launch sites. The Secretaries of Transportation and Defense shall coordinate these requirements with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and other departments and agencies as appropriate.
    3) The Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation shall encourage, facilitate, and promote U.S. commercial space transportation activities, including commercial human space flight.”

    I don’t understand how it can be made any more clear what the policy of the U.S.A. is when it comes to commercial space. Windy keeps blowing hot air but it is sitting in front of him in black and white on what policy congress and the President are directed and the direction we are heading.

  • Bob Mahoney

    What’s written as official policy, sadly, is always open to interpretation.

    The original VSE, which helped in part to shape the sections of the policy you quote (and whose underpinnings still make lots of sense), truly was a viable vision for a long-term strategy, especially since it aimed to provide a framework for technical development/advancement with concrete goals & milestones.

    And yet, less than a year later, somehow (we all know how…) it got corrupted into the ESAS/Constellation juggernaut that seemed intent on blowing away half (more than half, really) of all the best parts of the original vision and subsequent policy…and yet that policy remained on the books, and Constellation was touted as the proper technical response to the VSE.

    Washington doesn’t work like the real world…much to the detriment of many things.

  • guest

    Well what Is needed now is not only a review of the transportation policy, but a plan for what NASA needs to be doing and where the Administration wants space (commerce, the industry, corporate America, international partnerships…) to go in the future, refuting the Vision if needed but definitely what is needed is the big picture plan, otherwise everyone can argue til the moon turns blue, and we will not know whether what we are doing is the right thing.

  • amightywind

    The President’s NASA proposal was such a muddle that codifying it in a policy is an utter waste of time. It is yet another transparent attempt for the leftists to erase the Bush name from all obelisks in Washington. The VSE clearly still influential in congress, and that is an irritant to Newspace.

  • The Augustine panel attempted to provide that, but the porkers in Congress rejected it like a bad transplant.

  • Coastal Ron

    amightywind wrote @ May 12th, 2011 at 10:02 pm

    The VSE clearly still influential in congress, and that is an irritant to Newspace.

    As an aspirational document (i.e. lacks the force of law), I’m OK with the VSE. Although from your comment, I don’t think you know what it says – here are it’s four major goals:

    • Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond;

    • Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations;

    • Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and

    • Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.

    What’s not to like? The only word that I objected to was the “2020” date, and for two reasons:

    1. It was a meaningless date, and meaningless dates do nothing but cause confusion (i.e. like you and many others experience).

    2. It forced NASA to make decisions based on how quickly we could get to the Moon, instead of the best and most sustainable architecture (not to mention less costly). If you read the write-ups about the initial Constellation plan, a lot of their choices were due to “this was the fastest way we could think of” type decisions.

    But I don’t think most of Congress could tell you what the VSE says, which is not surprising, since most don’t follow what an agency that consumes only 0.5% of the Federal Budget does in detail.

  • Bob Mahoney

    While I agree that the 2020 date was arbitrary, it wasn’t so unreasonable back in 2004 (16 years away) until someone sucked all the money out of the budget trying to build large unneeded rockets for an imposed 40-year-old disposable architecture instead of focusing on a truly open CEV competition that might have actually had innovative hardware flying by 2014-15.

    More important, though, is the danger of not assigning any date at all to critical milestones. Any development program without target dates is bound to accomplish little, because like defining particular objectives, defining particular target dates provides a necessary constraint for making actual decisions with actual hardware versus never-ending viewgraph engineering. Look at any tough technical govt program in history that accomplished something (e.g., Apollo, Nautilus), and you’ll see that it carried both a very specific very clear objective and a relatively firm completion date for that objective marked in red on the calendar.

    2020 might have been a poor choice for a VSE target date for lunar return for the reason you cite (too early), but I would hold that NO date would have been just as big a mistake…which is kind of where we are now but worse, since we have no specific date nor any specific objectives/milestones defined.

    Such a framework is the bureaucrat’s perfect environment: nothing specific required to accomplish, with no deadlines to meet. Folks who bemoan that we ‘wasted’ 30 years going around in circles with the shuttle, will absolutely LOVE how we spend the next 10-30 years going round and round the conference room with ever-improving mission design variations that never actually produce flight hardware.

