In a speech Thursday at the annual conference of the Academy of Medicine, Engineering and Science of Texas, NASA administrator Mike Griffin made a couple of resolutions for 2008. One is to ensure that Constellation remains on track in 2008 as the development of the Ares 1 launch vehicle and Orion spacecraft enter critical phases. “My considered assessment of the Constellation architecture is that we are not facing any technical showstoppers, but we must – of course – make a number of engineering design choices as we reach the preliminary design phase this year,” he said.
In the same speech, Griffin also spoke out strongly in support of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, which suffered a budget cut in the FY2008 omnibus appropriations bill and is also facing a GAO protest filed by Rocketplane Kistler as well as a Congressional mandate for a GAO study of the overall program. Griffin said that he views COTS as critical to minimizing the time that the US is dependent on Russia for access to the ISS once the shuttle is retired. “[W]e need to minimize this period of dependency, and that we need to get back into the game as soon as possible. If we cannot do that, we will have failed to lead. I find that an intolerable position for this nation.”
“For this reason,” he said, “my resolution for 2008 is to fight for the COTS program, to spur the development of U.S. commercial space transportation services to and from the International Space Station.” He added that he would seek to make up the cut made in COTS funding in 2009. “While I will of course respect the congressional direction in this year’s appropriation for NASA on COTS, I will be asking the Congress for the funds in 2009 to maintain NASA’s promised $500 million investment in the program. I hope to award contracts to U.S. companies in the coming weeks ahead, once we clear all legal challenges.”
What’s wrong in COTS (and HOW to do it BETTER) article:
http://www.ghostnasa.com/posts/020wrongcots.html
“‘“My considered assessment of the Constellation architecture is that we are not facing any technical showstoppers’â€
Griffin’s “considered assessment” is out of touch with the realities of the program. Orion still has 6,000 pounds of mass risk, of which 2,000 fall into a must-have category just to get the Ares I/Orion system to fly and fly safely.
rocketsandsuch.blogspot.com/2008/01/thats-heavy-man.html
If, after all the mass-shaving exercises this past year, that’s not a potential “techncial showstopper”, I don’t know what is.
Griffin’s “considered assessment” is also out of touch with the recent GAO report on Ares I:
rocketsandsuch.blogspot.com/2007/12/yikes-indeed.html
If issues (among others in the GAO report) like:
— a lack of “firm requirements or developed mature technologies, a preliminary design, or realistic cost estimates”;
— the “possibility that the reusable solid rocket booster heritage hardware may not meet qualification requirements given the new ascent and re-entry loads and vibration and acoustic environments associated with the Ares I”; and
— the “possibility that upper stage subsystems will not meet the Constellation program’s requirements for human rating unless the Constellation program grants waivers to failure tolerance requirements”,
Do not represent potential “technical showstoppers”, I don’t know what does.
“‘my resolution for 2008 is to fight for the COTS program… I will be asking the Congress for the funds in 2009 to maintain NASA’s promised $500 million investment in the program.’â€
It’s a nice resolution, but it’s too little, too late. With all the recent changes in the program and the importance of FY 2008 as the Bush Administration’s last real budget, Griffin & Co. needed to be on the ball this past year in terms of keeping Congress informed and lobbied on COTS.
FY 2009 is a lame duck budget because the next President has to operate under it and thus will make changes to it upon coming into office. Given that, Griffin is going to have a very steep hill to climb with Congress, unfortunately for COTS.
It’s also important to note that the FY 2009 budget request is not out yet. Thus, it’s unclear whether OMB and the White House even support Griffin’s call to restore the FY 2008 COTS cut in FY 2009. Griffin may be speaking out of school and making promises that he can’t keep.
FWIW…
Clarification request: Does anyone have an opinion on what, if anything, Congress’ actions on COTS may have on the existing SpaceX contract?
— Donald
Anonymous, if you give up so easy just due to a little last-minute Congressional language, I’m glad you’re not in charge. It is hardly “too little, too late” for COTS; in fact, since Mike instituted the program, this is the first true political bump it’s run into. Hell, politically, most rides should be that smooth!
I am also comforted that Mike realizes that in the limited time he (likely) has left, he needs to just have a couple of things he focuses on; not a long list.