  • common sense

    @ Bob Mahoney wrote @ May 13th, 2011 at 1:59 pm

    “versus never-ending viewgraph engineering.”

    Even though I tend to agree with you here, the VSE had such dates. Yet Constellation, its implementation, failed in every record. The dates, deadlines are no longer enough. Why would you think they did not have any hard dates in FY-11? My guess is that they very well knew it was pointless the way NASA stands today. Would you agree that SLS and MPCV only are made up jobs programs? That there is not enough money associated with them to actually ever see either fly? The problem is how you change a jobs program into an exploration program. And as its organization stands today NASA no longer has an exploration program except in words, even during Constellation, more so during Constellation.

    Here is my take. No date? Well it will take time to go through a significant reorg at NASA and no one knows how long since Congress is dragging their feet kicking and screaming. Once the reorg is (close to) complete then I suspect you will see those dates again. Once we actually have a better grasp of the actual capabilities will dates make sense again. Especially that today and unlike Apollo and Nautilus there is absolutely no reason to rush.

    “Folks who bemoan that we ‘wasted’ 30 years going around in circles with the shuttle, will absolutely LOVE how we spend the next 10-30 years going round and round the conference room with ever-improving mission design variations that never actually produce flight hardware.”

    See this only is part of the problem as you describe. All the while commercial space may make progress, enough progress that by the time the people at the helm at NASA HSF realize it then it’ll be too late. More proofs: The new “DIRECT” version of SLS that seems to be considered. They could not make Ares 1 but they will get a more complicated bigger LV in 5 years? What when Congress cuts a little more in 2012? 2013?…

    Anyway. Unlike what others may think I do feel your pain. But sometime you have to go through immense pain to come back to life. And so will it be for NASA.

  • Dennis Berube

    I think when all is said and done, if Musk can get his heavy lifter off successfully, if may change the face of spaceflight. I do believe in the end, that NASA will continue on with Orion, no matter what, whether they get their heavy lift vehicle remains to be seen.

  • Bennett

    “I think when all is said and done, if Musk can get his heavy lifter off successfully, if may change the face of spaceflight.”

    Do you ever read your own comment before clicking the “submit” button?

    The sentence I quoted is about as muddled as it gets, Dennis. How can anything be “all said and done” when the rest of the statement is based on one “if” and one “may”?

    This forum deserves clearer thinking than that.

  • Bob Mahoney

    @common sense

    Strangely enough (given our previous exchanges), I find myself agreeing with most of what you said here. Your one analytical error, as far as I see things, is to equate the original VSE under Steidle with the ESAS-shaped Constellation. That the former was transformed into the latter was, IMHO, the greatest space-related error (and yes, it was a big one) under the purview of the GWB administration. My suggestions of potential VSE successes above spoke to the pre-Griffin approach.

    An NACA-like NASA may be the best chance for a future of substantial and worthwhile space exploration (the still-operative word being ‘may’…the idea hasn’t been proven), but the chances of getting to that new paradigm [and it would be a new one, since NACA was essentially (>98% I’d bet) all aeronautics from 1915-1958, whereas NASA space has always had an operational component] are very slim for substantial reasons, some of which I described in my ‘prognostication’ Space Review essay early last year (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1594/1).

    I seriously doubt that the US as a nation is prepared emotionally (for lack of a better word) to abandon the ‘US astronauts flying & exploring in US spacecraft’ model. And, more substantially, govt institutions, once established, are extremely difficult to uproot or significantly change. While this or that program may get killed (don’t we know it), the institution that is NASA HSF is probably here to stay thanks to typical govt bureaucratic inertia.

    The one thing that just might override these factors, whether or not it truly is wise to do so and thus enable an ‘NACA regression’, is the depth of the current economic crisis (even if the entire NASA budget is less than the oil company tax breaks…). But if I were a betting man, I’d still put my wager on (given the nature of people, politicians, and govt) the survival of a NASA HSF akin to the current model (JSC mission control, KSC assembly of govt-owned govt-designed vehicles, civil servant astronaut cadre, etc).