If I limit myself to one specific comment, it is this: I am concerned that there might be a conflict (in either Mike’s mind, or those around him) in terms of the upcoming COTS 1.5 selection, between his two stated goals for the year: Ares-I, and fully recovering the COTS program. But thought of correctly, Ares I and COTS should be thought of as complementary – and it concerns me they may not be.
Since I’m not involved in COTS – which is just as well, since if I was, I couldn’t talk about it – I don’t know the details of most of what has been proposed by the 8 candidates. However, my understanding is that most represent a significant shift towards realism from those that were proposed in 2006 (skipping the Soyuz option for several reasons). In 2006 most depended on not only developing brand new crew and cargo vehicles, but new launch vehicles as well. In 2008 the shift towards proposals using already existing launch vehicles, such as Atlas 5 and Delta IV, takes well over 50% of the risk out of most of the proposals. In addition, some outfits, like SpaceDev, have continued to refine their proposals the past two years; with SpaceDev saying it has cut thousands of pounds of weight out of the DreamChaser mini-shuttle and done many other refinements.
The greatest need post-2010 is not for cargo delivery to the ISS; there will be several, competing options to handle that, only one of which will be controlled by Vladmir Putin. The greatest need is for a (relatively) low-tech human taxi to and from LEO, where until 2015 (and billions of dollars) we the US have (incompetently) put ourself in dependency to a single, non-democratic, arbitrary-acting government. That’s where we need something sooner, not later; something that adds a choice and flexibility to the mix, a flexibility we already will have in unmanned cargo transport.
If someone within NASA perceives that using COTS 1.5 to fund one of these lower-risk, EELV-based crew transport options would reflect badly on Ares I, it would, in my personal view, be a major mistake. In can be sold as just the opposite. Ares I is a very expensive, drawn-out program to create what is, essentially, a new man-rated booster; costing several billiion dollars, and not available for years. Using money that is not ‘new’ to Congress, via COTS, to try to have a second option, using existing, already-paid for boosters, to have that basic taxi service available sooner at cheaper dollars, can be sold to Congress as excellent insurance, with no requests for new money in the process. I also think GAO would look favorably on it. And it would show Congress – and the next Administration – that NASA is being more flexible than it is traditionally given credit for.
If – on the other hand – the perceived ‘Dark Side’ of NASA said internally that EELV can not be seen to compete with Ares I – no matter what, no thinking allowed – it will not only be confirming a perceived NASA ‘business as usual’ approach of protecting their own in-house concepts at all costs; it would also be a conscious decision to not do our best to decrease the gap. It would no longer be the Congress’ and the Administration’s fault for what’s happened; it would now be our fault. We would have had a choice that could potentially mitigate national risk, open up options, and create an industry faster – and we would, for internal stubborness reasons, have not taken it.
Existing launchers are not our enemy; handled well, they can be the Exploration program’s friends.
so far, there is NOT an EELV able to carry up to 30 mT (like the Ares-1) and up to 130 mT (like the Ares-5) to LEO, so, where is the competition?
the only problem is that both Ares will never fly in their current design:
http://www.ghostnasa.com/posts/012arescantfly.html
the Falcon 9 is NOT an alternative for ESAS rockets, since:
1. it’s max payload is less than 10 mT max (vs. the Ares-1 30 mT)
2. it’s first stage has 9 engines, so, will be not easy to man-rate: if just ONE engine will fail, the full mission aborts
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9
“Clarification request: Does anyone have an opinion on what, if anything, Congress’ actions on COTS may have on the existing SpaceX contract?”
There should be no impact to Space-X. There’s enough money left in the FY 2008 COTS budget to cover the Space-X milestones. The question is to what extent the cut limits the viable bidders for the Kistler slot, and to what extent their milestones get slowed down (and consequent impacts to the gap).
FWIW…
“Anonymous, if you give up so easy just due to a little last-minute Congressional language, I’m glad you’re not in charge.”
Huh? Where did I write that I “give up” on COTS?
What I wrote was that Griffin & Co. will have a “steep hill” to climb in FY 2009, given that it’s a lame duck budget year, and it would have been better if they should have been “on the ball” in FY 2008.