    Whether or not this evolved-over-50-years-and-many-tentacled arrangement can be streamlined to successfully ‘compete’ (I use the term loosely, to include the capture of the public’s imagination) with the burgeoning (we hope) commercial space industry without harming or inhibiting said commercial industry’s growth…I just don’t know. That the current administration was unable to pull it off (and it sure seemed like it wanted to) when its own political party held majorities in both houses of Congress suggests not—or, at the very least, that it will indeed be an extremely difficult task.

  • That the current administration was unable to pull it off (and it sure seemed like it wanted to) when its own political party held majorities in both houses of Congress suggests not—or, at the very least, that it will indeed be an extremely difficult task.

    You underestimate how unimportant space is, politically, other than the pork.

  • Bob Mahoney

    No I don’t, Rand. In fact, its unimportance folds into my point. While space remains far under the radar of “major national concerns”, the status quo is still so entrenched (if only by being a long-established govt institution) that even something of so small a political concern remained mostly impervious to an attempt by the WH to revamp it from the bottom up, to the point that the WH back-tweaked its own policy by re-instating Orion development and then conceding the Senate’s further mods to its own intended changes, leaving the country (and the institutional status quo) with what could best be described as the tattered entrails of Constellation.

    While it’s likely that the WH’s political heart wasn’t (and isn’t) truly in the fight because of its unimportance (except for how it might relate to votes in key 2012 states), nonetheless the cracked foundations of the status quo remain—at least for now—even if the fragmented programs they underlie are aimed in no particular direction.

  • common sense

    @Bob Mahoney wrote @ May 13th, 2011 at 6:45 pm

    “Strangely enough (given our previous exchanges), I find myself agreeing with most of what you said here.”

    You know I think it is a very emotional issue probably to you and I hence the easy misunderstanding. I remember once I thought you supported Constellation even though you did not and rightfully pointed me to your article on line. I also think possibly we do not see the same solution to this problem. Anyway.

    “Your one analytical error, as far as I see things, is to equate the original VSE under Steidle with the ESAS-shaped Constellation. That the former was transformed into the latter was, IMHO, the greatest space-related error (and yes, it was a big one) under the purview of the GWB administration. My suggestions of potential VSE successes above spoke to the pre-Griffin approach.”

    No here I think you misinterpreted what I said. I know very well what the VSE is and Constellation. VSE was a good start, despite the timeline, unrealistic. I also think that had we followed Steidle spiral approach then we would not have any of this debate. A CEV would have been flying atop an EELV by now. Constellation was, is a tragedy that we are all paying. From this failure I believe the only option is a commercial approach so to speak. CCDev is much closer to the original intent of the VSE than Constellation ever was. SLS and MPCV is another tragedy in the making for NASA HSF. It is simply idiotic to try a program without enough funds. And Congress will never give more.

    “An NACA-like NASA may be the best chance for a future of substantial and worthwhile space exploration (the still-operative word being ‘may’…the idea hasn’t been proven), but the chances of getting to that new paradigm [and it would be a new one, since NACA was essentially (>98% I’d bet) all aeronautics from 1915-1958, whereas NASA space has always had an operational component] are very slim for substantial reasons, some of which I described in my ‘prognostication’ Space Review essay early last year (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1594/1).”

    I think we agree here. A NASA style NASA probably is best today. I also think that it will be done with great pain. I think the denial of some of the leadership at NASA is telling. You’ll see. It is going to hurt, but it will be a slow death.

    “I seriously doubt that the US as a nation is prepared emotionally (for lack of a better word) to abandon the ‘US astronauts flying & exploring in US spacecraft’ model. And, more substantially, govt institutions, once established, are extremely difficult to uproot or significantly change. While this or that program may get killed (don’t we know it), the institution that is NASA HSF is probably here to stay thanks to typical govt bureaucratic inertia.”

    I think I am with you about the public. BUT inasmuch as they did not know we were supposedly headed back to the Moon if NASA HSF disappears, slowly at that, they will not see the difference. Especially that NASA astronauts will keep flying, for a while, on Soyuz and there ill still be an ISS for years to come. When this activity stops and if there is no commercial success then be prepared, NASA HSF will be done if not for ever for the foreseeable future.