I’d also point out that there’s more at stake than just a last-minute change in omnibus language. Tens of millions of dollars were taken out of the program, which will either limit the viable competitors for the Kistler slot or delay their milestones (or both). If I was a betting man, I would bet that efforts in FY 2009 will be “too little, too late” to restore the COTS money, again, given that it’s a lame duck budget year.
“in fact, since Mike instituted the program”
Although the first COTS selections were made under Griffin’s watch, the program’s inception goes back to Steidle’s team. Griffin actually cut the budget in half compared to what they were planning to spend.
Don’t get me wrong, I give credit to Griffin for coming out fighting for COTS now. But the program didn’t start with him, he and his team took their eyes off the ball in FY 2008, and I wouldn’t give them good odds for getting the money back in FY 2009.
FWIW…
“gm”, there are a couple of wrong assumptions here, I think:
so far, there is NOT an EELV able to carry up to 30 mT (like the Ares-1) and up to 130 mT (like the Ares-5) to LEO, so, where is the competition?
What is needed to close the gap is not an exact clone to desired Ares-I capability. That would essentially be trying to copy a non-economic, government-designed, government-owned and operated vehicle whose basic raison d’etre was to support moon and Mars missions. What is instead needed is preferably something unrelated to Ares-I systems, technologies used, and government-centric business plan; and see if current systems can be modified and made much more economic for reliable and safe up and down LEO transport. That may mean ‘only’ 3 or 4 true passenger capability up and down for each one; who knows. If the price and reliability are right – it would be a great addition to the toolbox, and probably sooner, and cheaper, than trying to duplicate kg for kg a government system. That isn’t the need.
You’re off on another subject with the Ares-V heavy-lift launch vehicle. Even Elon Musk has made clear that a true HLLV, at any point in time, needs to be the province of governments – ‘because there is no way to make something that only flies once or twice a year, but is very expensive, truly economical’. I compare HLLV capability at any given time to something like current supercomputer capability: the latest and greatest always needs to be jump-started by government. Ten or twenty years later, if markets can be developed, the private sector can put that capability on our desktop – while the government goes on to breaking ground on the next level up.
the Falcon 9 is NOT an alternative for ESAS rockets, since:
…………..2. it’s first stage has 9 engines, so, will be not easy to man-rate: if just ONE engine will fail, the full mission aborts
I wasn’t talking about a brand-new, commercially-developed launch vehicle (and engines, and….). I’m glad Elon and his (ever-growing) band exists, and is trying something new and radical (and it is radical, considering how many people are not involved, how much money is not involved, the customers they’ve already accumulated, etc). Elon – like most of the 2006 COTS competitors, is trying to do anything; and it looks like NASA made the right guess as to which of all those folks who were trying to do it all (ie, new engines, new launch vehicles, new cargo modules, new crew modules, etc. ) actually might be able to bring off the impossible and successfully do it all. The gist of my right-up was that it is good for the rest of us – and for NASA – that in COTS 1.5 the most of those other players have gotten a lot more real apparently and not trying to re-invent each and every wheel that is needed.
One last thought: the market is not just the ISS here. Any commercial entity that can be brought to bear sooner, rather than later, will be able to fill the gaping need that Bigelow is now challenged with as well. It is conceivable that properly done, any such winner would be able to turn itself into the dominant force in LEO human transportation for years to come.
HUNTSMAN said:
The greatest need post-2010 is not for cargo delivery to the ISS; there will be several, competing options to handle that, only one of which will be controlled by Vladmir Putin. The greatest need is for a (relatively) low-tech human taxi to and from LEO, where until 2015 (and billions of dollars) we the US have (incompetently) put ourself in dependency to a single, non-democratic, arbitrary-acting government.
Dear Mr. Huntsman.
I respectfully disagree.
We already have a proven alternative to the Shuttle for ISS crew transfer/return. Yes, it is from Russia, but at least it exists and it is proven. Putin is an idiot, but if not for the Russians and the Soyuz/Progress, the ISS may have ceased to exist.
On top of that, we are financing two alternative crew systems (Orion and Dragon). Dragon will be financed if SpaceX succeeds at cargo.
However, there is something important for which there are NO backup to the Shuttle –> external unpressurized cargo.