    “The one thing that just might override these factors, whether or not it truly is wise to do so and thus enable an ‘NACA regression’, is the depth of the current economic crisis (even if the entire NASA budget is less than the oil company tax breaks…). But if I were a betting man, I’d still put my wager on (given the nature of people, politicians, and govt) the survival of a NASA HSF akin to the current model (JSC mission control, KSC assembly of govt-owned govt-designed vehicles, civil servant astronaut cadre, etc).”

    Here we disagree on the outcome of the crisis. I think the economical crisis will plainly kill government type programs. For sure they will keep the workforce for some time. After all the government ought to help its citizens, even though it feels like the NASA crowd think they are entitled to this job which is unfair to most Americans. But we are not there, not quite.

    “Whether or not this evolved-over-50-years-and-many-tentacled arrangement can be streamlined to successfully ‘compete’ (I use the term loosely, to include the capture of the public’s imagination) with the burgeoning (we hope) commercial space industry without harming or inhibiting said commercial industry’s growth…I just don’t know. That the current administration was unable to pull it off (and it sure seemed like it wanted to) when its own political party held majorities in both houses of Congress suggests not—or, at the very least, that it will indeed be an extremely difficult task.”

    Well let me remind you that the former WH had Congress too, yet they were unable to succeed with Constellation. It is not an issue related to who is in power but rather that NASA HSF really is a jobs program that is affordable, not HSF the jobs program is, at about $10B/yr. And that is that. Don’t you start to see all the signs of cuts to come? I do and again it will hurt and NASA will have a major reorg which I believe has already started.

    We’ll see.

  • common sense

    @ Bob Mahoney wrote @ May 14th, 2011 at 1:28 pm

    “While it’s likely that the WH’s political heart wasn’t (and isn’t) truly in the fight because of its unimportance (except for how it might relate to votes in key 2012 states), ”

    I think you overestimate that by orders of magnitude. Compare it with Medicare even in those states…

  • Bob Mahoney

    I don’t think I do, Rand. I just know this WH doesn’t make ANY move, in any area, without political calculation…and no, I don’t accept that all WH administrations do so, at least not to the intense degree this one does.

    cs, I’m sure you meant “an NACA style NASA” would work best today, not “a NASA style NASA.” While I may question your grasp of the most current thinking regarding evolution, I’m gonna give you the benefit of the doubt on basic sentence logic. ;-)

    And while I had more faith in the Steidle program’s approach than the ESAS Constellation, I’m not as certain as you are suggesting you are that we’d already have a CEV flying atop an EELV by now. Perhaps, and I like to think that at a minimum we’d be darn close if not already there, but…you never know. We are talking about Washington. One can imagine that the current WH might have squashed even that effort just shy of the demonstration flights.

    Yes, the former WH had both Houses…but then O’Keefe departed for LSU and in came Griffin to ESAS everything. What a terrible shame of a lost opportunity. At least O’Keefe knew what he didn’t know…

    As for CCDev being much closer to the original VSE in terms of intent, yes in terms of LEO access. But CCDev is blatantly ignoring beyond-LEO applications/growth whereas the spirals of the original VSE always had ‘going beyond’ as a fundamental guiding principle behind the decisions they were making. [I think the old terminology is ‘scarring the design’ to make it open to future applications/enhancements. A major difference between their approach and Constellation’s was Constellation’s attempt to front-load ALL the capability on the first set of hardware, especially the S/C; Steidle’s team appreciated the cost-sense of tackling the requirements gradually but not closing out future options.] Today’s oversight appears to be perfectly happy to keep such long-term planning out in the hazy future for someone else to deal with, which means no real planning (or consideration in the design or architecture) at all.

    And this has always been my greatest fear. Without a commitment to a roadmap to somewhere (my preference being to everywhere in the SS through lunar ISRU et al a la the original VSE), space exploration may not survive past the demise of ISS, because once the purpose of the CCDev is fulfilled (ISS access), like Apollo after Neil set foot on the Moon, the program (and the will behind it) could evaporate.

    And not just for lack of a govt-led effort; the public’s interest (what little still hides out there) might fade to nothing, or become actively hostile. I do not know if a commercial-only industry will be able to make the leap to lunar operations without a significant govt baseline capability (and I’m not just talking spacecraft & rockets) paving the way. While NASA’s way of doing things has been expensive, one thing it has done (perhaps to a dangerous degree, in terms of creating false perceptions) through 50+ years of making it happen is to make it look easier than it really is. SpaceX’s successes are wonderful and Bigelow’s plans are grand, but space ops truly are unforgiving, and one thing all that slogging bureaucracy does (as painful as it is to acknowledge) is to offer levels of safety and redundancy. Getting to the first 95% level of safety is straightforward and relatively easy engineering; it’s that last 4.9% that costs the REAL money… And you can’t cite airline experience for comparison; flying in the stratosphere is orders of magnitude less challenging than getting to & from (and surviving in ) orbit…and beyond is even tougher.

    Will CCDev (and the commercial industry as a whole) survive a crew fatality? While the old NASA way of doing things may go away (perhaps even completely) because of economic pressure, I truly wonder if US HSF might die completely as well if the alternative route we’re all betting on (private industry) loses more than just a rocket or an uncrewed payload.

    As I had indicated, an NACA-style NASA may be the proper route. But I have serious reservations about tossing away capabilities when we aren’t quite sure that it is the best (or even a long-term viable) route.

    But as you noted, we shall see…

  • I do not know if a commercial-only industry will be able to make the leap to lunar operations without a significant govt baseline capability (and I’m not just talking spacecraft & rockets) paving the way.

    I’m quite confident it can, and will, given the people involved.

    Will CCDev (and the commercial industry as a whole) survive a crew fatality?

    CCDev may not, given the number of people who intrinsically oppose it who will use this as an excuse to kill it if they can, but it won’t slow down the commercial industry as a whole, any more than airline fatalities have ever substantially damaged the airline industry.

  • Bob Mahoney

    Rand,

    I hope your palantir sees clearly and is not overly influenced by Sauron.

  • common sense

    @ Bob Mahoney wrote @ May 14th, 2011 at 7:36 pm

    Y’know all those fingers messing my keyboard…

    Look. O’Keefe’s plan would have given us, most likely, a CEV on top of an EELV. All that was needed was a LAS and “man rating” for the EELV. The EELVs were already flying. So if you did not have to put all that cash in Ares 1 you could have put it in CEV/LAS (LAS was part of CEV btw). 4 years to put a CEV on top of an EELV? See it this way. One flight uncrewed of a capsule on top of a non man rated EELV not possible? Reminds you of anything that happened recently? In Dec 2010? Please. It was all possible. Of course they still could have cancelled the program but it would have been a lot harder to say it was a failure. A lot harder. If you assume this WH had bad intentions which I believe not.

    CCDev is ignoring BEO, for now because there is no cash for BEO, come on. You know that. You know as well that MPCV/SLS is not a solution.

    I am not sure who you are blaming for the lack of plan. Personally I blame Congress. Without cash there is no plan that will work. And Congress will not pay. Apollo like plans are a dead end. Again you give way too much importance to timeline. Until the reorg occurs there will be no timeline with this WH or any WH. And I mean any meaningful timeline.

    Yes I agree it is not clear that commercial only will make lunar or whatever BEO. That is why we still need NASA to do it. But people in Congress think they can do that with an unfunded program which will stifle any real BEO work at NASA. Congress must get out of the way OR you will never ever see a BEO program at NASA. NEVER.

    I am not arguing that NASA has the expertise for flight ops. How could I? I am not even saying that the commercials have this expertise. Actually I think they probably don’t have it, nor do they know the extent of the difficulty, for now. But they may “buy” the expertise at NASA one way or another… A smart move is to have NASA “support” the nascent commercial LEO ops, and I think they will eventually do it. All the while developing true next generation spaceship for BEO. BUT again this is not what Congress is trying to force down the throat NASA to do. I mean come on don’t you agree with that? I can’t believe you don’t see it.

    I don’t know for sure about commercials surviving a loss of crew since it is not rational and highly politicized. They should in a rational world where we happen to lose passenger acft. But… I also know that NASA is unable, at least today, to deliver either. What choice do we have? Don’t tell m increase NASA budget, your friends (?) even in the GOP won’t do it.

    Yes NACA for now (see I learn to type since then) is the better way, actually there is no other way. Wait for the new cuts to happen soon.