This may be why external unpressurized cargo is “Option A” for COTS.
After the Shuttle goes away, there is no proven backup that can deliver unpressurized cargo to the ISS. The HTV is being developed by Japan — but it will not show up for some time (at best), and it is not proven. And even if the HTV succeeds, it is quite limited (volumetrically) in what it can deliver to the ISS.
Some relevant statements from the ISS Safety Task Force Report from a year ago, which talk about the criticality of external unpressurized cargo at ISS.
PAGE 56: the ULF {Unpressurized Logistics Flight} flights are at risk if the Shuttle is unable to fly all the planned flights by the planned Shuttle retirement date of September 2010. Four Shuttle flights per year are required to fly the planned manifest, which is a reasonable flight rate if no major problems are encountered that cause launch delays (ref. Section 5.3).
AND
PAGE 56: If productive operations cannot be restored through other cargo delivery means, the Station might have to be abandoned before NASA can complete its research objectives and obligations to the IPs. Even with alternative cargo delivery systems, other means to launch external spares may not be available.
AND
PAGE 58: “The ISS currently relies on the Shuttle exclusively to launch external components. Neither the Soyuz nor the Progress has this capability. While the European ATV and Japanese HTV will add necessary pressurized logistics capacity, only the HTV provides external cargo capabilities via its external pallet. However, thus far JAXA has routinely stated that it only intends to make two HTVs per year due to manufacture and launch restrictions. The number of HTVs required per year to meet the external cargo needs (four) may therefore exceed the JAXA produc-tion capacity.”
In reviewing the ISS Safety Task Force Report, I see did not see ANY statement that financing a new crew transport system via COTS was a critical, let alone, an important NASA need. If I am wrong, please give me a reference.
However, the ISS Safety Task Force Report did say (Recommendation 5.2.1 a.)
If a proven logistics support system is not available, the Program should commit to the future capability that is determined to have the highest chance of success until emerging capabilities are proven.
Based upon reading the specific recommendations of this ISS Safety report, they they clearly put a premium on picking the future LOGISTICS system that has the highest chance of success, and do not consider picking another crew system to be a priority … at all.
FWIW,
COTS friend
Great news from Mike Griffin about Ares I and Orion!
Jeff Hanley and Rick Gilbrech also reported 10 Dec 2007 that mass margins for Orion’s Lunar and ISS mission are closed. Ares I has good reserves for both missions. Both projects have passed SDR and have started preliminary design.
Many of the COTS space acts agreements are progressing too each with a different system. Watch out for Constellation Services/ULA’s elegant solution.
Oops correction: Ares I has passed SRR and is planned for SDR this summer, all contracts have been awarded for its development.
To GM, get your facts straight:
“the Falcon 9 is NOT an alternative for ESAS rockets, since:
1. it’s max payload is less than 10 mT max (vs. the Ares-1 30 mT)
2. it’s first stage has 9 engines, so, will be not easy to man-rate: if just ONE engine will fail, the full mission aborts
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9
You didn’t include the F9Heavy lift version which lifts 27500 Kg or 60,500 pounds or 30 tons, You are wrong. You could say the delta IV can’t lift X amount if you do not include the Delta IV heavy version.
You are wrong, the F9 DOES support engine out.
“Falcon 9 has nine Merlin engines clustered together. This vehicle will be capable of sustaining an engine failure at any point in flight and still successfully completing its mission. This actually results in an even higher level of reliability than a single engine stage. The SpaceX nine engine architecture is an improved version of the architecture employed by the Saturn V and Saturn I rockets of the Apollo Program, which had flawless flight records despite losing engines on a number of mission.”
http://www.spacex.com/falcon9.php
You really should read up on this BEFORE you post incorrect facts to support your incorrect conclusions.
If you dug even deeper you would know SpaceX is also developing the merlin II engine that will be apace to the F1 used on the Saturn V.
“In addition to the Falcon 9, SpaceX has announced plans for the development of the Merlin 2 engine, a scale version of a larger F-1-class engine to be developed in the future. The company is rumored to be working on a very large rocket to accompany the F-1-class engine, known by the codename “BFR” (Big Falcon Rocket). In the past, Musk has said “Long-term plans call for development of a heavy lift product and even a super-heavy, if there is customer demand.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX
Vladislaw
“Great news from Mike Griffin about Ares I and Orion!”