    Long term… Oh well…

  • I hope your palantir sees clearly and is not overly influenced by Sauron.

    The latter seems pretty unlikely to me…

  • Bob Mahoney

    cs,

    I’m not out to ‘blame’ anyone for the current lack of a long-term strategy; I’m aware that it came about due to a sequence of events & decisions across multiple administrations stemming from various motivations. I was merely indicating my dissatisfaction with its absence because a lack of direction is harmful in a number of ways, some potentially unforeseen. I described some of these in my previously referenced essay/article. As for your suggestion for ‘the culprit’, I have always found it most ironic that ‘congress’ is just another word for getting scr**ed.

    However, your later suggestion that Congress ‘get out the way’ is untenable. If the govt must be involved to any degree (and I suspect that it must be, but we need to be smart how), Congress is going to be involved. Such is the nature of the beast. The challenge to the ‘space community’ (such as we are) is to get Congress to work with us, not against us. Theoretically, this might be the best spin-off of regressing to the old NACA model… Without big rockets and flashy spaceships to sink their political teeth into, Congress folks might be content to merely know that research is going on in their districts. But I doubt it…

    As for your 4th-to-last & 3rd-to-last paragraphs, I think your typing got ahead of your thinking again. I couldn’t quite discern what you intended to say. I would agree with you (I think) that what Congress is trying to impose on NASA currently is not particularly helpful toward achieving long-range & long-term sustainable exploration beyond LEO. Like I said: the tattered entrails of Constellation…

    Gotta run.

  • common sense

    @ Bob Mahoney wrote @ May 15th, 2011 at 8:28 pm

    “Congress is going to be involved.”

    No, not necessarily. Or at least not in the way it is today, designing LV instead of NASA.

    “The challenge to the ‘space community’ (such as we are) is to get Congress to work with us, not against us.”

    That is a very good point. But so far we are nothing like a space community, we are a collage of communities, at war on LV designs, timeline and destinations. We seem to seek leadership at NASA, at the WH or even in Congress. What we really, REALLY need is leadership within our communities. We need people to come together. The only way to go about it is to look at the budget and projections for budget. Some people may want to re-run the (in)famous 90-day study and take oh may be a full year. To examine different structures, different timelines, destinations that are AFFORDABLE within said budget. Then we can go and lobby Congress to do the right thing. It will not come from any of the usual suspects I am afraid. I support commercial LEO access because I see it as a stepping stone for BEO. And I see no other solutions. Whatever else has been proposed so far, SLS/MPCV, Plymouth, HEFT are bridge to nowhere. Why don’t we stop the nonsense for once? WHY?

  • Bob Mahoney

    @cs Why don’t we stop the nonsense for once? WHY?

    Because people are people…and they always have been and always will be. As Linus once said “I LOVE humanity! It’s people I can’t stand!”

    I am currently reading a biography of Hyman G. Rickover focused on how his unforgiving and remarkably honest approach was instrumental to bringing into being not only the nuclear navy but also the nuclear industry. Most illuminating, with much wisdom in his quotations that introduce each major section. By Thomas Rockwell, someone who worked with him in the thick of it for many years.

  • Coastal Ron

    Bob Mahoney wrote @ May 14th, 2011 at 7:36 pm

    …and no, I don’t accept that all WH administrations do so, at least not to the intense degree this one does.

    The last administration was much more calculating and cohesive than the current one. I’m not saying which one is better for the country, but the last one definitely was a well-oiled political machine.

    But back to more important matters.

    And this has always been my greatest fear. Without a commitment to a roadmap to somewhere…

    If everyone could agree, then a roadmap would be easy, but there are so many opportunities out there that it’s hard to get a consensus without what I call a “national imperative”. There is no “need” for NASA to take us to the Moon, Mars or anywhere else, and the ISS is really a research outpost that survives on the perception that it is returning value (a squishy proposition in itself).

    The only funded HSF program right now is the ISS, so “dates” to anywhere else are meaningless. Cough up the money, outline the tasks, and then dates can be discussed, but before that point they are still just aspirational, which is a nice way of saying fake. Fake is not the basis for anything good.