What is the “great news from Mike Griffin”? There’s no quote or other information from Griffin in your post.
“Jeff Hanley and Rick Gilbrech also reported 10 Dec 2007 that mass margins for Orion’s Lunar and ISS mission are closed.”
The only Hanley or Gilbrech references from that date that I can find involve budget and schedule (add http://www):
.moondaily.com/reports/NASA_on_target_for_return_to_the_moon_by_2020_officials_999.html
I can’t find anything from Hanley or Gilbrech from that date about mass margins. Can you provide a reference?
I’d also note that only nine days later, Hanley was quoted as saying that there had been no decision about Orion’s landing mode (land versus water — again, add http://www):
.space.com/businesstechnology/071219-techwed-orion-landing.html
It’s hard to see how Orion’s mass margins could be closed with such large design decisions outstanding.
I’d also note that there are recent reports that Orion still has 6,000 pounds of mass outstanding in various risk categories, of which 2,000 pounds is in the highest risk category, meaning that it’s critical for Orion to fly and fly safely (add http://):
rocketsandsuch.blogspot.com/2008/01/thats-heavy-man.html
This would mean that Orion is still overweight to the tune of at least 2,000 pounds (or Ares I is underpowered to the tune of 2,000 pounds of payload).
“Ares I has good reserves for both missions.”
Do you have a reference?
The General Accounting Office’s (GAO’s) December report on Ares I noted multiple mass issues, among many other technical issues (again add http://):
science.house.gov/publications/requested_reports_detail.aspx?NewsID=2044
Here’s a couple of the relevant quotes on mass issues from the report:
“Both the Orion and Ares I vehicles have a history of weight and mass growth, and NASA is still defining the mass, loads, and weight requirements for both vehicles.â€
“a design analysis cycle completed in May 2007 revealed an unexpected increase in ascent loads (the physical strain on the spacecraft during launch) that could result in increases to the weight of the Orion vehicle and both stages of the Ares I.â€
There’s a more complete accounting of all of Ares I’s technical woes from the GAO report here (add http://):
rocketsandsuch.blogspot.com/2007/12/yikes-indeed.html
“Watch out for Constellation Services/ULA’s elegant solution.”
CSI is partnered with Loral in the second round of COTS. See (add http://www):
.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5329
FWIW…
Mmmmm……is the Falcon 9 being put together by the same folks who built Falcon 1, which was declared “operational” after only two launches, neither of which placed anything into orbit?
Can you explain how something can be operational with that track record? And what the basis of the hope that the larger Falcon 9 will succeed?
Also, where does Griffin expect to find money for COTS, given how the economy is tanking (reducing federal revenues) and Bush’s determination to cut taxes as part of a stimulus program no matter how both of these things will drive up the national debt?
Discuss please.
MESSIER: Also, where does Griffin expect to find money for COTS, given how the economy is tanking (reducing federal revenues) and Bush’s determination to cut taxes as part of a stimulus program no matter how both of these things will drive up the national debt?
Doug,
Not every bit of news is an excuse to attack the Bush Administration. Keep it up, and you will start getting lumped with Whittington.
FYI, NASA has a $17 billion annual budget. Griffin’s promise was to get the COTS budget back on track with its FY2009 budget request, which will come out in a few weeks. The amount of money needed to make the COTS budget whole is small compared to NASA’s overall budget. The amount of money needed by COTS to make it whole is in the noise compared to that giant sucking sound heard coming from Ares 1.
So it is not that hard for him to keep his promise.
– Al
Lumped in with Whittington, eh? Well, Whoa! That could keep me up at night. I guess it’s OK by me, but I’m figuring Mark’s probably insulted to be lumped in with me. You may owe him an apology. We’ll have to see what he says.
I’m not getting much from this answer, aside that NASA is a small part of the overall U.S. budget and that COTS is a small part of that small part. This seems to be standard argument for funding the space agency, but it doesn’t always work. But since Griffin’s main pledge is to make a “budget request” for adequate funding, I guess you’re right in his ability to keep that promise no matter what the actual funding down the road.