    I’ve been a life long space and aerospace fan, and I’ve been active on this blog for close to two years. I’ve learned a lot, and here’s what I think of our chances of getting to the Moon.

    If every destination program that NASA gets funded for starts with the premise “first we build our own transportation system from Earth to our destination”, then it is doomed to fail. And that includes the VSE under a non-Constellation design. NASA’s puny budget cannot sustain major construction (rockets, spaceships, landers, etc.), concurrent major operations (ISS), and major exploration (many missions to justify the effort) at the same time. They don’t have the money, and they don’t have the political latitude to do things with the best hardware, and they don’t have the requisite management skill-sets anymore.

    The question has never been CAN we go back to the Moon. We did it 40 years ago, so we have the basic knowledge, and even better technology. The question is can we AFFORD to do it, and within the budget constraints, IS IT WORTH IT (i.e. science ROI).

    What I like about the current direction is that it encourages building blocks that have multiple uses. Commercial crew to LEO can be used for the ISS, but also any other destination in LEO, plus as a way to get exploration crew to LEO for transfer to an EDS. NASA could pay as little as $20M/astronaut to get to LEO, which is about what they would spend to study the cost effectiveness of using commercial services vs building their own rocket. Need to get 3 astronauts to LEO? Send an email saying you’re exercising your GSA Schedule contract for three seats. No politicians involved, nor mid-level bureaucrats. The lead time will be quicker too.

    Commercial cargo can get payloads to LEO, so likely all NASA will need is an EDS and the destination transportation (which could be sent ahead by commercial launchers). That reduces program costs and development leadtimes.

    When costs drop, and leadtimes shrink, the amount of time and money you need to go somewhere drops too. We see that already with Zubrin and NASA thinking out loud about possible Mars missions they could do using Falcon Heavy and Dragon. For probably $250M, NASA could send a Dragon capsule to Mars to test out a number of things, and that is the type of event (low cost, entrepreneurial-driven, new things for NASA) that drives public interest. Maybe not anymore money, since I do agree with Rand that in general the public is oblivious to what we do in space, but by driving down costs you can do more with the same money, so that’s a net increase in capabilities.

    In short, we need to concentrate on one transportation segment at a time, which right now is Earth to LEO. We already know that there is demand for crew services to LEO (NASA”s “Commercial Market Assessment for Crew and Cargo Systems” report), and the best way to sustain that demand, and create more, is to put it in place so people can try it out and see if they want to depend on it for commerce. Once that’s in place the next step will be to Lagrange/lunar orbit, which will be a lot closer and easier. Step by step.

    My $0.02

  • Bob Mahoney

    @ Coastal Ron: In short, we need to concentrate on one transportation segment at a time, which right now is Earth to LEO.

    This is precisely what we did 30-40 years ago. STS first, then space station, then beyond, all very much conceived and implemented as your preferred so-called “multiple-use building blocks”. [Read the 1969 Agnew-Mueller-Paine architecture study for a full appreciation.]

    And now we’re back where we started. Except that the “building block” vehicle designs being promised/developed today are more limited—by huge margins—in capability than the one we’re about to retire.

    Why are so many folks so certain that things will be different this time?

    Many are confident that cost will make the difference. Perhaps it will. But will the road ahead really be that much cheaper? I’m not so sure; once we fully get our hands around the new ‘commercial’ paradigm of space transportation providers and sort out the kinks lurking in the details, maybe not.

    And since we’re starting off this new paradigm with inherently more limited designs as our building blocks, I fear that our options may be even further constrained (this time for lack of technological potential and/or operational ease) than our options had been during the past two decades by economics… [But for cost the shuttle could have supported lunar return; perhaps the new providers may bring down cost, but the notion of Dragon or a close derivative thereof (offered up after one brief Earth-orbit test flight) actually getting us to Mars is laughable.]

    I do so hope that my fears are misplaced…but I’m enough of a student of history to appreciate that actual societal implementations of technology rarely follow the path defined by the hopes of the most ardent optimists among us. And even when the technologies themselves exceed wildest expectations, unintended (and sometimes painful) consequences typically temper the promises thereby bestowed.

    We shall see…

  • Bob Mahoney

    BTW, the author the The Rickover Effect is Theodore Rockwell, not Thomas Rockwell.

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